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I.—COLLEGIATE EDUCATION FOR GIRLS.

THOSE who have been sufficiently interested in the cause of feminine education to observe the movements which have from time to time been made in its interest, will remember that, more than a year ago, a meeting was held in the city of New York, under the auspices of the American Woman's Educational Association, to take into consideration the educational and industrial wants of American girls. The secretary of the Association presented a report, in which it was represented that woman's natural vocation as house-keeper and "prime minister of the family state," requires a much more thorough and extensive education than most women possess; that great numbers are suffering for want of employment, which proficiency in the domestic arts would readily supply; that education of the particular kind required ought to be provided for in colleges having professorships of the various departments of domestic science, which should be as well endowed and as remunerative as the professorships of the higher branches of learning in colleges for young men. It was further represented that the graduates of such institutions would be fully qualified to administer the various duties of the household and of "woman's profession" generally; that the domestic arts themselves, by being thus made the subjects of special collegiate study and instruction, would become honorable and popular; that women would thus become more capable and useful, and their industry

more remunerative in consequence; in a word, that the measure proposed would be the most suitable and available method of raising thousands of suffering women from the helpless, hopeless, miserable condition in which more and more, in the progress of our peculiar civilization, they are placed.

We refer to this report, made by one of the most sensible of American women, and herself a prominent educator, because of its correct appreciation of the general sphere of woman in reference to her industrial capacity, its thorough appreciation of the dignity and importance of her proper vocation, and its implied estimate of the trouble which is inevitable to the present generally prevalent disposition to neglect and despise it.

We can not, however, assent so cordially to the method it proposes. There can, we believe, be no doubt that the degradation of domestic employments, through the prevalence of false social tendencies and false ideals of life, is a source of incalculable evil to American women; but our opinion as to the proper means of correcting this evil, and of the general educational wants of American girls, differs from that suggested in the report above referred to.

Our grandmothers were tolerable professors of the various departments of domestic economy, though they possessed but a tithe of the strictly scientific information which young ladies of the present day may readily acquire in any respectable school, or even at their own firesides. Indeed, there is so much that is practical in woman's natural, proper vocation as housekeeper and wife, so much that women of all ages have had to do and have succeeded in doing, and so little occasion for the application of scientific information beyond that which is within easy reach of any young lady of ordinary capacity and intelligence, that we are not entirely confident of the propriety of making this vocation the basis of extensive theoretical study in the college course, however admirable and desirable the practical study of it may be in the household. And we doubt still further, whether domestic duties can ever be rendered exceedingly popular, merely through the appearance of honor and respectability which collegiate study might throw around them. These duties, indeed need no borrowed plumage of respectability. It is only necessary that they should be justly estimated in their own proper dignity and importance. They are in themselves eminently respectable and

honorable. In no other field of effort can woman do so much for herself, or for the general progress of the race. The man whose domestic affairs are well conducted, whose daily home necessities are well supplied by the careful ministrations of a faithful, capable, loving wife or daughter, has double the efficiency for his proper work in life, whatever that may be, that he can have if he lives under the domestic conditions which seem to be most in order in American households of the present day. And his wife or daughter will unquestionably do more for him, and for every purpose toward which his efforts may be directed, if, by her careful ministries, her faithful sympathy and counsel, she constantly recruits his strength and inspires him with courage for his daily encounter with the difficulties and duties of external life, than if, turning him over with herself and the family to the care of incapable and unfaithful servants, she goes forth to assist him in his proper work, or devotes herself to the task of representing and maintaining his social respectability according to the standards of modern fashionable life.

So far, indeed, from domestic employments being degrading or dishonorable, they are rather that upon which the honor of woman most essentially depends. It is only in her proper sphere of the household duties that woman is a daily necessity to man, a *helpmeet for him* that is suited to his needs. Here woman is always wanted; here she can always prove herself in the highest degree useful and necessary, whatever may be said of her in other positions. And if the wife abandons the sphere in which she can best assist her husband, and add most to his efficiency and strength, to become an expensive ornamental appendage instead, then the husband is less dependent upon her than upon his servant-girl, and the latter really occupies the most honorable and responsible position of the two. In the sphere of domestic duty, man can not dispense with the assistance of woman; and if she will resume the position in which she is most necessary and useful to man, her recognized importance will be proportioned to her usefulness and helpfulness, and her honor commensurate with her capacity to bless. But in other relations man *can* and *does* dispense with the assistance of woman; nay, in many instances, he must. In fact, some of the ugliest of our social problems owe their ugliness to the fact that woman, except in the lower classes, has so generally abandoned her natural, original, heaven-appointed, useful, and

honorable position, to become an expensive and unprofitable ornament which few young men can afford to support or possess. So that in her assumption of a fancied respectability, she is really bringing her sex to dishonor. She has elevated her ladyship, only to the essential degradation of her womanhood.

For what that is weak and helpless and feeble and useless can retain respect in a world where industry is a constant and daily necessity, in comparison with the heathful and helpful strong? Verily, we need a sense of chivalry higher than has ever yet been attained, if all women are to become "*ladies*," and so far helpless and expensive, instead of industrious and helpful. And it is a significant commentary upon the progress of this tendency, that one of the wisest and most sensible of our female educators is obliged to cast about her for some artificial inducement by which to coax women back to the common, original, divinely-appointed duties of the sex. Most assuredly, women can only dishonor themselves by despising their proper vocation, and it will yet appear that their essential honor is inevitably conditioned upon their usefulness and helpfulness in the sphere and relation which God has assigned them.

But it is not to be inferred, from these facts, that our efforts in the higher education of girls should be directed to the acquisition of household accomplishments. Such a course would be as impracticable as it is unnecessary. The best attainment in domestic science will be reached, only through an actual experience of domestic duties and cares—through a habit and practice commencing in childhood, and continuing with the growth, as part of the routine of daily life. Thus domestic proficiency will be the natural concomitant, and, as it were, the substantial groundwork of the intellectual education; and it is only thus that the strength and practical efficiency will be developed which is necessary to the successful management of household affairs, and which can also be transferred, as occasion may require, to the school or college, or to any other sphere of useful and honorable effort.

We have already expressed our opinion of the narrowness and insufficiency of utilitarian ideas of education in general, and we see no occasion to make any exception in reference to the vocation of woman. The woman is superior even to the housekeeper or nurse, or to any other occupation in which she can engage, however important such

occupations may be as the means of her usefulness and the foundation of her influence and honor. *We should aim, therefore, to educate the woman*; and, aside from a proficiency in the common duties of domestic life, which she will acquire only by practice, the education we should aim to give her should be liberal rather than special, even if she expects to pursue some special occupation or profession afterward.

In regard to the question, What kind of liberal education is best for young ladies? there is doubtless room for a considerable variation in details, according to the different circumstances and tastes of individuals; but the general outline of the educational scheme will ultimately be determined by our estimate of what constitutes the proper excellence of the feminine character. The course to be pursued will vary in one direction or another, according to our ideas of what woman is, and what, in the progress of society, she ought to become. This is the principle which has thus far ruled in this department of educational effort, and which, whether consciously or not, must doubtless continue to direct all our efforts for the advanced education of girls.

But widely different views of the sphere and capacity of woman are at the present time entertained in this country; and these differences are naturally answered by corresponding differences in our theories of feminine culture. The two extreme or representative theories and tendencies in this field we may properly notice in this place. The first, or that which is at present the most prevalent and popular, may be properly denominated the ornamental theory. It rests upon the conviction, tacitly implied, that the young girl is to become not a useful, helpful, intelligent woman, but more especially a "lady;" not the cheerful seconder and ready assistant of her husband, but rather his joy and his pride; not the stay and comfort of home, but the ornament of society, which she will bless with her smiles and graces and the charm of her accomplishments. She is not to help, but to be helped; not to serve, but to be served; and really has not much need of substantial or useful qualities, either of body or mind. In fact, any noticeable prominence of such qualities, and especially any efficient exercise of them, would almost be regarded, according to this standard, as unladylike and unrefined. It is, of course, needless to specify the kind of education which such a

theory of woman requires, farther than to say that it values substantial mental attainments far less than the more specious accomplishments, and that the moral graces, according to the same estimate, are suffered to fall far below those arts by which personal attractions may be most effectively displayed.

The other system, or tendency, is by no means as popular nor so well established as that above noticed; but it is distinctly marked, and derives considerable importance from influences which are constantly working in its favor. It is based upon a theory of woman's sphere and capacity which is akin to the so-called doctrine of woman's rights. This theory supposes that, if woman is not quite the equal of man in intellectual power, her present presumed degree of inferiority, at least, is in great measure attributable to the prescribed disabilities and want of opportunity under which she has labored. She only needs educational advantages equal to those enjoyed by the opposite sex, to do and become what no one has ever suspected her capable of before. She will not only adorn society by her charms and graces, but she will contribute her full share to the solution of its difficult problems, and compel our admiration of her intellect and genius. Her various gifts and capacities will, when fairly developed, compare favorably with the corresponding qualities in man. She will be at least almost his peer in independent power, and his superior in natural refinement and grace.

The advocates of this theory would give to girls the benefit of what is termed a thorough collegiate education, either side by side with their brothers, or in institutions established expressly for them. The minds of girls, they say, should be disciplined and strengthened precisely like those of young men. The course of study should be extensive and thorough, including the solid and substantial as well as the ornamental branches. Girls are as intelligent as boys—often surpass them in the common-school or academy. Why, then, should we send the boy to college, and stop the girl abruptly in the course in which she promises such success, or merely give her accomplishments to make her personally attractive at the expense of intelligence and intellectual power?

In practice, the two theories and tendencies above noticed are, to a considerable extent, intermingled; or, rather, there exist other and less distinctly defined theories and tendencies intermediate between them.

It is not our present purpose to discuss any theory of woman's sphere or capacity, or any corresponding educational tendency. We shall, in fact, find ourselves relieved from the necessity of such discussion by the obtrusive presence of those alarming facts relative to the health of our women, whose significance was considered in a previous paper. It is doubtless to the false ideal of life implied in the ornamental theory of woman, and the natural effort to realize it, that the present physical weakness of woman in the United States is to be mainly attributed; and any encouragement of this theory, or the educational tendency which it begets, would be simply to urge her the faster on the road of extermination. It is true that we should understand and take to heart the truth that "*ladies*," according to the prevalent signification of the term, never were, and never can be, the mothers of a vigorous race. American women ought to be gentlewomen, in the essential significance of the word; but the highest worth and honor of the sex is lost whenever the woman disappears in the lady. If being or becoming a lady implies a fancied or assumed elevation at the expense of majorities of the sex, or the repudiation of the natural conditions and ordinary duties of life, it were better that the term should be altogether forgotten. It is indeed the only word applying to any portion of the American people in which the aristocratic idea is thoroughly ingrained. There are no lords or nobles among our men; but nearly all our women are "*ladies*," or are striving to reach that fancied elevation. Let American girls become gentlewomen; but relinquish the bad ambition of becoming ladies, farther than the latter may strictly and properly replace the former.

We shall find, further, that the second theory of female education, above noticed, is forbidden by considerations similar to those which condemn the first; namely, the limitations of physical health. It by no means follows, because the girl can learn as fast as the boy at school, that the young lady can safely perform as much intellectual labor as the young man. There is not the same difference between the boy and the girl that there is between the young woman and young man as they approach physical maturity, and begin to assume the characteristic qualities of the respective sexes.

At ten years of age, the girl will often run as fast and as far as her brother at the same time of life; and whatever difference there

may be in his favor in capacity and endurance, is fully compensated by a superior quickness of apprehension on her part, in such studies as boys and girls usually pursue in school. But in studies of the gymnastic order, which enter so largely, and properly too, into the collegiate course for young men, there is no comparison between the respective capacities of the young woman and young man. There is, doubtless, a practical difference of texture between her brain and his, corresponding to that which distinguishes the two systems generally. The one is firm and tough, the other sensitive and delicate; the one grows stronger and firmer by exercise, the other would be irritated and enfeebled by the same process continued to a similar extent. How absurd, then, to talk of giving girls the "benefit" of the same course of study as that by which young men develop and discipline their intellectual powers, as in a kind of intellectual gymnasium! It would be just as sensible to train girls in the same course of physical gymnastics, in the expectation of making them as strong physically, or to subject them to the same thorough military drill, in the hope that they would endure the hardships of war as well, and meet its dangers as calmly. For the mental and nervous system of the young lady, no more than the muscles of her body, can endure the severe and protracted tension which the young man is capable of, without danger of ruinous exhaustion.

We should therefore be exceedingly careful how much of this drill and gymnasium work we admit into the curriculum for young ladies. Woman does not need, and can not by any possibility acquire, a strength like that of men, either in her physical or mental capacities. She may, indeed, surpass him in qualities not less excellent and admirable; but strength is clearly not one of her peculiar gifts.

We are aware that a course of study, corresponding in some degree to the usual college curriculum for young men, has sometimes been pursued by young ladies with apparent success, though doubtless with less thoroughness and completeness than is required of candidates for degrees in our established colleges. But there is danger that even this success should cost vastly too much. The woman is sometimes, in a sense, sacrificed to the scholar, or rather to the pedant; and the result is a petulant, critical sharpness, instead of the breadth of intellect which characterizes the educated

man, or the refined and appreciative intelligence of the cultured woman.

The proportion of unmarried women seems to be unusually large among those who have had the "benefit" of severe courses of study. The intellectual effort may doubtless be carried so far as to exhaust the sources upon which the natural grace and attractiveness of the woman depend. We believe, indeed, that few young ladies, with their eyes fairly open to the probable consequences, would care to undertake what would be esteemed a thorough collegiate course for young men, even if the danger to the physical health were far less than it actually is, and must be. But to insist upon such a severe standard in the present enfeebled condition of the health of our women, and in view of the serious possibilities therewith involved, would be a folly which it would be scarcely possible to exceed.

If, therefore, we shall pay a due regard to the demands of woman's physical life—to indications which, under existing circumstances, it would be little less than madness to neglect—we shall find that the discussion as to the kind of liberal education which young ladies ought to receive, is brought within comparatively narrow limits. For it is the substantial integrity of the physical womanhood which is to give significance and value to any education which woman can receive. Such a womanhood must at all events be preserved, or, if necessary, restored; for without it, the graces of culture are but emptiness and mockery. We must not suffer the foundation to be undermined while we are attempting to raise the superstructure. Abandoning, then, any favorite theories of feminine education which we may be disposed to entertain, let us consider what are the limits assigned to our efforts by the laws of nature and by positive and indisputable facts; remembering that the question is not what would best suit our fancy, but what we can actually accomplish—what we can safely attempt, and with reasonable hopes of success.

We have already expressed our opinion of the difference between woman and man, in respect to mental power and endurance. Indeed, it requires but the commonest and most casual observation to discover that there is a general difference in the brain and nerve-force of the sexes, in respect both to quantity and quality, corresponding to the difference in physical structure and muscular development. In man, the cerebral and nervous systems are strong, steady, and

comparatively unimpressible. In woman, they are fine and delicate, responding to the slightest impressions. The nerves of men are often so strong and steady that they are scarcely conscious that they have nerves at all; women seem as frequently to be all nerves; and the brain and nerve-force in woman generally is unquestionably more delicate and impressible, and, in consequence, more easily exhausted than in man.

Her mental capacities are inevitably determined by these conditions. She is quick to receive impressions, to perceive, to appreciate, and makes rapid progress where success depends mainly upon these qualities; but she is decidedly unequal to man in such pursuits as require close and long-continued application. She will tire sooner of any severe mental exertion, and man will continue to perform intellectual feats which she will be utterly unable to imitate.

The deductions of reason and the testimony of experience seem, therefore, alike to indicate that a decided difference should be made in the amount of intellectual labor required of the different sexes as they approach maturity. It is probable that two-thirds of the proper intellectual work of the young man, or two lessons per day instead of three, is all that the young lady can successfully accomplish or safely attempt in her collegiate course. The rest of her available time should be so disposed as to restore and refresh rather than exhaust the mental capacity.

Again: the period which nature has assigned for the special effort of education is much more limited in the case of the young lady than in that of the young man, by the fact of her more rapid physical and mental maturity. The young lady is often as mature at twenty as the young man at twenty-five, and there is an average difference between the sexes in this respect of at least three years; and this difference, pertaining principally to that period of life in which the effort for advanced education is to be made, should of course be met by special provision in the educational scheme.

There are evident reasons why the special effort for the education of young ladies should not, at least in a majority of instances, be protracted beyond the ages of twenty-one to twenty-three years—certainly not to twenty-five or thirty, as they may well enough be in the case of the young man.

Physical womanhood is a matter of such imperative importance

among us, and it has come also to rest on such a precarious foundation, that it should never be sacrificed in the interest of mere scholarship. It should rather be preserved in its freshness and vigor; and truer education for the mature young woman will generally come in the ordering of nature and providence than can be given her in the college. She should not, therefore, be defrauded of the "unreturning spring-time" of her life by a too assiduous or too protracted devotion to merely scholastic pursuits. But, notwithstanding these limitations and disabilities, we may still secure for our daughters a high order of intellectual culture, if we make a wise disposition of the resources at command, and carefully improve the opportunities which exist.

It should be remembered that, in the true theory of woman's education, the gymnastic development of original intellectual power is not the prevailing idea. Our aim should be rather the cultivation of taste, appreciation, intelligence, and practical skill. It by no means follows, because woman is naturally inferior to man in independent intellectual power—the power which pursues original investigations and makes exhaustive researches, which classifies facts and devises conclusions, which discovers and demonstrates principles and invents machines—that we should endeavor to make up for her by education what she lacks by nature.

If a person is found deficient in musical talent, we do not take extra pains to make him an accomplished musician on that account. It is generally thought to be wiser to develop such talent as he may have, and to expect musical proficiency only of those who have natural ability for music. And, surely, in distinctions as broad and fundamental as those which distinguish the sexes, the indications of natural capacity and adaptation are by no means to be neglected. In arranging a collegiate course for young ladies, therefore, we may omit, as unnecessary and inappropriate, a large amount of work properly belonging to the course for young men, the chief object of which is gymnastic discipline; and the time and strength thus saved may be devoted to more appropriate ends.

It is generally admitted that woman is naturally superior to man in taste, appreciation, refinement, memory, and quickness of apprehension. This fact not only indicates the general direction which should be given to her educational efforts, but these faculties, if

properly improved, will do much to compensate the disadvantage under which she labors in other respects. She will learn with remarkable facility whatever is fairly presented to her mind, though she can not investigate and demonstrate and collect and arrange for herself. It is for man to discover, examine, prove; it is for woman to perceive, appreciate, accept. All experience shows that the mind of woman is not adapted to do pioneer work. She can not solve the difficult problems of philosophy or science, though she may surpass man in her enthusiastic appreciation of truths fairly revealed, and in her ready acquisition of knowledge that is brought within the range of her comprehension.

Man must prepare the way for her, and make smooth the rough places. She can keep pace with him in the ennobling but arduous pursuits of advanced learning, only as she leans on his arm and is supported by his strength. She inspires him with new courage, and prompts him to nobler achievement by her sympathy and helplessness, her appreciation and refinement and taste; and these are the qualities which he most needs and prizes in woman. It is better, therefore, that her education should be so directed as to develop her proper capacities and gifts, rather than be perverted into an attempt to make her more like man; and instead of those studies whose object is chiefly the development of original intellectual power, she may limit her efforts to those which are adapted to increase her intelligence, improve her appreciation, refine her taste, and develop her practical skill. She will acquire in these a mental discipline adapted to her sphere and capacity, and sufficient for all her needs. In the other course, she could appear only as second rate, never as the equal of man. Her success would be difficult and doubtful, imperfect and unsatisfactory, at best; and would probably be achieved only to the prejudice of her womanly nature, the disparagement of her most valuable gifts and graces, and the neglect of the most important functions of her life. We should, however, be careful to guard against the error of substituting the merely showy and ornamental for the disciplinary and gymnastic. The one course is as enervating and demoralizing as the other is wearisome and exhausting. Our aim should be culture rather than ornament; the substantial instead of the severe; the education of woman as she is, and in the sphere and capacity which nature has assigned her, and not attempt to raise

her above, or to turn her aside from, the proper duties and functions of her sex.

We can indicate but a brief outline of the course of study which, in accordance with the above ideas, it seems desirable that young ladies should pursue in that department of their education which corresponds to the collegiate course of young men. There will, of course, be room for considerable variation in detail, though the same fundamental principle be observed.

For our own part, we regard a considerable knowledge of the Latin language as almost the first and most important element of liberal culture, whether for women or men. There seems, indeed, to be no branch of study in which the two requisites of useful information and wholesome mental discipline are so happily combined. Besides the literary value of the matter of the language, the study of it is exceedingly valuable as a preparation for the study of modern languages, and for its relation to the nomenclature of science; while the discipline it affords is not of the severe gymnastic kind, but is rather adapted to strengthen the memory, correct the taste, increase the faculty of accurate apprehension and the facility of expression, and to develop the power of logical and linguistic analysis. In a word, it seems admirably adapted to the wants and capacities of the feminine mind, while as a study, under competent instruction, it is interesting, and not wearisome or laborious.

A substantial knowledge of the Latin should generally be acquired before any modern language is commenced. Smattering in this or any other language or science, is absolutely demoralizing in its effect upon the mental tendencies and habits. Thoroughness in whatever is attempted is necessary to strengthen the mind, and give it a wholesome confidence in its own powers. The selections for reading need not be extensive, but they should be carefully made and thoroughly mastered.

The Greek language can add but little to the advantage which will be derived from the Latin, in comparison with the amount of labor necessary to its acquisition. It should therefore be omitted from the general course for young ladies.

Half the mathematics, or rather half the mathematical work, of the ordinary collegiate course for young men, may also be profitably omitted. It is probable that all, or nearly all, the different branches

of mathematical science which belong to the usual course should be included in the course for young ladies ; but these branches should be pursued more in outline, so as to secure an intelligent understanding of subjects and principles, but without the exhausting mental labor of a purely disciplinary character with which they are usually burdened.

The same rule should be observed in Physics and Astronomy. The underlying principles of these sciences, with the interesting and useful information pertaining to them should be acquired, including, perhaps, some of the simpler demonstrations ; but the more difficult demonstrations, with all unnecessary and uninteresting detail, should be carefully excluded from the course.

History is not only exceedingly valuable as a branch of general education, but it is also peculiarly adapted to the capacity of the feminine mind. It should therefore enter largely into the course for young ladies. Still, as a study, it should be pursued chiefly in outline, including only so much detail of biography and interesting anecdote and incident, as may be useful to assist the memory, enliven the imagination, and inspire interest in the general subject. This outline may afterward be filled out by more particular research, as opportunity may offer ; but no young lady who aspires to a liberal education can afford to remain ignorant of the great facts of history, nor of the great characters whose lives and deeds it records, until she can find time to learn, or even to read in the most cursory manner, the particulars of its exhaustless detail.

Discipline in language, both logical and practical, may be acquired from the English and the Latin ; poetical taste and appreciation from these and the German. The French—which should be spoken, if possible—has great practical value, and ranks high as an element of polite culture. The logical and reflective powers will be sufficiently disciplined by such courses of Mathematics, Physics, and Astronomy, as are above suggested, supplemented by suitable outlines of Moral and Intellectual Science. History and the natural sciences will store the memory with facts and the mind with intelligence.

Thoroughness in abridged courses should compensate for abbreviation ; and doubtless an abridged course in any subject or science is better for any purpose than a fuller course hurried over in such a manner as to give the learner but confused and imperfect ideas, to

baffle the memory, and shake the mind's confidence in its own powers.

If young ladies, in a collegiate course, are required to prepare only two recitations per day, ample time will remain for due attention to the claims of feminine industry and physical exercise, and recreation and accomplishments.

The pursuit of the latter, it may be observed, should not be regarded as constituting a part of the *real work* of college or of life. However valuable accomplishments may be as a means of refined and rational enjoyment, or of elevated culture, they yet can not rank among the more necessary or important objects of life, and are of merely secondary importance, even to woman. They should, as far as possible, be made to take the same place in education which belongs to them in life generally; namely, as a means of recreation to refresh and restore, rather than a labor to exhaust. They must lose their essential quality and value by being enforced as a drudgery—a character which, if enforced, they are especially apt to assume. They can not be pursued to advantage farther than they can be made to respond to the voluntary inclination and taste of the pupil. It is better, therefore, to endeavor to inspire a love and appreciation of them, to offer suitable assistance and encouragement, and then to leave the pursuit of them—except, perhaps, some of the necessary rudiments—to the option of the students themselves. Intelligent and appreciative young ladies would not fail, under such circumstances, to avail themselves of such opportunities of acquiring accomplishments as might thus be placed within their reach, and would consider the pursuit a pastime and pleasure, rather than a laborious drudgery. In this way they would not only not interfere with the regular work of the college course, but would actually assist and promote it, as furnishing a most rational and enjoyable means of recreation in unoccupied hours. It is well also to allow the inevitable options of life to commence early with things not indispensably important, and with those in reference to which there may be the most natural inducement to right choices.

Reading-circles, also, in which something of the freedom and ease of social gatherings should be permitted, might be rendered exceedingly useful in colleges for young ladies, for purposes both of relaxation and improvement. If suitable courses of reading were arranged by the

professor of literature, so as to include choice selections of history and fiction, prose and poetry, the exercise would be valuable for the acquaintance with literature and the cultivation of literary tastes which it would induce; and if the opportunity thus afforded were properly improved by the instructors in elocution, the young ladies participating in the exercise would become accomplished readers; and if free conversation and criticism upon the works and authors read were allowed and encouraged at suitable intervals, the best possible means would thus be afforded for developing the conversational powers of the students.

Reading and conversation, in themselves, are doubtless among the most valuable accomplishments for young ladies; and such an exercise, if properly conducted, could scarcely be surpassed as a means of rational relaxation and enjoyment.

As regards the circumstances and conditions under which young ladies may most successfully pursue the higher branches of learning—whether in private schools, endowed academies, or colleges; whether in institutions by themselves, and with only female instructors, or in the same colleges and classes with young men, and subject to no more restrictions—a great variety of opinions will of course exist, so crude and undeveloped are our ideas of the general subject of feminine education. There are, however, but one or two of these questions which seem to require discussion in this paper.

We believe that the instructors of young ladies in the collegiate course should, as far as possible, be men; though women may, perhaps, be profitably employed as teachers of accomplishments, and in elementary courses in other departments; and the assistance of capable women would doubtless be necessary in the management of any institution for young ladies.

Woman is naturally a teacher of children, but not of the mature or rapidly maturing mind. Nor is she adapted to the work of instruction in those courses of learning which belong to the more advanced stages of educational development. Here she is the learner, rather than the teacher; she follows, rather than leads; she is fitted to perceive and appreciate, rather than to reduce and demonstrate. Even when highly educated, she has rarely that grasp and comprehensiveness of mind, that thorough and independent mastery of difficult subjects and sciences, which is necessary to present the matter

of advanced education to the learner in the most practical and available form. But young ladies in the collegiate course should have the best of instruction, the best possible presentation of the subject-matter to compensate for disadvantages under which they necessarily labor. The young man has time and strength and energy by which he can overcome obstacles, and work his way successfully, even with comparatively indifferent instruction; and the result will be discipline and increased confidence and strength, even if his progress in learning be less rapid. But the young lady has neither time nor energy which she can afford to spend in this way. The more of both we can save for her, the better it will be for all her purposes and interests. She therefore needs more careful and competent instruction in her collegiate course than the young man; at least, if any difference is to be made between the sexes in this respect, it should be in her favor.

But where shall we find a corps of female instructors who could adequately replace the faculties of any of our first-class institutions for young men? And what should we think, considering the question of ability merely, of putting our sons, during their college course, in charge of the best female faculty which could possibly be collected? It avails not in this case to say that women are inferior to men as instructors, because they have never had suitable opportunities to fit themselves for the work; for we need instructors who *have had* suitable advantages, in addition to the requisite natural endowments.

Surely, young ladies must have the instruction of competent men, who have a masculine grasp and mastery of subjects, and who are capable of such thorough and skillful presentation of them as will make them easy of apprehension, if we would conduct them successfully through the various difficult branches of learning which belong to the higher departments of education. The objections to this course, whether real or imaginary, must be overcome and removed, or they must content themselves with educational advantages decidedly inferior to those which they might otherwise enjoy.

And not only should the instructors of young ladies in the collegiate course be men eminent for their scholastic and scientific attainments, but it is indispensable, also, that they should be good and true in their characters and lives.

The influence of personal character is one of the most important
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elements in the work of education, in any case. Young ladies are usually much more susceptible than young men to impressions of this kind; and daily association with true and noble characters in the intercourse of college life could not fail to exert the most salutary influence upon their minds—an influence to be transmitted through them to their future homes and the whole circle of society in which they are destined to move. If we are as true to woman as she is to us, or even true to our own dearest interests as represented in her, we shall be willing to give, without grudging, a fair proportion of our best and wisest instructors to the work of assisting in these ennobling and inspiring, but still arduous pursuits. This is but justice to her, in view of the neglect from which she has hitherto been permitted to suffer, and it is due to the great interests of the family and of society, which can thus be most effectually promoted.

Assuming now, as we safely may do, that competent instructors for young ladies in the higher departments of education can be found or provided in sufficient numbers, and in an organized capacity, only in connection with endowed institutions, the important question, whether it is advisable to open the doors of our colleges for young men, to young ladies also, and to attempt the education of the sexes side by side and in the same college classes, remains yet to be considered. We are aware that there are many persons who think this question has been considered already too long, who believe that the time for action is fully come, and who are impatient of the "fogyism" which still hesitates. And there is a class of colleges whose eagerness to adopt the supposed improvements of this wonderful age, and to keep pace with what is glibly termed the spirit of the times, is calculated to remind one of a certain familiar adage touching the fate of the party distanced in the race, which it would be as undignified for us to repeat as for learned faculties to act upon. Yet the subject, and all the more for these reasons, seems to require the earnest, careful consideration of thoughtful men; and perhaps some of the quick-witted educators above referred to may yet be induced to attend what they will doubtless be inclined to consider *post-mortem* examination of it.

There are many who zealously advocate the measure proposed, in the belief that it will furnish the most obvious, in fact the only practicable, solution of the problem of collegiate education for girls.

It is said, also, that the experiment has already been tried, and with the most satisfactory results; that both sexes, in fact, are improved by the association.

For our own part, we believe that there are insurmountable objections to this plan. First, as we have already explained, not only the courses of study, but the methods of instruction and discipline, should be so decidedly different for the different sexes that the two could not be combined without sacrificing features essential to the true success of either, and the attempt would involve confusion and complication, with corresponding decrease of efficiency; secondly, because, in such an association of the sexes, at a peculiarly susceptible age, there would not fail to be engendered, in many instances, a spirit which, if it did not tend to the subversion of good discipline and strict propriety, would at least be incompatible with the best improvement of the time for the purposes of study. The supremacy of Euclid and Whately, in the minds of many of the students, would be stoutly and pertinaciously disputed by trains of thought and feeling more alluring and absorbing, if less substantial and practical; and if no open improprieties were ever indulged, if no matter for interesting gossip ever transpired, still the traditional contest between Venus and Minerva would inevitably be excited under circumstances so favorable to the former that the latter would unquestionably need all her proverbial valor and prudence to maintain her ascendancy. At least, it can not reasonably be expected that the deceitful Paphian goddess would become a faithful assistant or quiet subordinate in the schools of her rival. A disturbing element would always be present under such a system, to increase the difficulty and responsibility of discipline, and would certainly interfere, to a greater or less extent, with the proper work of education and with the general results of the educational effort.

But we are told that the experiment has already been tried, and the plan is found to work well every way and in every case; that there are no difficulties of the kind we have anticipated, and that our imaginings and theories must yield to facts; that so far from any increased difficulty of discipline being involved, even the difficulties incident to the usual system vanish at once, under the new arrangement. Both young women and young men behave themselves better in classes together, and of course out of them, than either would in colleges by themselves. Wild and restive dispositions tame down at

once under the magical influence of the association of the sexes in the daily exercises of the class-room. Indeed, the reports from the "mixed colleges," old and new, are too decidedly and uniformly favorable to engage our fullest confidence. They seem rather calculated to remind us of the fact that educators are not generally inclined to be over-hasty in disseminating impressions unfavorable to their favorite theories, and that faculties of colleges generally do not care to have such difficulties as may sometimes occur in their institutions discussed in the public prints. It seems to be regarded as a matter of considerable practical importance that the prevailing outside impression in reference to a college should be, that every thing is working prosperously and smoothly. Without this simple explanation, it would seem a remarkable fact that, while difficulties do undoubtedly sometimes occur in schools and colleges, no hint of any such thing ever appears in the manifestos which are seen in the newspapers. Perhaps it may be that there are no bad or indifferently good institutions of learning in this country. It is certain that there are none which advertise themselves as such, or which seem by their own reports to have the least difficulty with any system they have chosen to adopt.*

Now, in reference to the statement that the young women in these mixed institutions are fully equal to the young men as students—in fact, generally surpass them—we remark that it may be generally admitted that girls are equal, perhaps superior, to boys, in the proper studies of the high-school; and there are doubtless persons who need to be told that a great number of the "colleges" and "universities" of our beloved country are in reality no more than high-schools.

And it is not difficult to understand how these exceedingly favorable reports from colleges operated on the mixed plan might be honestly made by persons interested in the success of the scheme, even while observers differently disposed might have very different and equally candid opinions. Nothing is more common in such cases than for the imagination to supply facts, or to suggest

* It seems finally to have been admitted, in a convention held last Autumn in Chicago, that difficulties of discipline, and "scandals," do sometimes occur, even in mixed colleges; but far less, it is still insisted, than would undoubtedly have to be encountered with either sex alone.

explanations of those which actually exist. But if we claim no allowance on this score, there are still some points on which we may be permitted to hang our doubts.

First: it seems to us that the fact or assumption of the extraordinary softening or neutralizing tendency, so complacently claimed as the result of the association of the sexes, proves too much. We see no reason why this influence, if it exists at all, should not extend also to the natural energy and enterprise of the young students of either sex, and so tame them where taming is, to say the least, exceedingly undesirable. And if there exist between the sexes thus associated a certain interaction of respect and admiration sufficient to control or essentially modify their conduct, how is it possible that the sentiment should not in many instances go farther than mere admiration and respect, and monopolize, to a very inconvenient extent, the mind of the young man or woman? It might be well also to remember that the standard of excellence or success in schools and colleges is not absolute, but differs greatly in different situations and circumstances; so that what some persons would call success, judging from the standard to which they are accustomed, might be very differently characterized by others, who would judge from a different stand-point, or according to a more perfect ideal. In fact, nothing is more common than for schools of all grades to have excellent reputations, and to appear exceedingly well to uninitiated observers, which yet will not bear the test of inside inspection by careful and experienced educators. There is perhaps nothing in which false standards of excellence are so likely to prevail as in advanced education. There is nothing in reference to which there are so few who are capable of intelligent criticism; and the fulsome and unqualified commendation so frequently bestowed on schools and colleges, by visitors and committees and reporters, proves only the interest or incompetence of the observers. It can do us no harm to know that we have not yet reached, especially in these higher departments of our educational work, such an absolute standard of perfection as these commendations would seem to imply.

On the whole, the reports which we hear, or have been able to gather from the few existing "mixed colleges," are not such as to make us entirely confident that there are not influences at work in them, without which the effort for education would generally be more

successful. And when we are told, by the advocates of this system, that our surmises and imaginations must yield to *their facts*, we would respectfully suggest that the common consciousness and experience of mankind is hardly to be regarded as mere speculation; it claims rather the authority of universal fact, and is not to be set aside without more, and more positive, testimony than has yet been adduced. The force and depth of the prevailing conviction on this subject is well expressed by Catherine Beecher, when in a recent article she says: "*It is impossible not to believe that, between the ages of fifteen and five and twenty, young men and young women will carry on their intellectual training far more thoroughly and successfully apart than thrown into the same classes.*" And, though we are well aware that there may be young ladies whose introduction into classes of young men in college would excite no unusual interest on the part of the latter, yet we may also be certain that there are others equally worthy and well disposed, but only better endowed, whose presence would not fail of producing effects decidedly unfavorable to the success of the business in hand. It is indeed probable that the young ladies who would be most likely to be found in college classes with young men, would generally be of the former class; but this, we presume, will hardly be claimed as an argument in favor of the theory.

There is indeed not the slightest reason to expect that the parents of beautiful, intelligent, susceptible daughters would, if the opportunity were offered, generally be willing to send them to colleges where, separated from home and home influences, and at an age remarkable for impulse rather than prudence, "the age of vivid impressions and awakening passions," they would meet daily in college exercises, and occasionally in social gatherings, during a period of four continuous years, with the young men who compose the classes in our colleges. The great majority, also, of those who have sons to educate would doubtless expect that they would be more likely to attend faithfully to the earnest work of education, and would be in less danger of perplexing and painful complications of sentiment, in colleges by themselves, than if exposed to the influences which are known to be inseparable from the association of the sexes at the peculiarly impressible and impulsive period of life when the effort for advanced education must be made. And there is no probability that the number of students in any respectable college or university in the country

would be permanently increased by adopting the plan here considered. The opening of our colleges for young men to young ladies, in the manner intended by those who advocate the measure, might indeed satisfy the inconsiderate demands of a certain class of theorists, and may perhaps be admissible as a temporary expedient, in situations where there seems to be no present possibility of any thing better; but we may be certain that it will not, in the end, prove satisfactory or successful; and whatever is said and admitted concerning the beneficial influence of the sexes upon each other in the ordinary conditions of life, does not apply to the peculiar relations which young men and young women would necessarily bear to each other if assembled in the same colleges and classes. But how, then, are our girls to be supplied with suitable and sufficient opportunities for collegiate culture? What are the means which are at once the readiest and most practicable, and also the best adapted to their peculiar circumstances and needs? This is the last question we have to consider, and we shall state our opinions as briefly as possible.

First: there is a class of institutions already existing, or beginning to exist, in which the popular idea of admitting young ladies to the colleges for young men may be realized, without encountering any of the difficulties and objections to which the plan, as usually proposed, is inevitably obnoxious. These institutions, of which the University of Rochester may be taken as an example, are situated in large cities, or in their immediate vicinity, and are conducted on what is sometimes termed the university principle; that is, their managers content themselves with supplying the intellectual and educational wants of the students, and allow them to take care of themselves in all other respects. The students live in the city, in their own homes, or in quarters which they provide for themselves, and are responsible to the Faculty only during their actual attendance upon the college exercises. They come to the college-buildings every morning, and remain engaged with their regular recitations and lectures until noon, when they disperse to their homes, and the buildings are vacant during the entire afternoon. Classes of young ladies might, therefore, come to the college in the afternoon, have the same use of libraries and educational apparatus which the young men enjoy, and recite to the same professors, and in courses of study especially adapted to their wants. In a word, all the privileges and

advantages of real colleges might thus be made available for young ladies, without ever once obliging them to meet with students of the opposite sex; and all without any increased expense to the institution, beyond that incurred by the employment of a few additional instructors, which the increase of patronage and revenue would nearly, if not altogether, defray. Every city of sixty or seventy thousand inhabitants and upward, in our whole country, should have such a college for the education of the young men and women of its own population. Cities of this grade which can support scores of Churches, and pay liberal salaries to their pastors, are usually abundantly able to provide themselves with institutions of this kind; and the money required for their indorsement and support would be wisely and profitably invested, regarding the college simply as an element of material prosperity. There is, indeed, no reason why institutions of this class should not increase, and for the inhabitants of cities they would probably afford the best and most practicable solution of the problem of collegiate education for girls.

But such institutions, however they might be adapted to the populations of large cities, could not adequately supply the educational wants of the inhabitants of the country. The wisely ordained necessity which keeps most of our intelligent and capable farmers' sons busily employed during the season most valuable for out-of-door industry, renders such college arrangements as are most suitable for the inhabitants of cities, entirely unsuitable for them; since, to avail themselves of such opportunities, they would generally be obliged to abandon their means of support, or at least their principal sources of income, and be at the additional expense of living from home and in cities. And there are, in the prevailing tendencies of the times, especial reasons why we should not allow the *magnæ spes ultima Romæ*, which we have in our country-bred girls, to be unnecessarily imperiled, by exposing them to the tide of corrupting influences which seems inseparable from the course of modern fashionable life in our great cities, and in which so many otherwise promising young women are doubtless destined to sink the noblest instincts of their nature, and the dearest interests of their lives. For our views of the way in which alone the educational wants of our young men and women who are inhabitants of the country can be successfully supplied, we beg leave to refer to the plan of a class of institutions

sketched in a former article, entitled, "Collegiate Education for the People."

But in addition to the two classes of institutions already described, which would afford opportunities of liberal education in common both for young women and young men, the variety of tastes and freedom of opinions which prevail in this country, the differences of condition and culture among our people, as well as the force of tradition, and perhaps, also, the true interests of advanced learning, may require the establishment of a few colleges for young ladies exclusively, which shall, in other respects, conform to the traditions and customs of the usual American college system. There are one or two institutions of this kind already existing, and more will doubtless be demanded, as soon as the shallowness and pretense of the ordinary boarding-school education is thoroughly understood by those who have daughters to educate.

In regard to the means of endowment and support of the needed educational institutions in this country, it is important to observe that the *great principle of financial success is to make them easily accessible to the people*, by bringing them to their homes if they live in cities, or by accommodating them to their business necessities, if they do not, and must leave home to attend them. The people will be able and willing to pay for educational advantages thus placed within their reach, and the present and practical usefulness of such institutions will give them a strong hold upon the sympathies of the benevolent and wealthy. If, on the other hand, they are so awkwardly adapted to the popular wants, that only one young man or young woman in a hundred can ever hope to derive any benefit from them, they are separated at once from their natural sources of revenue and from the sympathies of practical men.

Further than this, we have only to say that there are many men in our prosperous land to whom God has given great wealth—given it not as a means of luxurious indulgence, nor for purposes of extravagance and display, nor for any selfish interest of the possessors or their children, who would be injured rather than benefited by the inheritance of such amounts as would raise them above the ordinary conditions of life, and deprive them of the usual incentives to honorable effort. The true purpose and value of these accumulations of property is doubtless higher and nobler than any interest of personal

aggrandizement, or any object of selfish ambition. It is pre-eminently the privilege of the men who are thus favored *to make to themselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness*, or, in other words, to use their wealth in such ways as shall cause their names to be honored, and their memories to be blessed. When, therefore, these men shall arrive at a just appreciation of the real mission of their lives, and shall understand in what their true greatness and honor and interest consists, money for the needed educational foundations will not long be wanting, and the era of liberality for these noble objects, which has dawned with such promise, will rise to its full noonday of beneficent splendor.

II.—INFANT BAPTISM.

IT is proposed in this paper to discuss briefly the subject of "Infant Baptism," and to do so by examining several questions of vital importance to the general subject.

I. AS TO DIVINE AUTHORITY.

Has the practice of infant baptism Divine authority? That only which rests upon the Divine will is of Divine authority; and before that can be binding upon the consciences of men, it must be clearly revealed. We are living under the authority of Jesus, as revealed in the New Testament. Is what is called infant baptism a New Testament institution? Is it anywhere said in the New Testament, either that infants should be, or that they ever were, baptized? We answer, that the subject is nowhere mentioned in that book, from its first to its last letter. Indeed, its advocates concede that the subject is nowhere *expressly* named in the Bible. But as some may not be prepared to admit that we can fairly start out with this concession, it may not be amiss to make a few quotations from some of the most distinguished Pedobaptists of Europe and America to show that it is so. Bishop Burnet says, "There is no express precept or rule given in the New Testament for baptism of infants." (Expos. Thirty Articles, art. xxvii.) Dr. Wall: "Among the persons that

are recorded as baptized by the apostles, there is no express mention of any infant." (Hist. of Infant Baptism, Preface, page 29.) Luther: "It can not be proved by the Sacred Scriptures that infant baptism was instituted by Christ, or begun by the first Christians after the apostles." (Vanity of Infant Baptism, by A. R., Part II, page 8.) Bishop Prideaux: "Pedobaptism, and the change of the Jewish Sabbath, rest on no other divine right than episcopacy." (Fascicul. Controvers., loc. iv, sec. iii, p. 210.) Witsius: "We do not, indeed, deny that there is no express and special command of God, or of Christ, concerning infant baptism; yet there are general commands from which a particular one is deduced." (Econ. l. iv, c. xvi, p. 41.

Many similar quotations might be made upon this point; but one other shall suffice. In 1860, the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church appointed a committee to prepare a tract on baptism for the *Doctrinal Tracts* of that Church, to take the place of a treatise upon that subject, ascribed to Mr. Wesley, which had for many years held a place in that volume. The tract was prepared, and now occupies the place in the *Doctrinal Tracts* formerly occupied by Wesley's treatise, and is published by authority of the General Conference. From it we quote as follows:

"They [opponents of infant baptism] object that there is no explicit warrant for baptizing infants, in the New Testament, and hence they conclude that infants should not be baptized. By *explicit warrant*, they mean some express declaration that infants should be or that they were baptized. . . . That there is no such explicit warrant for the baptism of infants, is freely acknowledged. (*Doctrinal Tracts*, page 250.)

These quotations fully justify us in assuming that the representative advocates of this practice set up no claim to express Scripture authority, but rely wholly upon deduction to establish it. We come, therefore, directly to consider the question, Is inference or deduction from Scripture sufficient Divine warrant for such a practice? We deny that it is. An institution like infant baptism can not be made justly binding upon the Christian conscience, upon the ground of mere inference from Scripture, at all; and much less upon confessedly questionable and disputed inference. An institution can not be said to be of Divine authority unless it can be shown to have been delivered in the Divine revelation in plain and unequivocal language.

Upon this point, Dr. Sherlock, a learned and distinguished Pedobaptist in England, while reasoning upon another subject, well and truly said:

"I would not be thought wholly to reject a plain and evident consequence from Scripture; but I will never admit of a mere consequence to prove an institution, which must be delivered in plain terms, as *all laws ought to be*; and where I have no other proof but some Scripture consequences, *I shall not consider it equivalent to a Scripture proof*. If the consequence be plain and obvious, and such as *every* man sees, I shall not question it; but remote and dubious and disputed consequences, if we have no better evidence, to be sure, are a very ill foundation for articles of faith. Let our Protestant, then, tell such disputants that, for the institution of sacraments, and for articles of faith, he expects plain, *positive* proofs; that, as much as the Protestant faith is charged with uncertainty, we desire a little more certainty for our faith than mere inferences from Scripture, and those none of the plainest." (Preserv. Against Popery, Vol. II, Appendix, page 23.)

This reasoning is good, and quite as forcible when against Protestants as when against Papists, and as strictly applicable to errors and innovations among Protestants as in the Roman Catholic Church. Now, are the inferences from Scripture upon which Pedobaptists rely for proof of infant baptism plain and obvious, and such as every man sees? or are they not remote and dubious and disputed? Unquestionably, they are disputed by Baptists; and most, if not all, of them are disputed by some eminent Pedobaptists. Luther, the great Reformer, as we have already seen, says, "It can not be *proved* by the Sacred Scripture that infant baptism was instituted by Christ or begun by the first Christians after the apostles;" and this shows clearly enough that he did not consider such Scripture inferences as are claimed for it, equivalent to *proof*. Nor would it be difficult to show, were one disposed to take up such a task, that every particular inference that has been drawn by Pedobaptists from Scripture in favor of infant baptism, has been disputed by other learned Pedobaptists. How, then, can they, in the light of principles they have themselves laid down in their discussions with Papists, expect us to accept such proof as they offer, as sufficient Scripture warrant for this practice? They have no proof, and claim none but inference; and what they have, even of this character, is certainly none of the plainest. As a sample of the proofs of this kind, brought forward in support of infant baptism, we will give attention to one—perhaps the one most relied on by the majority of Pedobaptists. It is commonly known as the argument from *household baptisms*.

In several instances in Scripture, households are said to have been baptized under the apostolic ministry; and from this fact it is inferred that infants were baptized by apostolic authority. But is this a fair, plain, obvious inference, such as every man sees? It is also said in Scripture that "Crispus, the chief ruler of the synagogue" in Corinth, "*believed* on the Lord with all his house;" and would it be a plain and indisputable inference that infants *believed*? Such an inference would certainly not be unquestionable. It might be very justly said that they are not capable of believing; and therefore, if there were any infants in the house of Crispus, the inspired historian did not mean to include them in what he predicated of Crispus and "all his house." And can not the same answer be made, and has it not been made, to the argument for infant baptism? It must be borne in mind that, from the Baptist stand-point, and with his views of Scripture teaching upon the subject, infants are just as incapable of being Scripturally baptized as of believing on the Lord; and therefore the answer is as appropriate in the one case as in the other. Evidently, therefore, to say the least, this inference is not a plain one, and such as every man sees, and therefore not sufficient proof, according to Protestant principles, for an article of faith, or an item of practice, to be made binding upon the consciences of men. And it should be further observed, in reference to this argument, that Pedobaptists do not take up any one case of household baptism, and endeavor to show, from the facts in the record, that there must have been at least one infant baptized in that particular case; but, on the contrary, their opponents, though by no means logically obliged to do so, usually make the first appeal to the facts in the case, inviting an investigation of them, and confidently claiming that they are, in every case on record, decidedly against the inference Pedobaptists would derive from the mere fact of household baptism. It is therefore evidently the mere fact that households were baptized that the inference is drawn; and, surely, one must be wretchedly warped in judgment to call it any thing stronger than a mere probability, even looking at it from the Pedobaptist stand-point. Household does not necessarily imply infant; and, then, we all know that it is not at all uncommon for something to be required or predicated of families, communities, states, or nations, when only those *persons* of the families,

communities, states, or nations, are to be understood as actually meant, who are capable of the thing required or predicated. Is the inference in this case, then, plain, obvious, and such as every man sees? We think not; and therefore we conclude that a score of such inferences would not be sufficient proof of an article of faith, or item of practice, to be made obligatory upon the Protestant conscience.

Before passing from the matter of household baptism, we deem it barely worth while to notice a new feature lately brought into the case by a somewhat distinguished champion of the practice under examination. It is this: that in one case of household baptism, that of Lydia, the Greek word *οἶκος*—whence comes house, or household—is, in the Peshito-Syriac version, of perhaps the second century, represented by a Syriac word that means *children*. So that, according to that version, we should read, "Lydia was baptized, and her children." Well, without having examined the Syriac version, or caring to do so, and, therefore, without questioning the statement as to the word in that version, we are ready to inquire, What of it? Does *οἶκος*, the word used by the inspired historian, mean "children?" Confessedly not. Then what follows? Simply, that whoever translated the Greek word *οἶκος* into a Syriac word meaning children, committed an error. That's all. But suppose it could be shown that *οἶκος* even means "children"—which no scholar will claim—then what follows? Simply, that children were baptized. And how is it to be proved that there was an infant among them? Will it be said that *children* means infants? Then it follows that Lydia's household was composed entirely of infants. Rather a cumbrous household for a woman in the business she followed, to have with her so far from home!

The question as to Divine authority might fairly be dismissed just here, with Pedobaptists, clearly without any such authority for their practice, even according to principles by themselves propounded in their discussions with Romanists. But the controversy can be carried further by their opponents, and they defeated upon their own and only field of controversy—that of inference. There is not only nothing in Scripture from which a fair inference can be drawn in favor of their practice, but much from which mighty inferences can be made against it. For instance, that faith, repentance, confession, or something else of which infants are confessedly incapable, is almost

invariably associated with baptism, or predicated of its subjects, in Scripture, is a fact that more than offsets any inference that has ever been made in its favor. The commission of our Lord, that affords all the Divine authority we have for baptizing at all, certainly authorizes only the baptism of such persons as, being taught, do believe the Gospel, and accept its offered salvation; and the history of apostolic practice is in strict harmony with the commission. It is a significant fact, too, that in the discussions of this question with their opponents, Pedobaptists usually have very little to do with New Testament teaching. Excepting from household baptisms, their deductions are, for the most part, drawn from the Old Testament. The fact that, in the covenant of circumcision, infants were circumcised, is their Gibraltar. Here they Judaize a little, and infer not a little, and never make any thing clear, and finally conclude that, because male infants were circumcised under the covenant God made with Abraham and his *fleshly* descendants, all infants ought to be baptized in the covenant of grace, wherein we are children of Abraham by *faith*. Who would say that their inference, from the circumcision of Abraham's male descendants, that infants now ought to be baptized, is plain and obvious, and such a one as every man sees? And, according to their own reasoning on other subjects, only such inferences afford sufficient proof for articles of faith and for binding items of practice.

We leave the question as to Divine authority, then; and it stands thus: It is, confessedly, nowhere said in Scripture, either that infants should be, or that they ever were, baptized. And therefore its advocates own themselves shut up entirely to inference for proof. Their inferences are certainly of a doubtful character; such as, when discussing the errors and traditions of the Romish Church, they themselves declare insufficient as proof for articles of faith. Infant baptism, then, we fairly conclude, is not a Divine appointment. It has no Bible history. It is an innovation, brought in since the Bible was completed. And this brings us to another question:

II. TIME OF ITS ORIGIN.

Since it can not be shown that the Lord instituted infant baptism, or that it was practiced by the apostles, or that in any way it is even mentioned in the New Testament, it becomes a question of

some interest, When did this practice come into the Church? And to answer this question with precision is a matter of great difficulty, if, indeed, it is not impossible; that is, it is difficult, yea, impossible, perhaps, to tell the day or week or year in which the first infant was baptized. And Pedobaptists are wont to make the most of the circumstance, too. They call upon those who claim that it is an innovation, to point out the precise time when it was brought in, as if it must have come down from the Lord and the apostles if this can not be done. But this method of proving the Divine origin of things could be adopted in proof of the Divine origin of many things that Pedobaptists as earnestly oppose as any body opposes infant baptism. The scribes and Pharisees could have argued thus the Divine origin of all their traditions, which, however, the Lord condemned, without attempting to give the precise times of their origin. Popish pettifoggers, too, could make the same argument for the Divine origin of almost all their traditions. They could, and indeed they do, call upon Protestants who oppose their traditions and innovations, brought in since the time of Peter and Paul, to point out the precise time when these things were brought in; and, in many instances, Protestants are unable to do it. Indeed, they do not consider it worth while to try to do it. It is better to spend our time trying to rid us of errors and human traditions in religion, than in inquiring after their precise age. It was enough for the Lord that the traditions of the scribes and Pharisees existed; that they were unauthorized by the law of God; that, in some instances, they rendered void that law, and he condemned them. Neither do Protestants consider it needful for them to inquire into the precise antiquity of the traditions of Rome. They have been brought in, and are so numerous and notorious that it is better to rid Christianity of them than to show the world just how old each one of them is. So of infant baptism. It came in at some time; and if that was the time of Jesus and the apostles, it can not be shown from the inspired writings or any other. It has been brought down to our time; and, as no man can show even a mention of it in the whole Bible, we have a right to conclude that it stands upon the same ground with other Church traditions. Dr. Freeman, a learned English Pedobaptist, well said: "The traditions of the whole Catholic Church confirm us in many of our doctrines, which, though they may be gathered out of Scripture,

yet are not laid down there in so many words; such as infant baptism, and of Episcopal authority above presbyters." (Preserv. against Pop., page 19.) Infant baptism is not laid down in the Scripture in so many words; yet it may be gathered out by inference, and then confirmed by the traditions of the Catholic Church. That is as strong as the case may be put. But if it were not already in the Church, and confirmed by the tradition of years, then who would think of gathering it out of the Scriptures?

Although, as has been said, the *precise* time when this practice was begun can not be pointed out, yet it can be very safely said, we think, that it was *about* the beginning of the third century. There is no mention of it to be found anywhere in any writing of the first and second centuries. It is claimed by some that Irenæus, who wrote about the year 175, refers to it. This, however, can not be made out. It is not claimed that he expressly names it; but only that he refers to it, calling baptism regeneration. But this is only an assumption, and deserves no further attention. It is claimed that Tertullian, writing about the beginning of the third century, expressly mentions the practice. But this is disputed by some very learned men, who contend that Tertullian speaks only of minors, or infants in *law*. So there is a controversy as to whether this father did actually mention infant baptism or not, with the preponderance of proof on the side of the Pedobaptists, in the judgment of the writer; though they do not make out their case beyond a reasonable doubt. But the question is an immaterial one. As we shall show, in the proper place, the evidence derived from Tertullian, granting that he does mention it, is clearly against the Divine origin of infant baptism.

Origen, who wrote about the year 225, is the first writer who does unquestionably mention the practice; and, upon a candid examination, we think his language readily yields the inference that it had not long been in vogue then. He speaks of it thus:

"Having occasion given in this place, I will mention a thing that causes frequent inquiries among the brethren. Infants are baptized for the forgiveness of sins. Of what sins? Or, when have they sinned? Or, how can any reason of the laver, in their case, hold good, but according to that sense that we mentioned even now: 'None is free from pollution, though his life be but of the length of one day upon the earth?' And it is for that reason, because of the sacrament of baptism the pollution of our birth is taken away, that infants are baptized." (Homil. in Lucan xiv, as translated by Wall in his "History of Infant Baptism.")

Origen, it need scarcely be said, was the most learned and most voluminous Christian writer of the third century. It is probable that no man in the Church stood so high as a living teacher as he, at the time he wrote this language. He was a native of Alexandria, in Egypt, and most likely resided there when these words were written. Alexandria was metropolitan. Now, it is quite reasonable, in case any thing *new* should find its way into the Christian practice, concerning which the brethren should desire information, that Origen should be addressed upon the subject; but it is not reasonable that he should be beset with inquiries as to why infants were baptized, if the Lord instituted the practice, and it had been observed by the apostles, and, after them, the whole Church, uniformly down to that time. He says he writes of "a thing that causes frequent inquiries among the brethren." The precise form or import of these inquiries he does not state; but that can be pretty obviously inferred from the answer he gives. His answer is, "Infants are baptized for the forgiveness of sins," which is a suitable answer to the question, *Why are infants baptized?* No doubt, therefore, this was the question so frequently coming to him from "among the brethren." Evidently the question he answered was not simply, "What is baptism for?" else the answer would have been simply, that baptism is for the forgiveness of sins, and need have had nothing about infants in it. But the answer is, "*Infants* are baptized for the forgiveness of sins," and therefore the question must have been one as to why infants were baptized. But why Origen, down in the third century, should be questioned upon a matter of this kind, we can not account for except upon the hypothesis that the practice had only recently been brought in. This thing that "caused frequent inquiries among the brethren" was a *new* thing in Christian practice—a thing the reason of which was not generally understood among the brethren—and that new thing, the reasons for which it was needful for Origen to give, was infant baptism.

Observe, also, that Origen expresses no surprise at the frequent inquiries among the brethren, as he evidently would have done had they related to some practice confessedly instituted by the Lord and practiced by the whole Church to that time. He knew the thing was new, and hence a reasonable subject of frequent inquiries, and therefore simply proceeded to give the reason for this new practice;

and, in doing so, refers to no word of the Lord nor apostolic example, but to his notion of original sin as, in his judgment, a sufficient reason for the practice. Why does he propound this new doctrine of original sin—for it was new, as we shall show in another place—and urge that as the ground of infant baptism, if he could have truthfully said that it was ordained by the Lord and practiced by the apostles? We will hear him further on the subject in another of his writings:

“Besides all this, let it be considered, what is the reason that, whereas the baptism of the Church is given for the forgiveness of sins, infants *also* are, by the *usage of the Church, baptized*; when, if there were nothing in infants that wanted forgiveness and mercy, the grace of baptism would be needless to them.” (Hom. viii, in Levit. c. iv.)

Here he gives the same reason for the practice, refers only to the usage of the Church, and plainly says it would be needless if infants were not sinners. In another of his writings, he says the Church “had a *tradition* from the apostles to give baptism *even* to infants.” From all this, it seems perfectly clear that Origen did not think of claiming authority for baptizing infants like that he could have shown for the baptism of believers. While he says nothing about the word of the Lord or apostolic example, he uses terms that indicate plainly that he considered giving baptism to infants an *extension* of practice. He evidently considered that the Church was going beyond what she had done from the beginning, in giving baptism “*even* to infants”—in baptizing “infants *also*.” Why say *even* to infants, or infants *also*, if they had from the beginning been considered as properly subjects of the ordinance as believers?

About the year 253, there was a Council at Carthage, composed, it was claimed, of sixty-six African bishops, over which Cyprian presided, he being bishop of the Church in that city. To this Council one Fidus, a country bishop, wrote a letter of inquiry respecting the baptism of infants—not as to whether they should be baptized, but as to whether it was proper they should receive the ordinance before they were eight years old, at which age male infants were circumcised under the law. After the adjournment of the Council, Cyprian replied, informing the querist that it was by the Council judged proper to baptize infants at the earliest age; and then proceeded to argue at considerable length the propriety

and necessity of infant baptism generally. From his reply we quote as follows:

"This, dear brother, was our opinion in the assembly, that it is not for us to hinder any person from baptism and the grace of God, who is merciful and kind and affectionate to all. Which rule, as it holds for all, so we think it more especially to be observed in reference to infants and persons newly born; to whom our help and the Divine mercy is rather to be granted, because by their weeping and wailing, at their first entrance into the world, they do intimate nothing so much as that they implore compassion." (Epist. 64, ad Fidum, as translated by Wall.)

Here we have the decision of the Council, that infants ought to be baptized at the earliest age, and some of its reasons. Then the bishop proceeds with a general argument for infant baptism as follows:

"Elisha, in his prayer to God, stretched himself on the infant son of the Shunamite woman, that lay dead, in such a manner that his head and face and limbs and feet were applied to the head, face, limbs, and feet of the child, which, if it be understood according to the quality of our body and nature, the infant could not hold measure with the grown man, nor its little limbs fit and reach to his great ones. But in that place a spiritual quality, and such as in the esteem of God is intimated to us; by which persons that are once made by God are alike and equal; and our growth of body by age makes a difference in the sense of the world, but not of God."

So late, then, as 253, Cyprian claims no Scripture authorizing or regulating the baptizing of infants; but propounds, first, the doctrine of original sin, as Origen had done twenty-five or thirty years before, and then proceeds to argue that age and size make no difference in persons in the esteem of God; that the difference between an infant and a man is only a difference "in the esteem of the world;" that infants are as properly subjects of baptism as men, because that "persons once made by God are alike and equal." If, then, this be a sound argument, it certainly proves that infants are as clearly entitled to baptism as men, if men are entitled to it simply on account of age and size of body. But why this metaphysical argument? Had infants been baptized from the beginning? and were there none who opposed it? Did this bishop put his wits to torture to produce this wonderful argument for a practice, the propriety of which no one questioned? Or was it not rather to convince the country bishops, and establish the practice in the Church? And, again, if it was necessary to say any thing to establish it, why did he not say the Lord ordained it, and the apostles practiced it, if

that could have been truly said? Why was the question of infant baptism, in any form, before that Council? Why did the question as to the reason for baptizing infants go up to the great Origen from different parts of Africa? Is it not more than likely that these great men, bishops and abstruse reasoners, having once conceived the notion of original sin, had brought the practice of infant baptism into the city Churches, and, as it spread over the country, the questions about it came back to the city bishops: so that these learned bishops had to write thus to convince the country bishops, and adjust the matter to universal Christian practice? And this leads us to the consideration of another question:

III. THE GROUNDS OF IT.

In the discussion of the question just dismissed, as to the *time* of its origin, we saw that, in the beginning, it was grounded upon the doctrine of original sin. We are ready now to say that this has been its ground from the beginning down to the present day, save as practiced by the sect known as Pelagians. So intimately are the doctrines of original sin and of infant baptism associated, logically and chronologically, that it is scarcely possible to write a separate history of each. It is true, the doctrine of original sin is not preached now as it has been. The spirit of the age has modified it vastly. Still, in the old standards, creeds, and rituals, we find it about as it was taught by Origen, Cyprian, Austin, and Jerome; and where practice conforms to ritual now, it is made the ground of infant baptism. Take, for instance, the ritual of the Methodist Episcopal Church—which, in the main, follows after that of the English Church—and we find an exemplification of the fact here stated. Before baptizing an infant, the preacher, provided he conforms to his Church ritual, reads as follows in his exhortation to the congregation:

“Dearly beloved, *forasmuch as all men are conceived and born in sin*, and that our Savior Christ saith, ‘Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he can not enter the kingdom of God,’” etc.

Then, in his prayer, he reads:

“We beseech thee, of thine infinite mercies, that thou wilt look upon this child; wash and sanctify him with the Holy Ghost; that he, being delivered from thy wrath, may be received into the ark of Christ’s Church.”

Now, according to this ritual, infants are baptized "forasmuch as all men are conceived and born in sin," and it is believed that they are then delivered from the wrath of God. And this is in strict conformity with Pedobaptist doctrine in England and America at the time this ritual was adopted in this country, and with Pedobaptist doctrine back to the time of Origen. As confirming this, we will read from a treatise on baptism, published for some thirty years in the *Doctrinal Tracts* of the Methodist Episcopal Church, by authority of the General Conference, and ascribed to Mr. Wesley, a member of the Church of England, and the founder of the Methodist Church; and, hence, representing Pedobaptist views both in England and America. This treatise says:

"As to the *grounds* of it: If infants are guilty of original sin, then are they proper subjects of baptism; seeing, in the ordinary way, they can not be saved unless this be washed away by baptism. It has been already proved that this original stain cleaves to every child of man, and that hereby they are children of wrath, and are liable to eternal damnation. It is true, the second Adam has found a remedy for the disease which came upon all by the offense of the first. But the benefit of this is to be received through the means which he hath appointed—through baptism in particular, which is the ordinary means he hath appointed for that purpose, and to which God hath tied us, though he may not have tied himself."

This doctrine explains the ritual, and places the practice of infant baptism in Europe and America squarely upon the doctrine of original sin. The doctrine of Wesley here, was the doctrine of the Church of England at that time; and was the doctrine of the Methodist Church, of course, when published by Conference; and substantially the same teaching is, as we have seen, in the ritual of that Church down to the present. Commencing with Wesley, then, and going back to Origen, we find that, with great uniformity, infants were baptized by all who practiced infant baptism at all, because they were supposed to be guilty of original sin. Only one exception is to be noted. Late in the fourth century there arose a sect, headed by one Pelagius, that denied the common doctrine of original sin. This party was virulently opposed by St. Austin, Jerome, and others of the Catholic faith, as heretical. Their heresy was thought to be a frightful one. And so intimately were original sin and infant baptism associated in the theology of the time, that Pelagius was accused of denying infant baptism, though he had never uttered a

word to that effect, and had continued to baptize infants as regularly as any Catholic minister. There being no other ground upon which this practice had ever been defended, such men as Austin and Jerome, knowing that Pelagius denied original sin, felt warranted in charging it upon him that he denied infant baptism itself. But Pelagius had never denied, nor thought of denying, infant baptism; and now, seeing his logical dilemma, and having been born a century and a half after infant baptism was brought in, he could do no better than to construct a new ground for it altogether. Therefore, the notion was conceived that infants are actual sinners from their birth, and their fretting and crying was cited as proof of it; so infants were, by the Pelagians, baptized for the remission of *actual* sins.

With this exception, the practice of baptizing infants was grounded upon the doctrine of original sin, from Origen down to Mr. Wesley; and, indeed, by a large majority of Pedobaptists, where their ministers conform to their rituals, it is so grounded in their *practice* to the present. It is therefore highly probable, to say the least, that infant baptism was not brought into the Church until this notion of original sin had been conceived. Therefore, until recently, Pedobaptists have been wont to urge with great earnestness that this doctrine was taught by the Lord and his apostles. But that infants are guilty of original sin is not now insisted upon. It is not claimed that the Scriptures so teach.

Now, starting from the time of Origen, let us go backward in Church history toward the apostles, and see what that period will develop, as bearing upon the subject in hand. We come first to Tertullian, who wrote some twenty years earlier than Origen; and we will examine the disputed passage from that author; that is, disputed as to whether or not it was what we now call infant baptism that he mentioned. His language, translated by Wall, is as follows:

"Therefore, according to every one's condition and disposition, and also their age, the delaying of baptism is more profitable, especially in the case of little children. (*Parvulos.*) For what need is there that the godfathers (*sponsores*) should be brought into danger? Because they may either fail of their promises by death, or they may be mistaken by a child's proving of wicked disposition. Our Lord says, indeed, 'Do not forbid them to come unto me.' Therefore, let them come when they are grown up; let them come when they understand, when they are

instructed whither it is that they come; let them be made Christians when they can know Christ. What need their *guiltless* age make haste to forgiveness of sins." (De Baptismo, c. xviii.)

If it be granted that they are really infants that Tertullian speaks of, then we learn two things from him, to which we call attention: 1. He does not believe in original sin; he speaks of the "*guiltless* age" of little children. 2. He opposes infant baptism. Now, let it be borne in mind that he and Origen lived in the same age. Here, then, we have two great men of one generation, early in the third century: the one believes in original sin, and therefore in the necessity of baptizing infants; the other does not believe in original sin, and opposes the baptism of infants. And, further, let us observe that the great leader advocating the practice was beset on every hand with "frequent inquiries among the brethren" as to why infants were baptized. All this, to one who reasons at all, is fraught with significance.

Origen and Tertullian were representative men. Both of them believed that baptism was "for the remission of sins." *That* they had from Jesus and the apostles; and that, neither of them ever thought of questioning. They both expressly connect baptism with remission. But one believed infants were sinners, and the other did not; and therefore the one believed infants ought to be baptized, and the other did not. Now, let us go beyond Tertullian. In this period we have Irenæus, Justin, Papias, Diognetus, Ignatius, Polycarp, Clement, Hermas, Barnabas, and others; and in all their writings—though they speak of almost every thing in Christian belief and practice, affording the materials of our ecclesiastical histories of that period—there is, confessedly, no mention of infant baptism. And what about original sin? What about the ground of infant baptism? In this period we find no one championing the doctrine of original sin; nor any one proving there is no difference between an infant and a man; and, consequently, in this period no one mentions infant baptism. There was no such doctrine as that of original sin in the Church; hence no ground for infant baptism; hence no infant baptism; hence no mention of it. As to the condition of infants, the earliest Fathers—called the Apostolic Fathers, because it was supposed they were contemporaries with the apostles—taught very much as Jesus and the apostles did. One quotation on this

point, as a sample, shall suffice. "The Pastor" of Hermas was so highly esteemed in the early Church, that, so late as 175, Irenæus quotes it as *Scripture*. From this work I quote as follows:

"And they who believed from the twelfth mountain, which was white, are the following: they are as infant children, *in whose hearts no evil originates*, nor did they *know what wickedness is*, but always remained as children." (Similitude ix, c. xxix.)

This is refreshing to one, after passing along the long, dark line of Pedobaptist doctrine concerning infants, from Wesley to Origen. What ugly, hateful, false, shocking things are said, along that line, of the little innocent things that the Savior so sweetly and beautifully spoke of, and whose "angels do always behold the face of my Father!" Hermas was not far enough from Jesus, not far enough down into Egypt, for the doctrine of original sin, the egg that hatched out infant baptism, as well as other false notions and practices that still hang about the Church—rather loosely though, thank God! among Protestants.

The doctrine of original sin brought infant baptism into the Church, first in Africa, about the year 200; and infant baptism in turn has brought that unscriptural, ugly, and disgusting old doctrine all the way down into the creeds of the present time. But though it is now in the creeds of Pedobaptists, it is not generally in their hearts. The refining power of the spirit of Christ has about purged it out of the faith and feelings of the people. Who would believe it, but for the sake of infant baptism? And this brings us to notice that modern Pedobaptists are—

IV. SHIFTING THE GROUNDS OF THE PRACTICE.

Although, as we have seen, infant baptism has brought the doctrine of original sin forward, and stereotyped it, as it were, in the creeds, formularies, and rituals of Pedobaptist Churches, yet there are very few of them that really believe it. That doctrine, in the sense in which the Fathers taught it, and made it the ground of infant baptism, is now believed by very few. Who now believes in infant damnation, whether of the baptized or unbaptized? Among Protestants, nobody; among Romanists, none of the more intelligent. Among Protestants, the old formularies and rituals are becoming burdensome. Ministers and rectors are beginning to skip

the hard words, when baptizing infants; and sometimes they get into trouble over it, but most generally do not. In a diocese where rules a bishop of the old order, who is a strict adherent to the old ritual and the doctrine of ages gone by, we occasionally hear of ministers or rectors being *canonaded* for refusing to conform to ritual in baptizing infants—for refusing to say what would even imply that they are sinners. Old tracts perish, and new tracts appear, leaving out the hardest things that were in the old on this subject. Even Mr. Wesley is laid upon the shelf by Methodists. Preachers in preaching, and scribes in writing, upon the subject of infant baptism, now seldom, if ever, ground it upon the doctrine of original sin. On the contrary, it is generally assumed that infants are not sinners, but justified, and members of Christ's Church, and therefore entitled to baptism. So that, instead of "If infants are *guilty of original sin*, they then are entitled to baptism," we now not unfrequently hear them say, "If infants are *members of Christ's Church*, then are they entitled to baptism." This shifts the ground entirely. But how stands this new doctrine to Scripture teaching? Are infants members of Christ's Church? It is certainly nowhere said in Scripture that they are; and the assumption is palpably contrary to the spiritual character of the Church, as described in the Scriptures. But, to make out the case, it is assumed that the Church is substantially identical with the covenant of circumcision. This is anti-scriptural. The covenant of circumcision was made with Abraham, embracing his seed *according to the flesh*; but every member of the Church "*stands by faith*;" having been "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." The Church is not a family of flesh and blood, nor a nation of consanguineous subjects, as Judaism was; but "a spiritual house, an holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ." Consequently, Jews as well as Gentiles, the very best of them equally with the worst, have to be "*born again*" to enter the Church of Christ. No Jew could hold over and be a member of the Church, without being "born of the Spirit;" and this is a fact fatal to all arguments for their identity. The benefits of membership in the Church of Christ are spiritual renewal and sanctification of sinners; and, as infants are not sinners, and do not need such renewal and sanctification to prepare them for heaven, they do not need

membership in the Church. They are as fit for heaven without the Church as sinners will be made in it. But even if it could be proved that infants are members of the Church, that fact would not prove that they are proper subjects of baptism; for baptism is not *in* the Church, and therefore not to be administered to Church members. Baptism is initiative in its character, and with its Scriptural connections introduces aliens into the Church. "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he can not *enter* the kingdom of heaven." We are "baptized *into* Christ"—"baptized *into* one body," the Church. Baptism is connected with *salvation*. "He that believes and is baptized shall be saved." "Baptism doth also now *save* us." It is connected with remission of sins. "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins." But infants are not lost; are not sinners; and therefore are not proper subjects of baptism. When, therefore, the doctrine of original sin was abandoned as the ground of it, infant baptism became a groundless and an utterly empty ceremony. What blessing, according to modern teaching upon the subject, is secured to the infant by its baptism, that the unbaptized one may not enjoy as well without it? Or what curse will come upon the unbaptized infant that may not come upon the baptized one as well? Will any modern advocate of the practice tell us? To show that it is of any benefit whatever to the infant, the advocate must fall back upon the old ground, that "infants are guilty of original sin;" and that "hereby they are exposed to the wrath of God and liable to eternal damnation." But this, modern Pedobaptists will not do. They have abandoned the old ground upon which it was brought into the Church, and upon which it was, until recently, uniformly maintained; but perpetuate the practice without ground, and utterly devoid of reason or significance.

Some eminent Pedobaptists have of late fallen back upon the ground of Christian liberty, and hold and practice the baptism of infants simply as a human expedient. Such, we will take the liberty to suggest, might do well to consider whether it is not giving too high a sanction to a mere *human* expedient, though it be ever so wise a one, to perform it "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Is not this transcending the limits of Christian liberty? Doubtless this practice would cause little or no contention among Christians, if it were observed simply as a human

expedient, and not performed under such awful and unauthorized sanctions ; and these were not made to set aside entirely what is confessedly of Divine appointment ; namely, the baptism of believers.

Finally : there is at the present time, among the less partisan of all parties of Protestants, a desire for greater unity in the Church. Bitter partisan feeling is giving place to a feeling of brotherly love and unity. Love of strife is giving place to an earnest desire for peace and love among the disciples of Jesus. And there is, withal, a very general desire to return to the simple, primitive New Testament Christianity. Party spirit is dying, and party shibboleths are falling into desuetude. The spirit of proscription and religious hate is giving place to the spirit of tolerance and love. It is a time of removing the middle walls of partition that have been set up among the lovers of Christ, and of clearing away every hinderance to unity and co-operation among the people of God. Why should we contend about what God has not made obligatory upon us ? Why should we strive about opinions and customs conceived and inaugurated in the Dark Ages, and handed down to us by our Fathers, as if they could save us ? Among the many hinderances to Christian unity, infant baptism certainly is one. Christians can never unite in this practice. This can not be expected. Indeed, there is not unanimity upon the subject, even in the Pedobaptist Churches. Many among them not only do not sanction it, but speak out openly against it. On the other hand, all Baptists are opposed to it. There is no one thing in which they are more harmonious than in their opposition to this practice. With great unanimity, they believe and assert that it is a human tradition, and that, to the extent of its prevalence, it renders void the commandment of God to be baptized. Jesus certainly required believers to be baptized. In this there is agreement among all Christians. Pedobaptists can, and do, practice baptizing believers without any sacrifice of principle. Nor will they now contend that the omission to baptize an infant does in the least jeopard its salvation. In the light of these facts, then, and in the love of Christian unity and concord, we ask them to consider this question. Confessedly, there is no express Scripture warrant for this practice. Inference is the only proof that can be claimed for it ; and no inference has ever been drawn in its favor that is not dubious and questioned. Such proof, too, is confessedly insufficient warrant for

articles of faith or items of practice to be made binding upon the conscience. And now that infants are not looked upon as sinners, and therefore subjects of baptism, and are not supposed to be regenerated or saved in any sense by baptism as a means, and that consequently the doctrine and practice set so loosely about the Protestant Churches, it is a very auspicious time to give the subject a candid examination. And with this end in view, and not to stir up partisan feeling and strife, the foregoing pages have been written by one who sincerely believes infant baptism to be the fundamental error of the Church, and one of the greatest hinderances to unity among Protestant Christians, and the success of the cause we all love so well.

III.—MIRACLES.

NO thoughtful mind can undertake to treat such a subject as this without a growing sense of its difficulty. The literature of miracles has been made by piecemeal. Each age has brought in some new and peculiar contribution. Thought aggressive and thought defensive have been so sandwiched together, till now, when one cuts into the heart of a *definition* even, he finds the most motley-looking layers imaginable. Instead of the primary statement having all the clearness of an axiom, and the citations of truth following, as in the remarkably happy model given us by Paul, while discoursing in his Hebrew Epistle upon Faith, we are treated to a *dissertation* in that very part of the procedure where brevity is indispensable, and the proposition should be as lucid as a pencil of light. The consequence is, that after the definition is given, the definer is instantly compelled to fall to, in an extended defense of terms. As an instance, which we select from many, take the statement of Thomas Hartwell Horne. He says:

"A miracle is an effect or event contrary to the established constitution or course of things, or a sensible suspension or controlment of, or deviation from, the known laws of nature, wrought either by the immediate act, or by the assistance, or by the permission of God, and accompanied with a previous notice or

declaration that it is performed according to the purpose and by the power of God, for the proof or evidence of some particular doctrine, or in attestation of the authority and Divine mission of some particular person."

Now, we care not to call in question the truthfulness of this definition. As an historical record of the mind's determination upon this branch of proof, such statements may be useful. Otherwise, they are too cumbrous, too much after the rigmarole style of legal technicality, ever to be made available to the pulpit. Other definitions are terse enough, certainly; but they manifest too plainly that they have been compiled from the author's polemical view-point, rather than from the Word of God. Take this instance:

"A miracle is as little contrary to any law of nature as any other phenomenon. It is only an extraordinary event, the result of extraordinary circumstances; an effect that indicates a power of a higher order than those we are accustomed to trace in phenomena more familiar to us, but whose existence only the atheist denies. It is a new consequent of a new antecedent."

This is as much an apologetical refutation as a definition. Some definers seem to have entirely conceded the ground to their opponents, and affirm, therefore, that "a miracle is a violation or suspension of the laws of nature." Perhaps, when we have carefully scanned the extensive fields on and over which the battle of the miracle has been fought, we shall be ready to excuse many lumbering remarks and appendages. As the poet says of the theological scribes in respect to faith, so say we in respect to the miracle, "They *sought* to make it clear," though evidently it has come down to us "much bewildered!" The truth is, when we ransack the Bible from Genesis to Revelation, and attempt to take into the account every miraculous feature exhibited under a myriad of diverse circumstances, performed through almost every conceivable agency, and apparently for an untold number of purposes, nothing less than a sheet of foolscap will contain what we should like to say in our definition. Then we must take into consideration the exigencies of the hour. Each defense, when made, and for its own special attack, may, have been admirably suited. Was the skeptic inclined to a mathematical presentation of his coveted discrepancy, the defender would, of course, assume a mathematical aspect in his reply. And just in ratio to the ability of the two in leading that contest, was the growth of a literature peculiar to themselves. The waters stirred by a Lardner

on the one hand, or a Hume on the other, cease not soon their commotion. So different have been the tendencies of our master-minds on each side and in different ages, and so *partial* have been the retailers of their various arguments—mathematical, emotional, didactic, and philosophical—that the mind of the masses has been tossed to and fro, like an unanchored vessel in a storm, almost wrecking in the turmoil of extremes. One class flew to reverence, another to logic, still another to Scripture. One declared that the miracle must approve the doctrine; another exclaimed, “Nay, but the miracles depend upon the doctrine!” Whereas, “could they have learned the truth, they would have known that the Lord has not left himself without many proofs,” each of which, although so adapted as to bear with singular force upon its own peculiar cast of mind, always corroborates every other.

As for ourselves, as a brotherhood, we may say there is scarcely, if any, division among us upon this subject. To be sure, there are those variant opinions constantly forming which are contingent upon two classes of scholarship. Those there are among us who, in point of culture, are almost wholly Bible men, having given profound attention to little else all their lives; and when we take thought of the immense labor they have saved themselves in regard to plodding through all that the schools have pronounced upon as infallible dogmata, they must certainly be inexpressibly happy in possessing their simple yet unanswerable position upon the miracle. Then, others we have, who have undertaken the laborious task of informing themselves upon the vast bulk of biographical history which links itself to such questions. Thus, for the satisfaction of themselves, and all who may wish to profit by their researches, are they enabled to trace the argument from leader to leader, down through the nineteen Christian centuries. Both are useful. We need the historian as well as the scripturian. The work of the one complements the other. And, while we all unite in elevating Holy Writ above human wisdom, nothing amiss can result.

After having so freely offered our own criticisms upon definitions, it would seem within the bounds of propriety that we should be chary of offering a substitute. We can only say this in vindication: If we seek to amend, it shall not be to exhibit our trifle of wisdom. We would have our expression as simple as a child's. It is our hope

that a child can comprehend it. To this end, let all such heavy and ambiguous phraseology as "violation or suspension," "intervention of a higher power," "supernatural," and "preternatural," be kept out; and dropping with them, as we do, all the labor of the learned, what shall we be likely to glean from God's Book? Just this:

A MIRACLE DEFINED.

That a miracle is *a sign from God*. As brief a sentence as this, with God as the central figure, we would have stand out as the head-light for all to gaze at. Let this thought lead men where it will, their "path will shine brighter and brighter unto the perfect day." If it even take us back to Creation, and assert *there* the *miracle*, where no mortal eye could witness it, still it comes down again through the hoary vista of the ages, carrying with it the *record*, which declares for God's creative power, against the two godless schemes of man's development or eternity. Just what we squarely deny is, that the influence of the miracle is affected injuriously by time. Its power is designed to be reflective as well as direct. And the writer who assumes that, as prophecy grows stronger and stronger by age, so by age miracles wear weaker and weaker, has surely not taken all facts into account. The miracle asks for and covets time. Every instance, thus far, in which it has been subjected to the abrasions of science, like the diamond in the hand of the lapidary, it has come forth brighter. It is able to vindicate itself; and to-day, after having been again and again cast into the foul dungeons of infidelity, together with those "miracles of falsehood" and "lying wonders" mentioned by the apostle, it breaks its shackles, comes forth, stands face to face with the world, and proudly points to its sacred record as an evidence of its eternal standing.

We are aware of the effort which is being made by some to class miracles with magic, and cast both aside as incapable of being sustained; and in the proper place may find opportunity to notice this development still more carefully. For the present, we shall content ourselves by saying that its success has not been eminent; hence, it does not confuse us to confess that, if we believe in the miracle at all, we must receive it in its severest aspects. There was more true philosophy in the startling remarks of the old lady regarding Jonah and the whale, than many men have dreamed of.

One week ago from the penning of this sentence, there was a woman shot dead in our town, the lead passing through her right eye, breaking all the skull-bones, and leaving a horrid cavity, large enough to thrust the hand in. As each one stood over that corpse, was there the faintest doubt of her death? Certainly not. And still, were Jesus now on the earth, we should be required to believe that he could raise this woman to life! But it would require no dictation from modern chemists as to how great a degree of faith we must exercise; for that such would be the course of Christ, no room could be left for doubt. He would be no rash experimenter. There would be no galvanic apparatus in readiness to fit upon each stagnant vein; neither would the body be hurried off in a cart to some conveniently secluded laboratory. Life and death in His presence would not play their usual farce of "Ins and Outs." No blow-pipe would cause the eye to glare or the hand spasmodically to strike; nor would the whole frame be distorted into attitudes of mockery. Such would be the sterling wisdom of the Savior, that he would see, in a moment, his work was of such a sort as to preclude all thought of using natural law. Nor, when he took cognizance of the tedious and unsuccessful routine through which science has been laboriously dragged by her most accomplished devotees, could he look for benefits from her services. There would be but one chance open to him, and that would be the exercise of Divine power. He would say, "Woman, arise!" And because "by him and for him the worlds were made," the woman would spring into life. This is *our* belief!

But whether all who incline somewhat to the miraculous possess such faith, justly admits of question. In our conversations with men, we think we have detected an inclination to select the less marvelous signs, coupled with an attempt to constrain them into a natural explanation, as though this must suffice for their portion of belief. It is well enough to state just now to such persons, that their value of the miracle will correspond to their appreciation of God! If they heartily believe in a personal God, Creator of heaven and earth, they will find no difficulty in accepting all which the nature of the miracle brings them. Rather, they will instantly see that, whether to form man from dust, and create dust from nothing, or to raise and reanimate him, both man's creation and resurrection are logical prerequisites to Him who claims an independent standing above nature

and its laws. Whoever comes before us, be he God, angel, or demon, with the attempt to maintain *such* a claim, may be held to traverse the whole range of the miraculous; and the same must be required of man, the moment he assumes to have passed, independently, beyond nature. Such is the property of a miracle, that whether less or more, it matters not; all must be demanded of him who usurps the province of God. If, on the other hand, the claimant humbles himself to the capacity of a Divine agent, avowing necessary dependence for the permission and ability to perform a wondrous deed, the logical demand made upon him for the proof of his prerogative should be *less* stupendous. For he might plead, "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all." Such a one should be judged by the deed done and the doctrine taught since God sends out no miraculous idlers. My hearers will observe that, thus far, we have been reasoning in the abstract, and upon the hypothesis that wondrous deeds are now done. Whether these are fraudulent, is not just now our concern so much as how the deeds should be met. By the distinction drawn between the demand for a greater or less stupendous proof, we are enabled to give one instance of classification. Take, if you please, the Roman Catholic, who believes in his God and in apostolical succession, and we shall approach him somewhat differently from what we shall the Spiritualist, who denies both. For, since the Catholic would admit that the apostles could only do such miracles as God empowered them to, never arrogating to themselves any unlawful prerogatives, it is evident that if he who clings to apostolical succession does not assume the same attitude, he can be logically compelled to it. But where one takes so enormous a risk as to affirm deliberately that man is the only Deity, his opponent—if such he merit—has a right to hold him to perform every authentically recorded miracle, from Creation even unto Resurrection, upon the principle that what man has done, man can do again.

It much depends upon our selection of any two chemicals, and our method and proportion of adjustment, as to what result we shall get. No two things seem more useful in union than oxygen and hydrogen. Upon their proper combination we depend for every drop of pure water. Yet these two gases can be so combined as to give us something very foreign to that. So it is when a far-fetched

union of the miraculous and the doctrinal is attempted. One may say he sees no particular connection between Jesus converting water into wine and living a Christian life. He may have the skill so to present this contrast as to make it appear ludicrous both to himself and others, and even think he does it wisely. Doubtless there are men by thousands, who, having surpassed even this, are seriously endeavoring to serve a moral Savior, long since having firmly planted their doubt upon every thing miraculous. They are probably sensible of some lurking inconsistency; but think to evade it by seizing, with tenacious grasp, what they term the internal evidences.

But this is not so easily done, since for a man who shuts the Book of God there are no internal evidences; and for him who opens it, revelation itself is a miracle. One word from God, the Spirit, to souls in the flesh, can but proceed through a miraculous channel. There is no natural way known to man, through which God can communicate directly to him. Direct communication is by inspiration, and inspiration is a miracle. Indirect communication is through history. And since the present generation is not contemporaneous with the apostles and prophets, and they have given the world the only direct account, their account comes to us both directly from God and indirectly through history, and can be the only one through which to communicate God's Word and works: and *there is no escape from this dilemma!* For if we take more, it is not theirs; if we take less, it is not theirs; and if we take the same, it is theirs!

The plain truth concerning the formation of the Christian doctrine by our Savior and his apostles is, that, step by step as they advanced in their teaching, they made use of signs from heaven to hold their ground. There seems to be no other probable course to pursue in establishing themselves in the hearts of the people. We shall select the resurrection of the dead, chiefly for its notoriety, and yet but as one instance; for we verily believe it can be shown that there were wise and necessary reasons for the performance of every miracle.

But, before doing so, we have a remark or two to make. First, we must bear in mind that the miracle is to confirm God's authority. Hence, he has reserved this power for himself and his agents. Should he grant the license to perform it to those who are separate

in their interests from him, or should he permit himself or his agents to make common this portentous sign, the miracle would be relatively cheapened in its effect. For example, had God permitted the magicians of Egypt to transcend the bounds of magic, and operate in the same sphere with Moses, in so doing he would have thwarted his own purposes. As it was, so glorious was the contrast that an unmistakable stamp was made upon the memory of the witnesses in favor of God's superior power. So, again, had miracle and prophecy been the order of the day right on down until the appearance of the Savior, such an impression as was necessary to set firmly on foot the system of Christianity could not well have been made. That generation would have looked upon a miracle as this one does upon sunrise. But the Wise Being did not so choose it. He has so directed "the course of events" clustering around Christ, that they bear a testimony for him no other being can successfully claim. The way was prepared in the very hush of the marvelous; so that, when it pleased the Father that in him all fullness should dwell, there was ushered into being a train of wonders, the nature of which was as remarkable as the salvation of man was unique.

Man can not wait, age after age, for Science to formulate a God from her shiftless statements. He wearies listening to the attempts of Philosophy to construct one from her cold syllogisms. He palls upon the transcendentalism of intuitions. A sense of the Living Presence is demanded. Each miracle is a telegraphic message from God that needs no duplicate for proof. Christ is a special dispatch. Immanuel! God with us! Here all miracles concentrate. The power of redemption is the new creation. Its founder must be a miraculous being from A to Z; for, as the lamented D'Aubigne has well said, "He must not himself come of the old creation he is about to change. The first man of the new creation must issue from the hand of God, as did the first man of the old creation."

Now return we to our chosen miracle. A man was dying every moment, and apparently forever. What the use to urge the reception of eternal life, unless, by demonstration, the teacher could inspire within them a hope that they could live again? Here, as we conceive, is one of the palpable distinctions between the influence of Socrates' and our Lord's views upon immortality. Socrates, wondrous as was his advance upon the thinkers of his age, and confident as he

may have felt as to the subject of a future existence,—when it came to a successful propagation of his convictions, was lost for proof. Hear him, as he is about passing away: “My friends will have it that the body I am about to lay away is Socrates; whereas I expect shortly to be dwelling in felicity, with the gods.” And it must ever be thus where a teacher of the future existence is unable to cite the resurrection as proof. This will always remain the one overwhelming argument for another life. And this is exactly the method chosen by the Savior to establish this fact; and so with regard to other miracles, to establish other facts.

Miracles were the warp, and doctrine the woof; and both the Savior and the apostles beat the one into the other, until they were prepared to give us a texture as much a unit as the seamless garment worn by the dear Redeemer. And we are not sure but that it is a just judgment to pronounce upon such as would now willfully tear asunder the doctrine from the miracle, that they are fully akin to those who, with cruel glee, once cast lots over that rent mantle!

We have stated that the value we attach to the miracle will depend upon our appreciation of God. As this is the key-note with us, we desire to present it in a new form. There is a question back of the nature of the miracle. It is this: How is the universe controlled? Should it be world, or whirled? Happily we have now no controversy regarding the doctrine of chances. That theory, at least, has died the death. Men have reluctantly concluded that, whether by one power or another, an admirable control is unquestionable. We rarely now hear one express the modest opinion that he could manage matters any better! No: such is the present tendency of thought, in the skeptical kingdom, that every one is indoctrinating us with the constancy and regularity of physical law. Is it not plain, then, that if, after taking into consideration the magnitude of the nicely poised movements of the universe, we should decide upon personal agency as the guiding power, that the miracle in this event must be increased in its value to us? For no rational soul can think of refusing to Him unlimited power to act how and when he pleases, whom, he admits, holds the balances of the spheres in his hand. “What are the grounds on which so stupendous an assertion is made as that God can not, if he choose, so ‘control’ the working of those laws by which he commonly acts upon matter, as

to act on special occasions differently?" Is it said, that would be undue interference with existing laws? But what wisdom has man acquired to pronounce thus? Human experience, so sadly traduced by Hume, testifies to the contrary. My favorite animals, the horse and the cow, are under natural law as regards appetite, health, age, death, and other characteristics. It is by natural law, admittedly, that the Summer crop of grass is produced for their support; and yet, in a rigorous clime, I find personal attention necessary to conduct them safely through the Winter. I observe that my garden is subject to natural law, as to whether it is locked up by frost or mellowed by June suns; that by natural law it is productive of rank, thickset weeds, and that it is by personal control only that it is made profitable to me; and though, with one stroke of the hoe or one wash of rain, the work of a month is rooted up, neither action can be said to injuriously conflict with the laws of the sun, the season, or the soil. I step into a planing-factory, and see, above, around, and beneath me, one vast system of machinery—wheels, pulleys, and piston-rods. Yonder stands the foreman, directing every thing. The lumber is consumed. With a touch of his hand, he throws a belt, and all is still. 'Tis but the work of a moment, until the power is turned from the planes to the gang-saws, and the whole department resumes its deafening activity. Upon the particulars of this last illustration we wish to dwell. Now, the slipping of a belt is a matter that might occur without the interference of any one. But it is hardly probable that the lever which shifted the machinery from one set of cogs to another, would act so opportunely, of itself, as to accomplish such a change in different branches of business. Should the foreman be inquired of, he would tell us that, were no one present when the belt slipped, the machinery would stop, and the power soon expend itself.

In this case, then, we have found three things in co-operation—the machinery, the power to run the machinery, and the agent to direct the power. And, in the consideration of any piece of mechanism, this connection of it with the power and the agent, holds. The locomotive, the steam, and the engineer are a combination so absolutely necessary to each other that, without either the steam or the engineer, the locomotive would be as useless as the road on which it stands. Nor is there any escape from this fact by eulogizing

law. It is not law that runs that engine, but steam, under the management of the engineer. Turn the lever, and step off, and that lightning-winged servant becomes a fiery fury. Men familiarly speak of the law of the vegetable, the mineral, and the animal kingdoms, intending to convey the idea that the existence, perpetuation, and prosperity of the objects belonging thereto, depend upon the activity of law. As one has well said, you might just as well attempt to explain the history and movements of a watch by stating that it was the result of metallic law. Things do not originate in their own law. Neither do they operate by their own power. A law without a lawgiver, to give scope and function to it, lacks about as much tangibility as the air-castle the skeptic builds upon it. Let but a man attempt to suit such theories to the world's mechanics as he applies to the mechanics of God, and he would be overwhelmed in derision. Supposing, for example, he should intimate to the president of a railroad company that expenses could be curtailed by dismissing the engineers, since the locomotives, after having been placed on the track and fired up, would run themselves. What response would he receive? He would be told he was a fool! And what better can he deserve from God?

The laws which have immediately to do with the enterprises of man are no less adapted to independent action than those which come not within his reach. Yet wherever we go among the world's works, man's guiding hand appears as a necessity. And are we prepared to say that, beyond the sphere of man, such is the successful rotation and such the inevitable destiny of physical law, that the universe needs not personal attention to develop its highest end? I think not.

Prune away all idle words, and the whole question of the miracle shapes itself thus: Provided a purpose should call for it, can a new agent be introduced by the Creator, possessing new powers? None but an atheist would say no! Mark the likeness between the miracle and a discovery in nature; such, for instance, as the use of steam. The only perceptible difference between the introduction of the two powers seems to be, that the miracle is ushered in for a special purpose, and withdrawn when that purpose is accomplished, thereby excluding it from further observation; whereas the natural discovery remains to fulfill its end. But, even here, the very

withdrawal itself indicates personal action. The fact is, view it from whatever point we will, and we must either admit the free-will of God to exercise his pleasure upon every thing under him, or else deny that free-will to man. For very evident it is, that every time man lifts one stone that would otherwise remain at rest, or wings with a shot one bird that would otherwise pursue its journey, he steps into a domain which, to that stone and that bird, is as much higher than theirs as God's is than his. Deny this free-will to man, and miracles, together with the system built upon them, are not worth contending for. We become fatalists, and man but an automaton, in the strange predicament of having no one to control him, on the very hypothesis that God is incapable of acting personally upon his creatures. Here we come to the end of the chain, and are now prepared for the first phase of infidelity that may chance our way.

But if the skeptic could thus triumphantly wheel us off in a vehicle of our own foolish construction, the annihilation of the miracle is not yet. The very rocks would cry out against it! For, organized as they are into their various sections of strata, and each separated section holding imbedded, as it does, its own peculiar species of creation, a history is told here that scientists can not well misunderstand. Says Sir Charles Bell, one of the best English authorities: "Every thing declares the species to have its origin in a distinct creation, not in a gradual variation from some original type; and any other hypothesis than that of a new creation of animals, suited to the successive changes in the inorganic matter of the globe—the condition of the water, atmosphere, and temperature—brings with it only an accumulation of difficulties." And our own Agassiz, admittedly the best living authority upon such matters, but corroborates Bell by saying, "For myself, I have the conviction that species have been created successively at distinct intervals."

We shall not extend this argument by further quotation; for we really find but one decision where the geologist has not permitted prejudice to control it. But, before summing up, it may not be amiss to remind you that many of these ancient monsters, preserved to us in the rocks, have been so utterly swept from the stage of action as to be wholly unlike any living thing now on the earth. Here, then, is a record showing to us several distinct creations of animal and vegetable life, differing from each other and from all modern species,

between whose natures and the changing conditions of a newly created world, there subsisted the wisest adaptations. And as much as the doubter may be determined to look upon the miraculous portion of Biblical history as a base interpolation, he will scarcely have the boldness to assert this of the fossils. What we claim, then, is, that if even the story of the rocks is admitted as testimony, the evidence it furnishes of a miraculous interposition is alone unanswerable.

With these positions thus taken and defended, this part of our argument must end. We now institute an inquiry as to the duration of the miracles. Still another distinct feature of the theme will be, the duration of the belief in the miracle. Let us avoid confusion of thought by keeping the two separate. First, then, of the miracle itself. Does it continue? If not, when did it cease? Surrounded by so many ecclesiastical authorities, should one broach an independent answer he might seem venturesome. And yet we are free to confess that, if we should be compelled to deduce a conclusion from the sum total of theological pages, we should be puzzled enough to lay down the pen. Often, when engaged in our readings, the thought strangely impresses us that God has preserved to himself a forcible proof for the miraculous, in the innate love which some of these writers possess for the marvelous. One will drag before your eyes the marvels of the third and fourth centuries, and, with a speculative assurance that intends no gainsaying, declare that the end of the miracles was not yet. Another will sweep on down through the Dark Ages, touching upon Peter the Hermit and the Crusades, the Waldenses and the Albigenses, the Visigoths and the Huns; and, passing on into the twilight of the Reformation, will associate miracles with Luther and Melancthon, Edward Irving and the Wesleys. Not to rank Bushnell with Mosheim or Neander, Fisher or Schaff, and yet seriously doubting whether his influence, in some quarters, does not exceed any name mentioned, do us the favor, at your earliest opportunity, to read his "Nature and the Supernatural," chapter xiv, as a specimen of what may be done in the way of recording superstitious nonsense for genuine miracle, by first-class, indorsed thinkers. We find that much depends,—

1. Upon whether a man is a Catholic, Protestant, philosopher, or skeptic;
2. Upon whether his religious bias has led him to look

upon each instance of conversion as a miracle, and the plan of God to be such that he has resolved to save man, from time to time, either by one method or another; 3. Whether, in short, he possesses, in a larger or less measure, that reverence for his idea of sacred things, which every man's conscience will suggest and his credulity easily confirm,—as to what will be his view upon the duration of the miracle. And we confess freely, for one, that, were we to rank among those who entertain what is termed an orthodox system of salvation, we should hardly know how to touch this question, unless to say that the miracle is eternal. For, in every fresh instance of conversion, we should see but one more link connecting the miracle with all that has gone before and all that must follow, until man be removed from the earth. And where one continuous miracle is admitted, according to previous showing, the whole system and object of miracles are cheapened, and the argument invalidated. But happy are we in enjoying the fellowship of a brotherhood, who, while they join in leading the way to perpetuate the argument for the divinity of Christ by reproducing it in every confession taken, as well as by their weekly breaking of bread; and while they gladly concede and avow that all the original means through which God was pleased to bring salvation to man were indisputably miraculous; and while they unite in demanding of the sinner a thorough change of heart, life, and state,—still, instead of teaching that each man's conversion begins and ends in a miracle, affirm that, with the simple and abundant provision made by the Almighty and revealed through the preached word of the apostles, added to his intense willingness to save, it is next to a miracle that all the world do not embrace Christ.

We next take up the wonders of the Roman Catholic, Mormon, and Spiritualist; and although, in a former part of our treatment, we stated that, as the nature of their claims was different, we might hold the class that denies God to perform a wider circle of wonders than the class that does not, there is a classification under which all will come; that is, as regards the nature of their deeds. And this is our Scriptural mode of expression—they are “false miracles!” But what mean we by the adjective *false* as qualifying the word *miracles*? Just what we mean by that adjective when used to qualify any word; to wit, not being what they are represented to be. And

this is what we are ready to prove of all developments of note occurring between the Vatican and Salt Lake City. But says one, "Are they not permitted?" They are. "And does not the New Testament declare that He who permitteth, will permit until the Man of Sin be taken out of the way?" It does. How, then, is our argument upon the cheapening of the miracle affected? Not a whit. First: because the miracle being a false one, the merit of it is neither equal in character nor quality to a sign from God. Second: because, although those who are led away from the Gospel into these abominable practices, frequently look with disdain upon the miracle, one of two things is evident—either they believe their practices to be true, and, if so, are both illogical and false themselves for denying the miracle; or they believe their practices to be false, in that case being properly ranked with those "given over to strong delusion to believe a lie and be damned." And, in either case, so manifestly infamous is the tendency of their scheme, as contrasted with the work of God, that any one who pleases to take note of it may easily distinguish and vindicate the miracle. But, on the other hand, admit, for argument's sake, that these deeds, although perchance not of so high an order as God's, are still sometimes what they are represented to be—that is, miracles—and a man with any thing like an expert application of admissions will instantly make a parallel; but when this is done, it will be difficult for him, ever after, to prize the miracle as he did before the parallel was drawn. If it came within the scope of the argument, the same might be said of prophecy, the moment you grant all claimed by the clairvoyant. One can evidently see that, by such prodigal dealing, justice toward the truth of God would speedily fall to the ground.

Having cleared our way thus far, step we back instantly to the apostles' day. Here we find the miracle. It matters not what our conclusions may be respecting the deeds of the second, third, fourth, fifth, or any other century, save the first; we all agree in hastily directing our steps toward *this* time, when we attempt the miracles' defense. We had almost said, we instinctively detect the superior excellence of the vantage-ground when standing in the midst, not of the least, but the greatest of all mysteries. This fact is significant. We all agree, also, in the Scriptural judgment, that there has never been an age, since the departure of the apostles, in which

Christianity has been at so perfect a state as regards doctrine, discipline, worship, and practice, as it was in theirs. Now, since it was declared that when that which was perfect should come, that which was in part should be done away, and the apostle, in the argument from which we extract this quotation, mentions the working of miracles as one of the specialties under his consideration, one of two things must follow: either they were done away with the apostles, or they continue until now. We have come to a point, now, when the conclusion will turn upon a correct understanding of the commission, as recorded by Mark. Admitting the context, we find that the eleven apostles were upbraided with unbelief and hardness of heart. Now, either they were the ones to whom the signs were promised, or they were not; and if they were not, reference must have been made to those who should believe their preaching. But whoever they were, so marvelous was the nature of the signs, that we should reasonably expect history to record them. And whether they were simply believers, or apostles and believers combined, we should expect no discriminations made.

Those who suppose the Savior intended to make the promise extensive enough to embrace all believers, find themselves not only puzzled to show Scriptural authority for saying that the signs were granted to any thing like a majority even of the first believers, but are also confronted at the turning of nearly every leaf of the New Testament by the discriminations made between both persons and congregations. But could it be shown that the specified signs followed every original believer, we hold that the promise would have been fulfilled and the purpose accomplished at the time when the apostle declares the Gospel to have been preached to "every creature under heaven." Should our argument be granted so far as relates to that age, but a possibility of continuance be still claimed, such a claim might be retained as valid, so long as the original limit, "them that believe," is preserved. But, just here, all possibility is destroyed,—1. By our inability to find these signs following every believer in every subsequent age; and, 2. Because it is impossible to establish any identity between the signs of the apostolical period and what few scattered ones we do find, either as regards the need that gives rise to them, the circumstances surrounding them, the character of the performer, or the character of the miracle.

We have now eliminated the thought that a miracle is a *sign from God, done away with the apostles*; and it is as regards this thought that we have a few things to say concerning the duration of the belief in the miracle. Although done away as an active agency, the belief in the miracle as a fact must endure until the fact be disproved; and the time for disproving a fact, if fair opportunity offers, is when the fact first comes to light. For if it be disproved then, any evil influence which might result from its belief can be nipped in the bud. But, of course, we can know nothing of what occurred eighteen hundred years ago, only as history informs us. And where the historians are themselves either eye-witnesses or contemporary with eye-witnesses, their capacity and veracity being unimpeachable, they certainly stand outside the circle of all other historians, and their testimony should be weighed and respected, even though they dwell in a marvelous age! Was this formerly done? Did the thousands of persons residing at Jerusalem, who entered into the kingdom of Jesus Christ, give proper consideration to the proof offered by the apostles? 'Tis well known they did; that their belief in a risen Lord was founded upon this proof; and that they confirmed their faith by their death. On the other hand, did the Jews, who were themselves eye-witnesses to many of Christ's and the apostles' wonderful deeds, deny their genuineness? or did they not admit them, with alarm for their own departing power? History says they admitted them. And that same faithful servant, History, speaks out plainly in favor of an impartial recognition of the resurrection from the *dead*. Much is sought to be made by the statement that only the disciples of Jesus saw him after he arose. But what shall we say of Lazarus? Great crowds of Jews went out from Jerusalem to Bethany to satisfy themselves as to the genuineness of *his* resurrection. They saw him for themselves, and what was the result? They were divided into three classes,—1. Those who went away from Bethany believing in Jesus; 2. Those among the chief rulers, who also believed, but did not confess him for fear of being put out of the synagogue; 3. The rest of the chief rulers and Jews, who became so enraged as to exclaim that "the whole world had gone after Christ," and consulted together as to how they might put Lazarus to death. Here was one person appeared from the dead, then, who was no phantom; and here a story told, too fatal in its

results to be thrust aside as mythical. We claim that all such facts must stand, unless the record can be impeached. Fortunately for us, early Christianity was not without desperate foes to attend to this, in the persons of Marcion and Celsus, both of whom, living in the second century, and in the respective order of their names, made direct connection with the time of John, the writer to whom we are indebted for the above narrative. Did Marcion attempt to deny that the enemies of Jesus had witnessed these deeds, or that the deeds had gone to record? If so, and his denial was well founded, why was it that Celsus, who followed directly after, busied himself in writing a work in which he largely quoted from the New Testament concerning the birth, teaching, miracles, death, and resurrection of Christ? And why was it he boastingly exclaimed, "I am fighting Christians with their own weapons?" Judging from movements of a more modern date, skeptics are too apt readily to avail themselves of the ground gained by their predecessors, to attempt, without good reasons, so sudden a change of base. But if neither Marcion nor Celsus could deny the existence of the New Testament, why was this?

We have entered into a class of facts now, that it is in vain for men to close their eyes to. It will avail them nothing, in the sober judgment of conscientious thinkers, to assume the vain task of converting history into romance, and fact into fable. Neither is it a matter of great moment how often or how resolutely the stamp of disapprobation may be placed, by the skeptic, upon magic, witchcraft, or necromancy, since, in this work, he will have the hearty co-operation of every Christian. No one's belief in the miracle can be injured, if he keeps before him the cause which has led to this repudiation. Had it originated, as is often the case with inferior systems, in a growing objection to the administration of our Chief Ruler, founded upon a matured experience of radical defects in the principles of his government, Christians might indeed have great cause for alarm at the present skeptical tendency. But it did not. It began in the world's obtaining a more accurate knowledge of the laws which govern certain things, once looked upon as phenomena; such, for example, as comets, meteors, and eclipses. This knowledge gave rise to well-founded suspicions being placed upon all those astrological superstitions found recorded in ancient history, relating to the

supernatural founding of earthly kingdoms, and the presidency of the gods over each dynasty of corrupt kings. Step by step, the world has advanced, leaving these and other mythological features behind it. "Neptune no longer presides over the sea, nor Æolus over the winds; Ceres, with her horn of abundance, remains no longer mistress of the harvest; the dryads and the fauns have left the streamlets and the groves;" and men ask, in seeming soberness, the question, Why should not the Hebrew God cease his rule over the world? To which we answer in six words, *Because He is Lord over all.*

Whatever else may be swept away, there are a million incontrovertible proofs that God remains. And while He endures, so will his acts. Observed day by day, as they occurred, and by men of piercing scrutiny, careful was God that their observations should be cemented together by that method indorsed and adopted by the whole world, and without which, all observations, whether of a miraculous or scientific order, soon wither away and die. What is it? Testimony! Now, let that be subjected to the severest test. Let it be thoroughly sifted. In the eloquent language of Peter Bayne: "Let the word 'miracle' be put aside. Did Christ walk on the sea? Did he cause the dead to arise? Did he give sight to the blind by a word? Did he feed multitudes with a few loaves and fishes? Let no question be put as to how he did these things, or whether in doing them, he suspended the laws of nature. The inquiry was, Are they matters of fact? They are more startling than ordinary occurrences; let their evidence, then, be more rigidly scrutinized. Was the eye which saw them, filmed by enthusiasm, or unsteadied by agitation? Was the ear which heard them, dulled by prejudice or opened wide in credulity? Was the tongue which reported them, set a-going by any selfish motive? Did falsehood misrepresent, or stupidity misconceive, or fanaticism distort, or imagination invent them? Hang the scales of evidence with such delicacy that they will quiver at the touch of a sunbeam; sift each grain of proof with lingering reflection, and search it with vigilant sagacity; let Judgment look with her most steadfast gaze, and Suspicion with her keenest glance; but if, when the facts of Christ's life are thus weighed in the balances, they are not found wanting, let them, in God's name, be believed!"

IV.—DOGMATISM AND ITS CURE.

DOGMATISM—the word is *cynical* in sound, and the thing is *cynical* in nature; so much so, that unlearned etymologists have not unfrequently nor unnaturally imagined that there is something *doggish* in the root of it, and that when the apostle exhorts the Philippians to “beware of *dogs*,” he intends a kick at dogmatism. But even an unfledged Greekling knows better than this. It is of no such ignoble origin. With the Greeks, a dogma was an axiomatic, or an aphoristic, utterance of an opinion—of what seemed to be true, especially on questions of philosophy. It meant also a resolution or decree of authority, the expression of what it thought, and intended that others should think or do in a given case. In this sense, it is used in the New Testament to express the “decrees” of Cæsar, and the “ordinances” of the law, but never in the sense of “doctrine” (*διδασκαλία*) or teaching. Very early, however, we find Christian writers employing it to designate a doctrine of the Christian Church, or the whole of the Christian doctrines; also, the tenets of philosophical schools. Gradually this sense has been creeping into our English usage, and now “doctrine” (which was originally “teaching”) and “dogma” are synonyms. The confusion is significant, and, as it has worked, bad. It confounds what men think, and have decreed that others shall think, concerning the teaching of the Scriptures, or of nature or of morals, with the teaching itself; substitutes the former for the latter; and so bars the approach to the original fountains of light, cuts off further researches in the wide domain of truth, stereotypes the forms of thought, and trammels the freedom of action.

In its wide, popular sense, a dogma is any peremptory opinion, formally stated and authoritatively applied, whether with or without sufficient evidence. The ground of a dogma is not to be questioned. We must not reason about it. This has already been done for us. The true dogma says, “I am Sir Oracle; when I ope my mouth, let no dog bark!” It is an intellectual idol, before which men must bow down in worship, or be immolated in sacrifice. It knows no middle

ground ; none higher, none lower. The infinite and eternal relations of things have been sounded by it, and it has come forth with all that can be known. There is nothing left to be discovered or even thought of. Further research is irreverent impudence, and a different conclusion narrow ignorance or willful heresy, fit only to be Anathema Maranatha.

Dogmas are of different grade, and diverse as the subjects of thought and feeling. Some are great, some very small ; some apply to the widest interests of the human soul. Man and God, even, are fixed in formulas, and concluded by a syllogism. Some converge upon the smallest points of personal life. What a man chews, or should not ; and where he spits, or ought not,—even these are protruded in fierce resolutions upon missionary societies and other elephants' backs, and thence fulminated. Between such extremes come infinite questions of custom, of politics, of ecclesiasticism, and what not ; and for each there is a bristling cur of a dogma, perhaps a whole kennel of them, latrant lest some free-thinking freebooter should break through the sacred inclosure of prescription, and expose its weakness.

The blind acceptance, willful support, and fierce enforcement of a dogma—this is *dogmatism* ; and the agent in such work is a dogmatist. It is profitable to consider the origin and forms of dogmatism. Sometimes it comes from individual peculiarity in mind and body—native, or the result, in part, of education. Strong natural proclivities, uncorrected by wholesome discipline, transmit themselves from generation to generation, generally with increase of power, till we have, at length, distinct family types, both as to mind and body. A special natural tendency inclines to a corresponding special culture. The taste determines the pursuit, and the pursuit strengthens and increases the tendency, till at length the development becomes enormously one-sided. The mind is intensified, but narrowed, and shuts itself up to the contemplation of its favorite theme of thought or action, not only to the exclusion, but even to the disparagement, of every other source of light or sphere of exertion. It starts with a preconceived notion, and is acutely quick to see whatever confirms it, but willfully blind to every thing that opposes it. If the notion happens to be accompanied with the conceit that it is original, it soon assumes the fascination of an idol,—and its author not only

worships it himself, but is zealously set to have all things else bow down to it. Hence, the spirit of personal dogmatism becomes both proscriptive and persecuting. All faith must be tested by its symbol, and all worship must reverence its shrine. It is not content to receive others without respect to differences of opinion. It tolerates no differences. *Its* opinion is true—is the truth—is, in fact, divine; all other opinion is not only false, but devilish, and deserves to be incontinently crucified. It takes arms against the world; all history, all science, all philosophy, all religion, must be re-examined, reinterpreted, and rewritten to adjust themselves to the new notion. Even nature must be tortured and forced to give testimony to its support. Her ordinary and law-established course must be turned into special channels, artificial and predetermined, that facts may be made to conform to dogma, and the strange and wonderful be substituted for the ordinary and familiar in the premises of our reasoning.

It were easy to find illustrations of the effect and power of personal dogmatism in any department of thought or speculation; but I may accomplish the double purpose of at once illustrating my subject, and of opening up to the attention of the reader useful matter of reflection, if I select, from the many examples that suggest themselves, one which, perhaps, has more widely excited the scientific and theological mind of the age than any other. I refer to what is popularly known as "Darwinism;" more specifically, the conceit of "natural selection," or, as it has been happily characterized by Mr. Herbert Spencer, the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest." The leading assumptions of this doctrine or scientific dogma are, that while the total animal and vegetable population (man and his agency exempted) remains almost stationary, there is a tendency to increase in numbers in a geometrical progression, and therefore every individual has to endure a severe struggle for existence, in which many perish; that every plant and animal transmits a general likeness to its offspring, with individual differences however, which are endless in variety and direction, and which also have power to transmit themselves. These individual differences vary in power or fitness to survive; and hence, in the inevitable struggle for existence, and in lapse of time practically infinite, those variations only that are "fittest" to live will triumph, and be transmitted to offspring. The

rest will perish. The peculiarity thus transmitted will become intensified by continual reproduction, until it attains to the highest degree of utility or fitness for the conditions of its being. Thus the "survival of the fittest" becomes the law of propagation, and the principle according to which species are at once originated and preserved.

Nothing can be simpler than this. It is not only perfectly easy to understand what Darwin means—and this is no small recommendation to a dogma—but it can not be denied that there is some truth in his assumptions; enough, at least, to fascinate his own mind with a spell little short of idolatry, and to win the easy consent of many others, already eager to find a solution, even though an imaginary one, of enigmas too intricate for their analysis. Darwinism does, in fact, afford a pleasing explanation to so many interesting and curious facts in Natural History, that the scientist almost regrets to discover that it breaks down under any test. But breaking down, as it does in so many cases, as a theory, and failing to sustain itself by any process of fair induction, by even a single example of that origination of species which it so confidently assumes to account for, what else can we call it than the merest dogmatism that ever vexed the mind of scientist or theologian? What is more common than to meet with theories which explain well enough many of the phenomena of a particular branch of science, but which fail before the *instantia crucis*, which at last reveals their inadequacy? With so many examples of splendid imaginations dissipated by the sober mind of analysis and observation, we would think that a dogma so portentous could scarcely have ventured into notice without some solid ground of observation and fact to rest upon; that, before attempting to account for the origin of species upon the principle of "natural selection," it would have at least secured to itself the advantage of one example in which the principle had been found active and efficient! But it is of the nature of dogmatism to shut its eyes to all truth that lies not in the line of its own determined vision. It sees neither to the right nor to the left. Though it be closely flanked by facts hostile and overwhelming on both sides, it neither pauses to consider them, nor modifies its course in adjustment to them.

We said there is some truth in Darwinism. There must be in

any theory that can command a moment's respect. That circumstances modify the offspring which any given species may produce, and that these modifications may become so intensified, especially under the intelligent direction and control of man, as to give rise to strongly marked and persistent *varieties*, is the truth of Darwinism—a truth as well known to the patriarch Jacob as to Mr. Darwin, and far more profitably employed. Just so far as Darwinism rests upon fact, upon the verification of experiment, it finds its vindication in Bible history written more than three thousand years ago, and familiar as household words wherever the true God is worshiped or his Word revered. There is no farmer or gardener that does not understand and employ the principle, and if Darwinism were content with the assertion of this principle, no one would object; but then it would be neither new nor Darwinism. What it does assert, that which is its arrogant dogma, is not that natural selection plays a part, and evidently a very subordinate part, in the modification of species, but that it by itself suffices for the work, and is, through its tendency to conserve and intensify minute individual differences, probably the sole agency in the origination of species. He explicitly affirms that "natural selection acts only by the preservation and accumulation of minute inherited modifications;"* and concedes, with fearless confidence, "If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, and slight modifications, my [his] theory would absolutely break down."†

It is my purpose to state the dogma of Darwinism, not to attempt its formal refutation. This would be a task beyond the limits allowed me in this article. I must ask the indulgence of the reader, however, while I affirm that, by the test to which Mr. Darwin himself proposes to submit his theory, it has been tried—tried by naturalists as accurate in their estimation of facts as is Mr. Darwin, and far more rigid in their logic—and the result is, that it does "absolutely break down;" not in one or two, but in scores of instances. The complex organisms of the eye, the ear, the voice, are all utterly inexplicable upon the theory of "natural selection." In each of these organisms there are many co-operating parts, in each of which the corresponding

* "Origin of Species," fifth edition, 1869, page 110.

† Ibid., page 227.

variations would have been utterly useless had they not taken place at once. Now, the greater the number of the variations necessary to an improvement, the greater the improbability of their all being effected contemporaneously; and in the case of each of the organisms named, this improbability amounts to a moral impossibility.

"If we suppose," says Mr. Murphy, a distinguished scientist, and himself, too, a generous and enthusiastic admirer of the genius of Mr. Darwin,—“if we suppose,” says he, speaking of the perfect eye, “that any single variation occurs on the average once in m times, the probability of that variation occurring in any individual will be $\frac{1}{m}$; and suppose that x variations must concur in order to make an improvement, then the probability of the necessary variations all concurring together will be $\frac{1}{m^x}$. Now suppose, what I think a moderate proposition, that the value of m is 1,000, and the value of x is 10, then $\frac{1}{m^x} = \frac{1}{1000^{10}} = \frac{1}{10^{30}}$. A number about ten thousand times as great as the number of waves of light that have fallen on the earth since historic time began! And it is further to be observed, that no improvement will give its possessor a *certainly* of surviving and leaving offspring, but only an *extra chance*, the value of which it is quite impossible to estimate.”*

Now, let it be considered that what is true with respect to the improbability of the complex organism of the eye having been formed upon the principle of “natural selection”—that is, by the fortuitous concurrence of many minute variations in reproducing and improving themselves—is equally true of other complex organisms in the human body (as, for instance, the ear, the voice, etc.), and it will be seen that there is such a complexity and multiplication of impossibilities, if I may use such an expression, as not only to surpass all our powers of enumeration, but as utterly to paralyze the imagination and confound the reason. But that which we can neither imagine nor rationally apprehend is, by its very nature, to us a moral impossibility; and such is the theory of Darwinism! Such is the probability that an imaginary gemmule has been the dædal mother of all things, and that man himself is but the chance; that is, the undesigned result of infinite variations struggling for existence, and, in the battle for life, developing into higher forms of organism, upon the principle of “natural selection” or the “survival of the fittest!” Think of it, dear reader, that the chances are as a thousand quintillions to one that even your eyes could have been so formed, and how hopeless the probability is that a respectable monkey or tailless

* “Habit and Intelligence,” Vol. I, page 319.

ape could have been your ancestor! Surely, we must discover some more plausible proof of our genealogy, if we would establish our claims to be sprung of such noble progenitors! What honor would we not owe to these æsthetic grandfathers, if we could only believe in them!—to the first gallant baboon, for instance, who, with an artist's eye for the beautiful, detected the superior charms of the Miss Baboon that happened to be developed with hairless ischial callosities, and forthwith selected her for his spouse, and so inaugurated a line of improvement, which, by careful watching, has at length spread over the whole body, and brought us up to the beautiful and useful perfection of well-nigh hairless nakedness! Could he have foreseen the wide bearings that his happy choice had upon the destinies of his race, how his soul would have exulted in the splendid vision! Spinning and weaving and stitching; the spindle, the loom, and the sewing-machine; with all the stir of commerce and art of personal decoration which they foster,—these and countless other things have come of it. Strange ingratitude, that what our beauty-loving grandfathers and grandmothers so persistently, and with so much good taste, sought to develop in us, we should with equal persistency labor to cover up and hide! No sooner were our bodies rid of our ancestral hair than we began to cover ourselves with the hair of other things; and now, to admire clothes, and seek a spouse with reference to such decorations, is the characteristic of the living descendant of that baboon that first discovered the beauty of a hairless skin! Can it be that the human representative of this ancient ancestor is setting off in another line of development, and that the time is coming when the world will be peopled with a race born in clothes and decorated upon the principle of "natural selection," as the lilies, without toiling or spinning, with bonnet and plume, and cincture and robe, and whatever else is beautiful in color, fascinating in form, or rich in substance? Darwinianly speaking, it is only a question of time.

Do I intend to disparage the patient and wide-searching labors of Mr. Darwin? Not consciously, I am sure. He ranks, deservedly, among the first of living naturalists, and has so harried the fields of Natural History that but little in all the zones of animated nature has escaped him. To almost exhaustless industry and intuitive keenness of observation, he adds the subtle insight of genius and

the regulative faculty of reason, to a degree and in a combination but rarely realized in one mind. His soul is fired by the lofty inspiration, *cognoscere causas rerum*—"to mount to the causes of things"—and to disclose the *rerum primordia*, the first elements, of the infinitely varied animal and vegetable life that fills the earth. His contributions to our knowledge, both by his own experiments and observations and by the gathered stores of his research, are varied and valuable. His fertility in the invention of theories, his admirable felicity of language, and the almost poetic enthusiasm with which he pursues the shadowy resemblances out of which he builds his imaginary system, so astonish and fascinate us that we are reluctant not to agree with him.

But patient and ingenious as have been his experiments, keen as his observation, and, in the fields of natural history, almost universal as his research, he has had before him, through it all and in it all, but a narrow purpose. The foregone conclusion has vitiated his inductions, the prepossession of a theory has colored his analysis of facts, and his eagerness to discover *proofs* diverted his mind from the unbiased investigation of *truth*. "The human understanding," says Lord Bacon, "resembles not a *dry light*, but admits a tincture of the will and passions, which generate their own system accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which he prefers." And again: "It is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human understanding to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives, whereas it ought duly and regularly to be impartial; nay, in establishing any true axiom, the negative instance is the most powerful." (Nov. Org. Aph., 46, 49.)

This great canon of the "Organon," Darwin violates in all his labors. There is "a tincture of the will and passions" thrown over the facts of nature, under which "affirmatives" glow in light, while "negatives" fall into shadow. What harmonizes with the fancy of "natural selection" is seized, and set in the growing circle of proofs; but the negative instances—they are set aside and forgotten. Yet it is under these that his theory breaks down.

Darwinism is an illustration of scientific dogmatism. But dogmatism is not peculiar to science. We find it equally, if not more frequently, in theology; and often these two in bristling antagonism. Theological dogmatism is often the merest superstition,

which is, in its essence, a false apprehension of God and divine things. Superstition sees every thing through a veil of mystery; it interposes its own many-colored shadows, and so discolours and darkens revelation. The hue of the prism mingles with the colors of the spectrum, and confuses the analysis. The true mystery that sleeps in the infinite depths which lie in the background of all our knowledge, the unfathomableness that draws out the soul in unutterable longings, and out of which God reflects himself as from a mirror,—this, superstition replaces by a false mystery, which is born of its own darkened understanding, and which obscures the impenetrable clearness out of which God appears to us, and which is the secret pavilion of his presence. Superstition sees through a glass darkly; but the eye enlightened as Paul's, in a glass, bright reflections of things ineffable it may be, but only through excess of light. The mystery is not a mystery of darkness, but of clear depths of inscrutable glory.

All have met with superstitious dogmatism. Paul calls it *ἐθελοθρησκεία*, *will-worship*; that is, *self-devised worship*—a word which we find not in classic Greek, and which Paul probably coined to express the deeper philosophy with which he penetrated the secret workings of man's religious nature. It is a zeal for God indeed, but, like that of the imaginative and reverential Greek, not according to knowledge. We are in the habit of thinking that superstition is confined to the ignorant heathen; but this is a great mistake. Superstition is indeed the foster-child of ignorance; but not of ignorance in the wisest sense, or indeed the common sense, of the term. The Athenians, with their multiplied creations of idols, were yet the light and the ornament of the world. The Romans were superstitious, but not, as we commonly speak, ignorant. Yet Greeks and Romans were ignorant of the true God—had and cherished false notions of Him and of divine things; and this was the nursery of their superstition. It is useful to remember that superstition may be found where there is much knowledge of many things. Paul teaches us that idolatry springs from the arrogance of knowledge and the vanity of imagination, not from stolid ignorance or stupid insensibility. It is rather the wild overgrowth of exuberant fancy, blindly striving to realize in fixed forms the native intuition of supernal power. Who that understands the mythology of the Greeks, and has penetrated into the

subtle spiritual symbolism which it embodies, can call it the product of ignorance or intellectual inferiority! It stands among the sublimest of the creations of the human mind, for the reason that it is the invention of the loftiest and most cultivated intellect upon the highest theme that can engage the heart or exercise the understanding. It is ingenious, it is beautiful, it is preternatural; it is all that the intuition of the Divine, unaided by inspiration, could make it; and stands, like the Babel-tower, monumental at once of man's native thirst for the immortal and divine, and of his utter impotency, unaided by revelation, rightly to know or at all find out God.

This false conception of God and of divine things which is of the essence of superstition, is peculiar to no age or people. Demetrius and his fellow-craftsmen still survive, hammering away at their silver shrines, and getting no small gain by their cunning handiwork. "Great is Diana!"—the old mob-cry of Ephesus—still rings fiercely in our streets, and fulminates from the columns of our newspapers. The politic town-clerks, the self-complacent appeasers of superstitious rage—they, too, are still among us, with their bland voices, quieting the tumult of the people with false assurances that their Jupiter images are true, impregnable gods, "not to be spoken against," and bidding them "take their ease in their possessions." Truth, in the mean time, may retire to Macedonia for a calmer audience; but her voice is not silenced. Its echoes will roll back, and strike the hollow images of Ephesus, and rebuke the specious lies that lurk in her temple.

I said that scientific dogmatism and theologic dogmatism often meet in bristling antagonism. But there can be no antagonism in truth. *Scientific truth* can never be at war with *theologic truth*. Both are revelations from, and of, the one true and living God; both are addressed to the same fallible being, for study and interpretation; and both are alike liable to be misunderstood. When the dogmas of the scientist and of the theologian clash, therefore, there is error in one, it may be in both. What mistakes have both made, and with what dogmatism does each assume its own infallibility!

It used to be said, "The undevout astronomer is mad;" so manifest is the hand of God in the midst of the starry magnificence, and so worshipful his power in the order and grandeur of their movements. Now, it is rather the fashion to associate the pursuit of science

with infidelity, or a kind of rationalism, that reduces Christianity to little more than a superior system of ethics; and so the theologian easily comes to suspect the scientist. He is alarmed at his investigations, and shuts his mind against a fair and thoughtful examination of his discoveries. He takes it for granted that the theories of the scientist have a lurking viper of infidelity in them, and is for putting his heel upon their heads without further consideration. The scientist, in turn, with the old conceit of his class, thinketh himself wise, and his neighbor a fool; and so the antagonism waxes fierce, and both are diverted from the honest investigation of truth, to the blind and fierce defense of their respective dogmas. It never occurs to them that they may be both blind leaders of the blind. "Stop," says the theologian, "your theory of development is contrary to the Bible." "Nonsense," retorts the physicist, "your Bible contradicts nature. Look at that old story of Moses about the six days of creation, and compare it with the records of the rocks. And then remember Galileo!" And so they stand grinning at each other, with scornful words of dogmatic ignorance. The one assumes that his interpretations of the Bible are infallible; the other, that his conjectures about nature are demonstrations. And therefore the one says, "Down with science! as a study, it tends to infidelity;" and the other cries, "Down with the Bible! as a book of inspiration, it is refuted by science." Meantime wiser men, believing both books, and open to the reception of all truth, have reviewed the statements of each, and, comparing that old story of Moses with the records of the rocks, find that there is no necessary contradiction in the case. And as to Galileo, sensible men have long since agreed to let the owls of science hoot at the Pope and his cardinals about that, to their heart's content. One would think they had made the night hideous, with their inconsequent babblings about it, long enough to satisfy even an Ephesian mob. The Bible is about as much responsible for it as for image-worship, or the sale of indulgences, or the tax of Peter-pence. Amid the din and dust of dogmatic strife, Nature and the Bible both still raise their heads, standing together impregnable in their Divine harmony—the one the *work*, the other the *word* of God. I love and believe them both, and have no fear, "whatever record may leap to light," that either will ever be put to shame.

We notice that the battle of dogmatism is not confined to different spheres of thought and action. It is often fiercest between aspiring chiefs in the same family. In science, the Vulcanists and the Plutonians, the Nebularists, the Uniformitarians, the Darwinians, and other species of indeterminate origin, are busily engaged in "the struggle for life," working out, it may be, in their reciprocal strife, the problem of "natural selection," and expecting, in the end, "the survival of the fittest." It is sad to think that the verdict which we so much covet is, after all, hanging upon "the lapse of time, practically infinite." In theology, also, Augustine and Pelagius, Calvin and Arminius, and many of smaller minds, have gone down in dogmatic strife, with the field yet unconquered, and swarming with belligerents.

True, in these degenerate days, with the facilities and the necessities of newspapers, the dogmatists are, many of them, smaller, and busy themselves on the less weighty matters of the law. Still the mint, anise, and cummin are taxable; and, though small matters, they involve the *principle* of tithing as much as things of greater value; and your dogmatist is always strong for "the principle of the thing." One loves a fine architectural house of worship, with Catherine-wheels and spacious aisles and lofty ceilings, and, over all, a dim religious light falling from stained windows, and the majestic swell of the organ pouring out sublime music under the hand of a professional performer; and he can hardly believe that any man is a Christian who does not delight in these "adjuncts" to worship. He wants them, thinks they are good—in fact, necessary to success—and so grows peremptory about them, and will have them, and denounces him as little better than a heathen, an uncultivated boor, who is opposed to them. Another thinks the secret of all reverence and excellence in the Church is wrapped up in the distinction between clergy and laity. The cut of the coat, the color of the cravat, the gown, the surplice, the band, alb, stole, and dalmatica,—these are, or should be, badges of priestly awe and dignity, to give effect to ceremony and pomp to worship; to mark his reverence, and distinguish him from the common herd of the laity. And there should be rich altars and gilded crosses, and dreamy light of inextinguishable candles, and solemn chantings and liturgic readings, with mazy movements to and fro, and worshipful genuflexions of

priests and retinues of trained boys, and other stage effects, to dazzle the eye, and fascinate the fancy, and awe the feelings into fit mood for "divine service." By such pageantry only, can the Most High be attracted to come down and dwell in his holy temple. Less than this is vulgar profanity, and unfit for the respect of gentlemen.

O, ye gentlemanly dogmatists, who sit at ease in your cushioned pews, and, rapt in elysian dreams of sensuous pleasure, fancy yourselves the *élite* of the Church, the guardians of its respectability and purity, what think ye of Him who, in reply to the anxious inquiry of the imprisoned Baptist, and as highest proof of his mission, answered, "The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, to the poor the Gospel is preached; and blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me?"

Opposed to the dogmatism of refinement and fashion, we notice another species, which we may call, by contrast, vulgar dogmatism. It is sharply and vigilantly hostile to liturgies and choirs, read sermons and all sorts of printed manuals, except such as editors and their free contributors give us in ephemeral religious weeklies; to educated preachers with white hands, who quote Greek and Hebrew, and wear gloves, and walk with silver or gold headed canes; to paid pastors, who milk the goats and starve the lambs; to organization and missionary societies; to architecture, particularly Catherine-wheels; to dim religious lights, particularly stained glass; to instrumental music, particularly the "ground-out sort;" to altar scenes and decorations, particularly crucifixes and wax candles; to the "order of the clergy," particularly such as are called "Reverend;" to priestly vestments, particularly gowns and white cravats, and whatever else it scornfully calls "*toggery*." These all, it regards as so many disguises of antichrist, and, like the rough Douglas greedy for the blood of majesty, flourishes its arm, and cries:

"Now, by my sword, I will kill all his coats;
I'll murder all his wardrobe, piece by piece,
Until I meet the king!"

Doubtless the reader has seen and heard individuals of this species. They prate much against pride, but with a rough arrogance that it is hard to imagine to be born of humility. The weapons of their warfare, too, are by no means spiritual. They hate with a

carnal unction that is absolutely ugly. They persecute, for the smallest differences, with a bitterness and injustice surely never prompted by love nor guided by conscience. They resort to measures, too, sometimes, which are scarcely as respectable or manly as the old school-boy freak of "barring out the school-master" for holiday. And sometimes the most fantastic conceits are magnified into idols, and tricked out for worship.

The time has been when superstition made saints of mountains and cloaks and handkerchiefs, and actually offered prayers to them, and granted indulgences for worship paid to them. There was "Saint Mount Oracle," and "Saint Cloak Amphibolus," and "Saint Handkerchief Veronica;" and with each of these there was some *idea* associated, which was thought to have power to bless. The baptism of bells is still practiced. They have godfathers and godmothers, like other children of the Church, and are inscribed with words indicative of their function in "Divine service."

"Colo verum Deum; plebem voco; et congrego clerum;
Divos adoro; festa doceo; defunctos ploro;
Pestem, dæmones fugo."

"I adore the true God; I summon the people; I convene the priests; I worship the saints; I teach the festivals; I mourn the dead; I drive away pestilence and devils." Here, again, there is an *idea* underlying the symbol. The bell is *named*; and the idea is, that the *saint* whose name is given to it, speaks by its tongue. It represents the saint, personates him or her, and so is the medium of blessings.

Among the shameful superstitions that the Reformation overthrew, the most degrading and bestial was the festival called "the Feast of the Ass." It was in honor of the "Virgin Mary's" flight into Egypt, which, they assumed, was upon the back of an ass. It was observed on the 14th of January. A beautiful young woman, with an infant in her arms, represented the Virgin Mother and the Holy Child. They were mounted upon an ass richly caparisoned, and, followed by the bishop and his clergy, marched in solemn procession to the Church, where they were placed near the altar, and high mass commenced. Instead of the usual responses, however, the people were taught to bray. A ludicrous hymn, half Latin,

half French, was solemnly sung by priests and people in praise of the ass.

"Ecce magnis auribus!
Subjugalis filius;
Asinus egregius,
Asinorum dominus!"

"See the broad majestic ear!
Born he is the poke to wear;
All his fellows he surpasses,
He's the very lord of asses!"

And, breaking out in a thunderous chorus of invocation, the whole congregation sang:

"Now, Signior Ass, a noble bray!
That beauteous mouth at large display;
Abundant food our hay-lofts yield,
And oats abundant load the field."

In some eight or ten similar stanzas were the honors of the ass celebrated, when the worship closed with a grand braying match between the clergy and the laity. The clergy led off with three appalling brays; and all the people, lifting up their voices, as the sound of many asses, responded imitatively:

"Hez va! hez va! hez va hez!"

We laugh at these wild dogmas of a time gone by; and then, in sober thought, exclaim, "Disgusting superstition!" "But," says the dogmatist, "there is a pious *idea* here, that it is profanity to laugh at. This worshipful gratitude is in acknowledgment of the service rendered in saving from the rage of Herod the holy child Jesus." This is the dogma: What the worshiper *thinks* of the "Feast," and to him it is sacred—to despise it, is sacrilege.

I have attempted to give some dim idea of dogmatism, by definition and example. I have a few words to suggest on the subject of "its cure." I must deal in general propositions, and with a brevity that, I fear, will prove obscure.

The evil is both of the head and of the heart. Narrow abstractions or broad unanalyzed generalizations,—these are the *intellectual* causes of dogmatism. Evil passions, uncharitableness, self-conceit, willfulness,—these are the *moral* causes of dogmatism. The remedy for both, so far as they can be remedied (and that, of course, is only partially),—the remedy is in a broad, full, all-sided, manly culture.

Train the mind in nothing but language and forms of logic, distinctions of words, categories of thought, and imagination of theories, and you breed a school of sophists—Aristotelian or scholastic, according as you admit, more or less, the regulative light of experience. Narrow the mind to unreflecting observation; limit it to the sphere of its own experience; fix its gaze alone on phenomena, with no apprehension of law—upon effects, with no search for causes,—and you breed a brood of empirics. Again: unduly abandon the faculties to the control of the feelings, the fancy, and the imagination, and you generate mystics, children of blind superstition, who “see men as trees walking,” and grope about in a world but half realized, grasping at shadows. Still further: let the training be thoroughly scientific, but confined to physics; let it be inductive and logical—broadly based on observation and experiment, and skilled in the judgment of premises and the use of proofs, till you reach the grand development of a Huxley or a Tyndall,—and yet you have only a physicist, perhaps a materialist. The supersensuous world of spirit has never been brought within the field-view of their telescopes or microscopes or spectroscopes; and because it is not so known, and, upon Paul’s authority, *can not be so known*, they are ready to deny that there is such a world. Good Christians are sometimes startled at the dogmatism of scientists about spiritual things, telling what they see and can not see through their glasses—what they read and can not read in the rocks. Do they forget that it is of the very nature of spirit *not* to be seen in a telescope? One would think that these dogmatists imagine the spirit to be subject to physical analysis; and that, passed through a prism, it should yield a spectrum, and report its composition! But when a man has shut himself up to the examination of the physical world alone, and to only such phenomena and methods of investigation as belong to it, what else can we expect of him? One who is color-blind can not discern colors, and one that is spiritually blind can not discern spiritual things.

It should not be astonishing, therefore, when a physicist, like Dr. Tyndall, who has become famous by finding out so many wonderful things about atmospheric dust and sound-vibrations and light-undulations, and who can lecture so eloquently and illustrate so luminously about them, should nevertheless make himself, in a

measure, ridiculous before the judgment of the common sense of mankind, by supposing that the efficacy of prayer is to be tested by physical experiment. Had the religious side of Dr. Tyndall's nature been duly cultivated, he could never have fallen into this folly.

It is not sufficient to educate the intellect alone, even though you cultivate in due proportion all its faculties. The "tincture of the will" must be of *Divine* light. Hues as from heaven must rest upon all our seeing. The heart must be made good; for out of it proceed the worst fruits of dogmatism. Neglect the passions, give them unbridled freedom, and the nature will run into shameless profligacy, degrading debauchery, bestial licentiousness, and society become a lava-bed of intrenched violence, scheming treachery, and lurking for blood. Allow the will to become a law unto itself, and, by idolatrous self-exaltation, to put itself in the place of God, and to say there shall be no other gods beside *me*,—and you nurse the demon of a dogmatism that will create a solitude, if necessary, that the iron rule of its tyranny may have peace.

This education of the heart must begin at the fireside; it must be furnished its first lessons in the typical sacrifices that father and mother lay daily upon the family altar; it must flow as the very life-current through all the discipline of the primary school. Upon the wrists and the frontlets of the pupils, and the phylacteries of the teachers, there must be written, in characters of living light, the one supreme, eternal law of noblest human impulse and action, "Little children, love one another." It must pass with the scholars to the higher forms of the academy, and rule the presiding genius in the person of the pedagogue. And in the college, in the university, where all the arts and all the sciences and all the professions are taught and learned,—over the entrance to these wide and high temples of all manly human culture—if we would send forth full men, thoroughly furnished for the noble services of life, lifted above the narrowness and the tyranny of dogmatism, all-sided in their sympathies, and, like the oxygen in the physical world, universal in affinity for all that is good and fruitful of blessing in the social and spiritual realms of thought and of action,—in these consecrated places, over the entrance and upon the walls, and reflected from the hearts of the students, let the motto ever stand, "the master light of all their seeing," Reverence for God and Charity for Man.

V. FÉNELON AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.

II.

FÉNELON AS A MISSIONARY IN SAINTONGE.

UPON the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, a general crusade of "missions" was organized by the Court and Church of France. Wherever in the kingdom there were any Protestants, missionaries were sent fully armed for their work. We have already given a description of these missions, in the beginning of this article. They were purely and simply crusades of artifice, of violence, moral and physical, and of exterminating persecution, often of the most terrible kind, against the Huguenots. The missionaries and the dragoons, who were pleasantly called "*booted* missionaries," went together. The *missionnaires bottés*, indeed, were regarded far more effective in the work than their black-robed fellows. The Bishop de Mirepoix closes one of his villainous letters to the Duke de Noailles, under date of August 22, 1685, in these words:

"I rejoice, in advance, at all the good you will do in our midst, and offer myself to you as one of your missionaries, *although I am aware that those who strike are more effective than those who talk.*"*

This was a common sentiment; and Fénelon himself, as we shall see, regarded the dragoons as very efficient aids.

When this universal crusade of terror was opened against the Protestants, attention was especially directed to those provinces where these were the most numerous. Aunis and Saintonge, lying on the Atlantic Ocean, with Rochelle as the chief city, had an immense Protestant population. It is well known how famous Rochelle was in Huguenot history. This region was singled out for especial, vigorous missionary effort. It had already been fearfully ravaged and desolated by the dragonnades,† and now the "missions" were to be carried on with new "apostolic vigor."

* "Bulletin," Vol. I, page 167.

† To make more clear the circumstances in the midst of which Fénelon accepted his mission, the condition of its theater, we need simply state a few facts:

In the Summer of 1685, "eight hundred 'booted missionaries' were sent to Rochelle and its vicinity. At first their conduct was restrained, and they made terms with those with whom

A chief was wanted for this great mission, that was to gather in the fruitful harvest of the preceding efforts made here by priests, monks, and dragoons, and to crown the work with immortal success. Bossuet, Madame de Maintenon, and the Jesuit Père la Chaise, proposed Fénelon. He was chosen, and accepted the office. "It was natural," says his biographer—and we agree with him—"that the author of the "Treatise on the Protestant Ministry,"* and the

they were lodged, to compensate for not committing outrages. But the *convertisseurs* having heard of this, forbade them this moderation. Immediately they changed their manners, and committed a thousand cruelties. But this did not go fast enough. Arnoul sent four companies of dragoons, who had already ruined the [Huguenot] nobility of the neighborhood. They entered Rochelle, as into a city taken by assault, and scattered terror in every direction. All had to yield. Every thing was laid waste by less than two hundred dragoons and eight hundred fusiliers. The contagion of this ruin swept away also the Isle of Ré, and all that remained of the Reformed in the neighborhood." (Elié Benoit, *Histoire de l'Edit de Nantes*, V, page 862.)

On the 8th of September, Louvois, the minister, wrote to the Marquis de Boufflers: "His majesty relies on you to march to La Saintonge the number of infantry, cavalry, and dragoons you may judge proper. . . . Send all the troops necessary to oblige these obstinate *religionnaires* to give the good example; . . . let them see that those to whom they belong [their Protestant feudal lords] can no longer give them any protection." On the 13th, he commanded D'Asfeld to send the Battalion de Vendome into the Isle of Ré. On the 6th of October, Louvois wrote again to De Boufflers: "You must take pains, by detachments of soldiers, to finish the purging out of what remains of *religionnaires* in the province. In case there are still any at Barbezieux [the property of Louvois himself], I entreat you to begin with them."

On the 17th of November, the minister writes to Foucault: "I have received the letter you have taken the trouble to write to me, of the 12th of this month, and have given an account of it to the king. He commands me to inform you that his intention is, that the dragoons of the regiment D'Asfeld, which is among the nobility of the Pretended Reformed Religion of Lower Poitou [bordering on Saintonge], remain there until these are converted; and that, instead of conducting themselves with the good order [!] which they have hitherto observed, they are to commit every possible outrage (*le plus de désordre qu'il se pourra*), to punish this nobility for their disobedience." That is, in not being at once converted!

In December, Louvois wrote again to M. de Ris: "There is no better means of persuading the Huguenots, whom the king is no longer willing to suffer in France, than to severely maltreat those of Barbezieux." These were on Louvois's own land—his own people!

The character and effect of the "missions" in these regions is learned from official statements of a date a few years later. In 1698, the intendant Bezons wrote, that "the single diocese of Saintes [La Saintonge] had lost a hundred thousand inhabitants. The cities were deserted, industry annihilated; scarcely enough people could be found to till the land." The intendant of the generality of Rochelle, in a memoir drawn up in 1699, said: "This country is gradually going to ruin by the diminution of more than one-third of its population."

Much more might be added; but this is enough to give an idea of the condition of the theater accepted by Fénelon as his missionary field. It was precisely in the midst of the dates first above given, in the Autumn of 1685—about October—at the very hour almost of the Revocation of the Act of Toleration, when all the furies of persecution were let loose, that Fénelon proceeded with his missionary troop, composed largely of Jesuits, to this field of "conversions!"

* "Traité du Ministère des Pasteurs," *Œuvres Choiesies*, v. 3.

superior of the *Nouvelles Catholiques*, should be one of the workmen called to render fruitful the work of Madame de Maintenon and Louis XIV." What this work was, we have seen.

No man with even the most moderate views and feelings about religious toleration, the sacred rights of conscience, and of the New Testament doctrine of converting men, could ever possibly have accepted such a mission amid such scenes, with such immediate antecedents, with such accompaniments, and at such hands and with such a control. It was the heritage of the brutal dragonnades that was offered to Fénelon. A mission conducted in the spirit of the Gospel, of Christian charity, and of toleration, was what no one among all these thought of or understood, and what was utterly impossible. There is not a single instance of such a mission anywhere in France at this time—before the Revocation or after it, during the whole century—and Fénelon perfectly understood this. His words before the king, before starting for Saintonge, about the weapons of the Gospel, etc., were the words of idle rhetoric and of vanity—nothing more.

Let us now study Fénelon as a missionary. To do this, it is only necessary to read his own "Letters on the Missions."* And, here, we must note a striking instance of willful unfaithfulness to truth in the Jesuistic method of dealing with history. Cardinal Bausset, in his eulogistic "Life of Fénelon," in which he is never weary of holding his hero up before a later age as a model of sweetness, charity, and toleration, in giving these missionary letters, suppresses entire passages, and precisely those that compromise his hero before the world in the manner of his dealing with "heretics." This deceitful suppression is itself a condemnation of Fénelon. But now for these letters; let Fénelon himself tell us what he was as a missionary. Only let us observe that, to understand him right, we must remember that Fénelon was one of the most cautious and crafty of men; especially in any thing he committed to writing. Nothing is more marked in his own character than his vanity in giving himself high praise, by showing the extraordinary power of his persuasiveness, and that he could effect by this alone what no other man could. This led him to give the most roseate coloring to his efforts and success. In skillful self-laudation these letters are masterpieces; and in the

* "Œuvres Choiesies," Tome IV.

power of *concealment*, by rhetoric and euphemisms, he has few equals. And yet the truth broke through, in spite of all.

The cruelties practiced on the Huguenots of Saintonge and the adjoining regions, had induced great numbers to leave the country by every way open to them, but especially by sea, as this country lies on the ocean, and Rochelle was then an important seaport, and as there was a constant and direct intercourse with Protestant maritime Holland. Many of the Huguenots, also, were seafaring people. This, the last, and indeed only, hope of freedom and deliverance left to the persecuted Huguenots, Fénelon was determined should be cut off. In his letters, dated La Tremblade, February 7th, addressed to the Marquis de Seignelay, the royal secretary, he says:

"The greater part of the people declare loudly that they will leave here as soon as the weather becomes favorable for navigation. I take the liberty, Monsieur, to represent to you, that I think that the guard of the places where they will have to pass should be increased. I am assured, also, that the river of Bordeaux does even yet more harm than the passages of this coast, since all those who wish to flee pass that way, under pretext of some business. It seems to me that the authority of the king should not be relaxed in any respect. . . . It is to be feared that a great number will leave in the vessels from Holland that will come to Bordeaux for the March fair."

In another letter the same vigilance against the emigration of the Huguenots is commanded. The last and most cruel act of tyranny, that crushes every hope, is to forbid an oppressed people to emigrate—to shut them up in the tyrant's land, as in a prison, to be treated at the oppressor's will. To this extreme cruelty Fénelon lent his hand. He becomes the voluntary informer with the king against the poor Huguenots, in order to barricade their passage to a land of freedom; and all this treachery while, as he himself tells us, he pretends to be their best friend to their face. And what confidence can we put in what Ramsay, the Scotchman, reports that Fénelon, when Archbishop of Cambray, said to him: that if the Protestants in his diocese desired to emigrate, he would give them all passports? * But there are other passages to be cited. In the same letter he says:

"While we are employing the charity and the gentleness of instructions, it is important, if I am not mistaken, that those who have the authority should make it

*The author of the "Notice" cites this very conduct of Fénelon as a proof that he did not understand and practice toleration and "the liberty of conscience," as understood and "invoked by Protestants;" and says that Fénelon was the *first* to do this bad office to the Huguenots with the minister. (See the quotation in the first part of this article, page 376.)

felt, the better to make the people sensible of the happiness of being kindly instructed. I believe monsieur the intendant will be here in a few days; this will be very useful, for he will make himself feared and loved at the same time. A little visit which he has just made us at Marennes did wonders; he succeeded in subduing the most difficult spirits. Since that time we have found the people more prompt and docile."

See the craftiness of this missionary! "We will employ the [everlasting] *charité* and *douceur* of instructions"—sweet words—"we will instruct them *doucement*;" "but, if I mistake not, the men of authority" should back us up, and make our "charity and gentleness" effectual, by putting one hand to the people's throat, and draw the glittering sword over them with the other. This is precisely the simple meaning of Fénelon's artful words. In the same letter he declares that "the authority should be inflexible to hold in check these spirits, whom the least mildness renders insolent."

In his letter from the same place, of March 8th, the same is expressed:

"In the mean time, the stubborn and indocile natural disposition of these people demands an authority vigorous and always vigilant. We must not do them any harm; but they need to feel a hand always lifted up to strike them if they resist. The Lord of Chatellars, sub-delegate of Mons. Arnoul, supplies very well what Mons. Forant can not do in this respect. The mildness of the one and the firmness of the other, being united, will do a great deal of good."

Again, in the same letter:

"An authority is also needed that never relaxes, to oblige all the families to send their children to Catholic schools."

Other extracts, of the same tenor, could be added; but want of space forbids. The passages we have quoted—with the exception of a few lines, the least offensive—are some of those suppressed by Bausset. It is difficult to conceive of a deeper perversion of mind on the subject of the rights of conscience than is here shown by Fénelon. To refuse the ready submission of conviction and conscience to the Catholic missionary, is hardness of heart and indocility; to hold an ever-uplifted sword ever ready to strike, if he resist the "charity and gentleness" of the priest, is "doing them no harm;" to convert men with the pressure and terrors of the civil and military powers to support him, is apostolic, is the gospel of peace; to use gifts and bribes—for this he commends in his letters—is "evangelical!" It is evident that Fénelon had not the most elementary

ideas of true liberty of conscience. His words, that seem to mean it, must be judged by his own comments and actions. With him, any relaxation of the supreme power of the Church and the king, was policy, prudence, mercy, charity—no more. An absolute right to freedom of conscience and its exercise in worship, and in the advocacy of faith he knew nothing of, he utterly denied.

Of course, Fénelon's eulogists, Cardinal Bausset and Father Querbœuf, see all this in a very different light, and have only words of admiration and of the sweetest praise of the "evangelical and truly apostolical missionary." But their words lose all confidence when we see how they also speak of Louis XIV and his purposes. This gives us the key to their language. Bausset says:

"Louis XIV had just revoked the Edict of Nantes; and in removing the pastors, whose presence would naturally be a hinderance to the success of his designs for the reunion of all his subjects in the same religion, he could not leave their former proselytes without religious instruction and without principles of morality. He resolved to send missionaries into the provinces where there were the most Protestants, to confirm in the doctrine of the Catholic Church those who had already returned to it, and to bring back those who still refused to come back to the religion of their fathers."*

This is the "sweet," delicate, and delightfully innocent way in which this cardinal delivers himself on one of the wickedest acts of absolute power; one of the most wholesale, cruel persecutions the modern history of the world has to record. Let no one, therefore, be surprised—and, no one is—to hear him talk of Fénelon's mission in a similar manner:

"Louis XIV attached so much importance to the success of the views of *confidence*, of *mildness*, [this everlasting *douceur*!] and *instruction*, which he had in the beginning adopted to bring back the Protestants, that he desired to make known, himself, his intentions to the Abbé de Fénelon."

Then we are told that Fénelon demanded that all troops and military array should be removed from his missionary field, as he desired only to exercise a ministry of peace and charity.

Father Querbœuf, following in the same vein, says that Fénelon told the monarch "that the sword of the Word, and the force of grace, were the only weapons which the apostles had employed," etc. These eulogists, it is quite evident, make a good deal of this language, as there is a coincidence in their words. Two things are,

* "Histoire de Fénelon," Vol. I, page 94.

however, perfectly certain: that Fénelon always assumed for himself great power of conversion, continually vaunted it, and this is just the occasion to make such a display before the monarch; and, secondly, that he did *not* execute his mission in this spirit, neither in Saintonge nor in the *Nouvelles Catholiques*. He did not remove the soldiery, the dragoons, but desired and praised their help, as his letters show. He wanted, besides, this *douceur apostolique* to support it, that the heretics should ever feel a threatening "arm uplifted over them." No wonder that Bausset *suppressed* the very passages we have quoted in Fénelon's missionary letters, as they would have given the lie flatly to his words about his hero's "mission of peace and charity."

There is another significant passage, however, in Bausset, showing that he felt himself that the world, after all, knew that there was more than *douceur evangelique* in Fénelon's missionary activity, and that he would have to give some explanation of it; and, O reader, note the masterly delicacy of the cardinal's skillful touching of this point! It is really worth studying. "Fénelon knew how to reconcile the zeal of a missionary with the sweetness (*douceur*) that was in his character." That is it—"the zeal of the missionary." That, reader, is the euphemism with Bausset for the dragoons, the "ever-uplifted arm," and all the cruel words in his letters, and acts in his work. Yes: with the Jesuit, this is mere "missionary zeal." But, again, the cardinal speaks thus of Fénelon's missionary letters to Seignelay (of which, remember, he had found it good to suppress the most odious parts):

"We observe in these the constant and invariable attention with which he sought always to give the predominance to the means of kindness and instruction, or, at least, to reconcile these with the measures of prudence and firmness which the Government was under the necessity of using to prevent the maneuvers of the powers jealous of France."

The secret is out. There was, after all, something else in Fénelon's missionary work besides "*douceur* and instruction;" and this something else was a little above mere "missionary zeal." Here it is "measures of prudence and firmness," etc. Is this not the very exquisiteness of Jesuitical refinement in the use of language? These are the Jesuitical definitions of the dragonnades.

But there are other very odious facts in Fénelon's history as a

missionary. He carried about with him an apostate Huguenot minister, to travesty the religion and arguments of the Protestants. "We make good use here," he says' in his letter of March 8th, "of the minister, who had here the entire confidence of the people, and who has become converted. We take him about with us in our public preachings, where we have him state what he formerly said to excite the people against the Catholic Church. This appears so weak and so rude and vulgar, that the people become outraged at him. The first time, several said to him, standing behind him: 'Why, then, you wicked man, have you deceived us? Why did you tell us that we must die for our religion, you who have abandoned us? Why do you not defend what you taught us?' He bore up under this confusion, and I expect much fruit from this." What are we to think of a man that could resort to such low artifices as engaging a miserable creature, such as he describes here, to play so mean a part? What kind of an exhibition, under the direction of the "missionaries," this "converted minister" would give of his former faith, can easily be conceived.

Fénelon sometimes himself played the part of the Protestant advocate, as he tells us, with much self-satisfaction, in the letter just quoted. This was in the presence of M. de Sainte-Hermine, a Protestant nobleman, whom he was extremely anxious to convert, and whose daughter Madame de Maintenon had forcibly abducted and placed in the *Nouvelles Catholiques*. "I acted the Protestant, and I said all that the ministers could say most convincing on their side. M. de Sainte-Hermine clearly saw the weakness of my reasons, whatever turn I might try to give them; (!) those of the Abbé Langeron [who played the Catholic] appeared to him decisive," etc. Is this not refreshing, this farce and its vain description by a man like Fénelon?

But there is another charge, that lies with great force against Fénelon, and that is his misrepresentations and revilings of Protestants. We need but refer to his letters from his mission as a proof of this. In that of February 26th he writes:

"These people are in the most violent agitation of mind; they feel a force in our religion and a weakness in their own, which strikes them with consternation. Their conscience is completely alarmed, and the most reasonable see very well where this must naturally end. But party alliance, false shame, habit, and the letters from Holland, which give them *horrible* hopes [*des espérances horribles*—

every thing Protestant was to him *horrible*],—all this keeps them in suspense, and, as it were, beside themselves."

What are we to say of this language and the spirit that is in it? When these unhappy people had been, by the most terrible cruelties by priest and dragoon, driven to despair, and were, in their agony, reaching out in every direction to heaven and earth for hope and relief, this priest, in the security of power and ease, coolly and pitilessly thus misrepresents and insults their very extreme miseries! Again, same letters:

"These spirits, unyielding, obstinate, and envenomed (*durs, opiniâtres, et envenimés*) against our religion, are nevertheless cowardly, and yield to motives of interest. If they are at all pressed, they are ready to commit innumerable sacrifices. To see them commune, you would suppose the work was done; but the only result is, that they are driven by remorse of their conscience to despair, or they are rather thrown into an impossibility or indifference of all religion, which is the height of impiety, and the seed of a multitude of the worst of men in all the kingdom."

If these Protestants are firm and steadfast in their faith against the religion of their persecutors, they are "*durs, opiniâtres, et envenimés*;" if, by the terrible "pressure" exercised on them, they in weakness yield, they are "*laches*," cowards; if they yield to the seductions of money and other favors, *recommended and used by Fénelon himself*, they are "*intéressés*," influenced by motives of interest; and the very despair, through remorse of conscience, to which they have been driven by Fénelon and his priests and dragoons, is a subject of pitiless censure and insult! And see with what *finesse* the worst terms are selected by him to misrepresent the character and conduct of his victims! To be firm and steadfast, is to be "*dur et opinâtré*," hard and stubborn; to reject his Church, is to be *envenomed* against it; and when Fénelon and his fellow-missionaries, frocked and booted, have made these people hypocrites and "*scélérats*," scoundrels, they finish by piously damning and reviling them for being what they made them.

But with all Fénelon's fine talk of his success, in his letters to Seignelay, the Secretary of State, to make a good impression of his abilities at court, it is evident that the truth was precisely the reverse. On this point his letters are full of flat contradictions. This "mildest of men" becomes finally irritated at his bad progress, and he pours out his spite against the Huguenots, who have grievously tarnished his fame as a *convertisseur*. In his last missionary

letter, addressed to Bossuet, March 8, 1686, he thus pours out his soul to his brother priest:

"Our progress," he sighs, "is very slow; it is not an easy matter to change the sentiments of an entire people. What difficulty must the apostles have had in changing the face of the world, to change the human mind, conquer all the passions, and establish a doctrine hitherto unknown, since we are not able to persuade ignorant men by clear and direct passages, which they have read every day, in favor of the religion of their ancestors, *and when even the authority of the king* excites all the desires to make persuasion more easy for us! But if this experience shows how great a miracle was the effectiveness of the discourses of the apostles, the weakness of the Huguenots does not the less show how divine was the power of the martyrs.

"The badly converted Huguenots are attached to their religion to the most horrible excess of stubbornness; but as soon as the rigor of punishments appears, all their strength leaves them. Where the martyrs were humble, docile, intrepid, and incapable of dissimulation, these are cowardly *against force*, stubborn against the truth, and ready for all kinds of hypocrisy. The remainder of this sect will fall, little by little, into an indifference of religion for all the external exercises, which should make us tremble. If they were to be made abjure Christianity and follow the Koran, *it would only be necessary to show them dragons,*" etc.

The words we have italicized give an insight into the means and manner of this missionary work, and the quiet reference to "punishments" and the "dragons" has a terrible meaning.*

But read the paragraph immediately following what we just quoted, and ask yourself what must the man be who, in such a connection, and in the midst of scenes of such wide and terrible woe, desolations, and miseries, can so write—so frivolously and heartlessly! He was weary of his mission, and longed for the delights of

* The words of Fénelon here have a significance far beyond what he himself imagined. What a fearful fulfillment of his prophecy have we seen! A great part of France, nobility and common people, as Protestants, were once under the diligent, instructive, and the powerful influence of the Bible and a child-like and strong Christian faith. What France might have become, had this great power for good been left free in its action, it is not difficult to judge. But the awful desolations wrought in it by the exterminating persecutions, driving countless multitudes of the best of these people away, and, as Fénelon says, making "hypocrites and villains" of the rest by forcibly destroying their faith and consciences, have brought moral ruin on France. Yes, the work of Louis XIV and Madame de Maintenon has been made "fruitful" by these "missions." But what a harvest!—"an impassibility and indifference of all religion," "the seed of the multitude of the worst of men," involving all the population—of all of which, the awful scenes of the Revolution, the Commune, and the present wide-spread desolations of atheism and infidelity are the accomplished history. "It should make us tremble," says Fénelon. The king, the nobility, the clergy of France, with many innocent men, did "tremble" when the ripe "fruits" of the harvest that Fénelon helped to sow were gathered in. A later Abbé de Fénelon, and the descendant and successor of Louis XIV himself, were bloody sheaves of the red harvest of the scaffold of the Revolution. Many writers of France, of all creeds, have traced the terrible logic of facts and events, as we have done here.

Germigny, a pleasant country retreat of Bossuet, and for the "other delights" of Paris.

"But when shall we see the Great Chancellor,* my Lord? It is high time that he should come to charm our *ennuis* in our solitude. I pray M. Cramoisi to have pity on us! 'O, Utinam!' . . .

"I pray you, my Lord, do not forget to speak of our recall to M. Seignelay. If he keeps us too long here away from you, we shall suppress the *Ave Marià*, and we may yet go so far as to be guilty of some great heresy, to obtain the happy disgrace that will bring us back to Germigny. This would be a blast of wind that would make us suffer a delightful shipwreck."

One of the men of whom Fénelon speaks in very high terms as a very valuable helper to him in his mission, is a M. Forfant. "The arrival of M. Forfant has given joy to the inhabitants [Protestants] of La Tremblade." He speaks of his example in religious devotion, and lauds also, of course, his *douceur*. Now, this man, whose character Fénelon knew perfectly well, was an apostate, in the pay of the king as a spy among the Protestants, especially the refugees in the Netherlands, engaged, under the guise of a Protestant, in inducing Huguenots that had escaped from France, by all manner of false promises, to return to France, when they were immediately arrested and punished. Several hundreds were thus, through this wretch, seduced back, and sent for life to the galleys. He, with an accomplice, was finally recognized at Amsterdam, and would have suffered the punishment due his villainy; but, by the unmerited kindness of a Protestant refugee, he was timeously warned, and escaped.

It is of moment in this connection to state also that, in his letters, Fénelon constantly praises, as his most esteemed and valuable co-workers, the Jesuits. He took these with him to Saintonge, as a part of his forces; and he declares that "the good beginning" he had made can only be properly sustained and carried out by the Jesuit fathers. "I have made the people hope much gentleness [*douceur*, every-where] and consolation from these good fathers, whose good life and knowledge I have highly extolled to them." "To awaken confidence among the people in these 'good fathers' [the Huguenots knew these black soldiers of the Papacy very well, and a good deal of art was necessary to awaken confidence in them], I have taken pains that several little favors, which we obtained for the

* "The Funeral Oration of Michel Letellier, the Chancellor," by Bossuet, just coming out of the press of Cramoisi. Fénelon was a famous flatterer!

inhabitants of Marennes, should pass in appearance through the channel of the Jesuits; and so made use of this to make the people feel that they are under obligation to them." The whole paragraph from which these words are taken is an admirable illustration of the art and subtlety of Fénelon, a characteristic indicated in the passages cited from Saint Simon and Nisard, in the first part of this article.

Before taking leave of Fénelon as a *convertisseur*, we must call attention, to make our picture complete, to a notable effort at proselyting, made in his mature years as archbishop.

One of the darkest pages in the history of the "missions" and "conversions," of which the Court of Louis XIV was the black center, is that which so abundantly records the liberal use of money—often very large sums—and of lucrative places, and other mercenary inducements, as means of "conversions." We give a specimen or two, from which the general character of these very numerous transactions may be understood.

LETTER OF CARDINAL DE BOUZY, ARCHBISHOP OF NARBONNE, TO THE DUKE DE NOAILLES,
ROYAL COMMANDANT IN LANGUEDOC.

"MONTPELLIER, *January 22, 1683.*

... "During the stay which I have made here, I have followed the plan of conversions which is known to you. I have discovered that Bordieu, the son, minister, has here connections and attachments that will facilitate his conversion, if he could be made to fear either an exile far away from here, or an order to quit the kingdom. If you judge it proper to send me here an order of arrest for this purpose, I am induced to hope that, by showing it to him, he can be disposed to listen to propositions; and, finally, by offering to him the position of a counselor at the presidial court, which the king will give him, and there being perquisites attached to this position, it will not be impossible to win him. He has talents, and it will be a good acquisition."

In a letter to the same, three days later, this worthy prelate discloses the same method of "winning" the brothers D'Arennes, for the younger of whom he begs a *bâton* in the royal household, and hopes "the king will offer him some *gratification*—pay for this position, as it will be well employed. It is superfluous to suggest to your prudence not to tell this secret to M. Boufflers." For the older, the "king will grant him *some advantage*." With these proposals he hopes to "convert" these two brothers. He has also been, in the same way, operating with a "minister and his son," but adds, with

commendable candor, "I have not been able to induce him to explain himself on the conditions." *

So much for a cardinal archbishop. The following letter is still more explicit, addressed also to Noailles:

LETTER OF CHARLES DE PRADEL, BISHOP OF MONTPELLIER, MAY 22, 1685.

"You have had the kindness, Monsieur, to use your influence with the king to obtain a pension of six hundred livres for Mademoiselle de Nancrest, who became a Catholic this Winter. Now, Monsieur, her elder sister is also ready, after the example of her sister, to make her abjuration; but as she desires an equal pension from his majesty, I believed that you would approve that I should address you a second time to obtain this favor. I hope in time that their brother will follow their example. This will be a great consolation for you, Monsieur, to have contributed so efficaciously to the conversion of an influential family in this province, as you will see from the memoir which I have the honor to send you." †

The upright, enlightened mind turns with indignation and the intensest loathing from these abominations. No man that knows and respects the very first principles of purity of conscience, of truth, and piety, can be guilty of such black hypocrisies and impieties. But among those who thus thought to bribe consciences with the lure of place and gold was Fénelon.

A young English Protestant lady, of eminent family, named Oglethorpe, had come to France to visit her sister, Madame de Mezières, wife of the Governor of Amiens, a city not far from Cambrai, the seat of Fénelon's archbishopric. The prelate met her—"by accident," he says (!)—"very shortly" after her arrival, and at once set to work to convert her. It would be a great glory for the eminent *convertisseur* to bring into the bosom of the true Church such a prize, and he consequently brought into play all his powers of *douceur* and *persuasion*; but, being resolved on a glorious victory, and not trusting to these alone, he re-enforced himself with less spiritual and honorable means. His letters on this subject, addressed to the Jesuit, Father Le Tellier, confessor of the king, reveal the full character of this enterprise of conversion.‡ The first of these letters, dated

* "Bulletin," Vol. I, p. 114.

† "Bulletin," Vol. I, p. 166. These letters are published from MSS. in the library of the Louvre.

‡ These letters are all published in the "Bulletin," Vol. VIII. A note in the "Bulletin" states that the first and longest of these—the one we quote, and that which most seriously compromises the character of Fénelon—was never before published, not even in his "Complete Works," in which what claims to be his full correspondence is published, and where the rest of the letters concerning this affair are found. This is another

Cambray, September 24, 1713, sufficiently sets forth this case, and we give it in full, and as it is moreover a model of its kind:

"An indispensable duty makes me forget, my reverend father, for to-day only, all the rules of the strictest discretion, in which I would not relax toward you.

"Chance made me acquainted with Mademoiselle Oglethorpe, sister of Madame de Mezières. But a very short time after she had come from England to France, she opened her heart to me on the troubles she had on the subject of her religion. I found in her a lively, penetrating, upright, and ingenuous mind. She stated to me her objections with force. I explained to her gently (*doucement*) the true doctrine of the Church, which is far different from that which the Protestants impute to us. Our conversations disquieted her. She went away to Paris, having her mind much agitated, and well convinced that all the pretended Reformers are inexcusable for having separated themselves from the Old Church.

"She has written to me from Paris several letters, and I see that God is operating in her heart, and that he is pressing her without relief for her conversion; but she can not take this step without incurring the indignation of her mother, who is an imperious woman, and opposed to the Catholic religion. By offending her mother, she will lose, according to the laws of the country, her share in the property of the family. She even has to give up a very advantageous offer made to her. This is, doubtless, for a young person of great spirit and life, and naturally very proud, a violent temptation to resist the attractions of grace. But it seems that she is willing to sacrifice all to her salvation, and to renounce England, provided she can find, in France, bread in a retreat. She is not acquainted with the convents, and what she has heard of them from the heretics in her own country repels her somewhat; but she would be content to pass her life in a chapter, in which she would be canoness. I have offered to exert myself to try to have her received at Manbenge; but we must first procure for her a subsistence, and I know of no other resource but that of the kindness of the king. His majesty did, last year, such a pious liberality to the Marquise de Langey, that this example makes me hope for some favor for Mademoiselle Oglethorpe. If you could see her, my reverend father, I am sure that you would be astonished and very much edified with her disposition. I have never found in any person more candor and nobility of sentiment, more courage and disinterestedness [!], to shut herself up in some retreat removed from her native land, even when she is certain in her own country of a very agreeable settlement.

"God is pursuing her, and does not leave her to herself, in order to rescue her from her false religion. I venture to say, that no good work is more worthy than this one of the zeal and of the benefits of his majesty. If Mademoiselle Oglethorpe were my relative, or if I were united in friendship with her family, I would be more timid and more reserved; but I have no human connection with her relatives, and it is only two months since I saw her, by a kind of accident, of which Providence deigned to make use. It concerns the salvation of a soul which I believe to be precious to God. The work is in good hands. I hope you will not have much difficulty to touch the heart of the king. I even believe that

unfaithfulness (easily understood, as are the mutilations of his missionary letters by Bausset), to the truth of history, in suppressing important historical documents, in order to shield from the just judgment and reproach of posterity, an eminent name.

God, who has changed the heart of a young lady so prejudiced against the true religion, will at once put into that of his majesty the desire to do what he has already so often done to facilitate conversions. A pension will remove all the difficulties, and place this person in a safe position for her whole life.

"It is with sincere veneration that I am, my reverend father, your very humble and very obedient servant,

† FR. AR. DUC DE CAMBRAY."

We commend this letter as a study. While in matter and purpose it is on the same level as the more vulgar ones of De Bouzy and De Pradel, in the charms of its piety and the exquisiteness of its *finesse*, it is far above them. Here we see the master. Note the constant, quick interchange, the glittering interweaving, of the gifts of place and the work of grace, of God and of gold; the high-wrought picture of the combined charms of mind, of disposition, of piety, and of longing for the true religion, of flattery of the king,—all as combined forces to draw from his majesty the coveted favor to enable the archbishop to win these fresh laurels as a *convertisseur*. It is a masterpiece in its kind, worthy of the priest experienced in his arts, and of the academician and author of the "Dialogues on Eloquence." The keen Jesuit, Le Tellier, evidently understood Fénelon's rhetoric, as we gather from his cool, laconic replies.

And yet Miss Oglethorpe's conversion was evidently not so far advanced as Fénelon tells Le Tellier. He had exaggerated for his purpose a good deal. It was her duty to return to England, according to a promise to her mother, who, only on this condition, obtained permission from the Queen of England for her daughter to visit France. A failure to return would compromise her mother seriously. The young lady had heart and honor enough to insist on returning, in spite of Fénelon's entreaty to the contrary. *He even urged the king to forbid this return.* "The authority of the king which keeps her here," he writes, "is a power which will relieve her mother of blame. . . . I confess to you that I feel a secret joy at seeing the king take every thing upon himself, by a true zeal for this conversion. His majesty wishes to spare this young lady the danger of a voyage to her country." This letter, full of intrigue, is to a lady who, doubtless, was in the plot to capture and *convert* and keep from England Miss Oglethorpe. She did return to England, to the terrible discomfiture of Fénelon, whose soul was filled with alarm by this *contre-coup*. Le Tellier writes to Fénelon of the displeasure of the king at the failure of this conversion, by the return of the lady

to England after the granting of the pension. Fénelon is in grief, and declares his innocence, and concludes: "She is truly penetrated by the truths of religion; but her journey awakens fear. We must pray God for her." It is not known whether Miss Oglethorpe ever returned to France, or ever became a Catholic; the probabilities are she did not.

In the registers of the *secretariat* of the king's household, preserved in the "National Archives," is the following memorandum, under date of November 19, 1713:

"Order (*brevet*) for 2,000 livres of pension in favor of la demoiselle Oglethorpe, in consideration of her sincere conversion to the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion."

This *brevet* is the brief expression, stripped of all deceitful rhetoric, of Fénelon's negotiations in behalf of the "conversion" of the young English woman, which was, perhaps, his last effort as a *convertisseur*, as he died about a year after. One by one do these witnesses come forth from their silent tombs, amid the moldering records of the past, to testify to sins committed by men against God and humanity; and no name, however great and honored, can be shielded from the just and inexorable judgment of history.

We are well aware that it is quite possible to array against the testimonies we have been presenting of Fénelon's intolerance, passages from his writings that sound like sentiments in favor of toleration and freedom of conscience. We have read these. But not only can no amount of words counterbalance and blot out the *positive* proofs that have been given, but it is a peculiar fact in Catholic writers, that their language is most deceitful and confounding, and can not be understood by the common meaning of words. They have a law of language entirely their own. They—even the Popes—talk of civil liberty, of liberty of conscience, of religious freedom, of charity, of toleration; but that man is terribly mistaken who supposes that these words mean with them what they mean with other men. Their language is full of *douceur*, of "tender mercies" to heretics; and multitudes, trusting to these words, have been deceived, often to their cost. We could fill pages of such sweet, charitable expressions (they are noted and at hand), did space permit, from men that fanned the flames of persecution, and who, by word and deed, have violated every principle of charity and toleration.

In the face of terrible experience, we are no longer misled by these fair speeches, though they are the style yet with the Pope and his men. The Catholic prelates of our country claim loudly for their Church the spirit and practice of toleration; their words are often most charming, and mislead many; yet what well-informed man does not know that there is no truth in all this? The Catholic Church has a history; it has its doctrines and its "morals," and it is—*semper eadem*!—unchangeable. It has its Popes, and these are infallible now—*past, present, and forever*; and the *Syllabus* is the infallible summary of its maxims of faith, morality, and conduct! No man, really, is more honeyed in his words of charity, of freedom and good-will to men, than Pius IX; yet *he* has written the *Syllabus*, demoralized and mastered the Vatican Council for his purposes, and had himself proclaimed absolute spiritual monarch, infallible—the prerogative only of God.

Let the men who have been victims in the hands of the Catholic power, tell us what these "sweet and tender words of charity" mean! Paul Rabaut, the brave "preacher of the desert," who, during last century, for many years traversed France with a price on his head, to encourage and console the oppressed Huguenots, in answer to one of these letters full of "sweetness and charity," written by the Bishop of Alais, enforcing the cruel law against Protestant marriages, says:

"It is difficult to read the letter of the Bishop of Alais, without recalling what passed relative to the Protestants, a little before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Messieurs the prelates assembled at Paris, issued a pastoral circular, which breathed only gentleness and charity; but at the same time they set every thing to work at the court to reduce to the extremest desolation this unfortunate people, which they pretended to desire to bring back to the Roman Church only by pacific means. The circular notice was made known to all the consistories with much display; but to give more force to the arguments, they were sustained by legions of missionaries after the Mohammedan fashion, who, with the cimeter in the hand and blasphemy on the lips, commanded the people to choose between death and the mass.

"For three months the unfortunate Huguenots have felt the effect of the bitter zeal of the bishops. Harassed without ceasing by the detachments which scour the country night and day, and by the patrols that oppress the cities and towns, they are forced to live like infidels, without the exercise of religion, without worship, without pastors, without ruler. Let not, then, the Bishop of Alais flatter himself that he can impose on us by the sweet style of his letter; we understand very well how to take it. We knew that '*to have the compassion of a father, to be urged by charity,*' are phrases which, in the intention of Messieurs

the clergy, have a meaning entirely opposite to that which they naturally present to the mind. Monsieur the Bishop of Alais, however, himself pulls off the mask, when he announces that the forbearance which he exercises is '*a last effort to bring back the Huguenots to the center of unity, the last mark of his charity and of his condescension for them.*' He expects, apparently, that the troops which are in such great numbers in the province, will join their arguments with his, and that they will finish what his condescension has begun."*

As further illustration of this perversion of language and of truth, and as bearing directly upon the point before us, we cite some further examples where Catholics have lauded, often extravagantly, for their charity toward the Protestants, the very men who have persecuted them. We have many notable examples on hand; we select a few prominent ones

Bausset says of Bossuet: "There exists not a single evidence that the Bishop of Meaux had any thing to do with what preceded or succeeded immediately the Revocation. He has just rights to the gratitude of Protestants: . . . he has never persecuted one." And yet, cunning and artful as Bossuet was to work by the hands of others, his diocese near Paris was a scene of constant persecution, and the documents now lying before us,† rescued from the national archives of Paris, show that, by his *own special* orders, persecutions were set on foot against the Protestants; and it is history, that old and young, the living and the dead, were visited with his cruel intolerance. But need we wonder at this statement of Bausset, when Bossuet himself—when he knew, as all France then knew, and as we all now know, that the kingdom was one scene of persecution against the Protestants—had the audacity, in a pastoral letter addressed to the new Catholic converts of his diocese, to say of the Protestants that, "far from their having suffered any torments, you have not even heard any one mention any thing of the kind; and I hear that the other bishops say the same thing." Is this not almost beyond belief?—and Bossuet was the most illustrious French Catholic of his age!‡

* "Histoire des Eglises du Désert," Tome II, page 563. Voltaire, in a letter to his friend, the Protestant minister Moulton, said: "I see too well that the same spirit that gave birth to these horrors [of persecution] does now, and will ever, keep them up. *They deceived us when they promised us mildness (douceur).* A tiger will always eat lambs, but will never become one." (Letters sur la Tolérance, No. III.)

† "Bulletin," Vol. IX, 60-71.

‡ A contemporary of Bossuet, Pierre Frotté, who had been Canon of Sainte-Genevieve, and Prior-Curate of the Parish of Souilly-en-Brie, in Bossuet's own diocese, but who had become Protestant and fled to England, wrote an answer to Bossuet's famous

Of Fletcher it is said, in a Paris religious journal, that he was "a pious, tolerant, charitable bishop, almost canonized by the Protestants of his diocese, while waiting for his canonization by D'Alembert and by glory." Yet this *protégé* of Bossuet, because the Cevenols finally defended themselves against the dragoons that fell on them and butchered them in their assemblies in the mountains,

"Pastoral Letter." In this answer, referring to the statement we have cited, Frotté, with indignation, exclaims:

"Shall we call *douceur* what you did at Claye, when, by your orders, Benjamin Godé, surgeon, was forbidden to exercise his profession; when the oldest of her children was taken away from the Widow Tessard; when, by your orders, the woman Boisseleau was carried off for the only reason that she knew perfectly her Catechism, and because she wonderfully encouraged her companions to hold out firmly against your temptations? And again, is it a great *moderation* in you to have shut up in a convent M. Monceau, physician at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, eighty years old, under the most cruel circumstances; to have placed eight or ten dragoons in the house of M. Laviron, of the same place; to have placed thirty of these in the chateau of M. de la Saremoise, a nobleman of Brie; to have sent to a convent of Meaux his wife and daughter?" And then adds, that Bossuet never showed more *fury* than against Isaac Cochard, of Claye, who, because on his death-bed he refused to become Catholic, was, *by his orders*, buried by the highway. (Bulletin, Vol. IX, page 64.)

Another contemporary writer, in a work published at the Hague in 1687, referring to Bossuet's statement, that "no one has suffered any torments in France," etc., exclaims:

"Just Heaven! is it possible that an honest man can write a thing so notoriously false? . . . How does he expect me to believe him when I see him thus *lying before all Israel*? It has already been stated in books that men have suffered in his diocese as much as in the others. I have myself seen a troop composed not only of men, but also of children, who have left all to flee from the violence of the dragoons there. . . . Is it possible that these new Catholics *have not even heard of sufferings*? What, is the Diocese of Meaux a place inaccessible to the cries and wailings? Is it like that famous mountain where the quiet is so great that the dust is not stirred, even in the times when the tempests commit the greatest ravages in the plains. *In Rama a voice has been heard—a lamentation, weeping and wailing.* Yes: in Rama, but not at Meaux, has it been heard. That the prisoners wail in their dungeons; that women and girls lament in the convents; that the chains of those condemned to hard labor send forth a loud noise; that those plundered, beaten, dragged away by the dragoons, cry aloud; because the martyrs are sabered down in the very places where they assembled to pray to God; that on the scaffolds and in the midst of the flames they send forth their cries of suffering,—these sounds, these cries, these wailings, these lamentations, have not reached these new Catholics. 'You have not even heard any one speak of them,' says this bishop. Is this all? No: they have not even reached the other dioceses, if we are to believe Mons. de Meaux; 'for,' adds he, 'I have heard the other bishops say the same thing.'"

"All Europe knows of the torments that have been employed in France—and here are bishops that live in the kingdom who have not even heard any body speak of them! Trust these prelates after this?—these men, whose cruelty of such long duration is proclaimed by the houses in ruins, the cities deserted, the provinces ravaged, the prisons, the convents, the galleys, men mutilated, women violated, the gibbets, and the dead bodies dragged on hurdles and torn to pieces! This truth is of such public notoriety that an abbé, in distributing this 'Pastoral Letter' at Rochelle, was constrained to advise those to whom he gave it, not to stop in that place, that Mons. de Meaux was mistaken, that he knew that these torments were only too true, but that the rest of the letter of Mons. de Meaux was true and incontestable. Trust these men!" (Bulletin, Vol. VI, page 285.)

implored the vengeance of God and of the dragoons against them, and prayed that they "might crush the cruel heads of these rebels, and annihilate these wicked wretches;" because, he said, "the fruit of seventeen years of our [missionary] labor is lost;" that is, these Huguenots would not be, and stay, Catholics. We even find, again and again, in the most extravagant style, Louis XIV himself lauded for his "*douceur*," "*bonté*," "*charité*," "tolerance," etc., toward his Protestant subjects; and that, too, by Fénelon!

But the climax is reached when the *Assembly of the Clergy*, in an address to Louis XIV, on the 21st of July, 1685, said to him:

"It was in gaining the hearts of the heretics that your majesty subdued the obstinacy of their mind. They would perhaps never have gone back into the bosom of the Church by any other way than the *road strewn with flowers* which you have opened to them."

The boundlessness of this insincerity, of this effrontery, this shamelessness, this lying, staggers all belief! The human mind is utterly appalled and confounded. Does not the spirit of delusion by which Babylon has gone forth to deceive the nations, and by which it is deceiving itself, find a most striking manifestation in this very perversion of human language and of truth? We seek in vain in the entire history of the world for a parallel to the immensity of the impudence of this declaration of the French clergy to the king. What confidence can be placed in *any* words of these men?

And it is in place here to ask what Fénelon himself has said of this king and his conduct toward the Protestants. In his letters from his mission, he speaks of the kindness, gentleness, and affection of the king toward "these people." In his discourse before the French Academy, at his reception as a member, March 31, 1693, when the history of the horrors of the Revocation lay completed before him, in his fulsome eulogy of the king, after reviewing his glorious deeds in conquering and subduing his enemies, he says, "At the same time, he accomplished within his kingdom the most necessary of all conquests, by subduing a constantly rebellious heresy." And again: "But what do I see, gentlemen? A new conspiracy of these peoples [the foreign powers] which roar around us, to besiege, say they, this great kingdom as one place. It is heresy, which, almost extirpated by the zeal of Louis, is rising up again, and collecting

such great forces." Are these the words of a man of love and charity, who abhorred persecution and violence?

But another fact must be noted here. It has been again and again said that the writings of Fénelon are filled with the loftiest sentiments of humanity, of rectitude, of the noblest virtues; that he was charitable and merciful; that he would on foot visit the poorest of his flock, and sit down with them, and partake of their rude fare; and when his palace was burned, he said that it was better that it should be destroyed than the poorest hut in his diocese. All this we believe to be, in the main, true. But the conclusion drawn from it, that Fénelon was therefore an enemy of intolerance, either in theory or conduct, neither necessarily follows; nor is it, as we have now abundantly shown, at all true in fact. It is the very quality of religious bigotry, and especially of such a bigotry as the Catholic Church inculcates, and as reigned in that day, that it can pervert the grandest natures and the noblest sentiments, and precisely, and sometimes only, in the direction of the objects of its hate, whether doctrines or men; so that men may be eminently great, noble, true, good, in every direction, except this one. Here alone light becomes darkness, truth falsehood, mercy cruelty, love hate. And, alas! we need not go to the days of the Middle Ages, or of Louis XIV, to see this verified. But this sad fact is most remarkably illustrated in the time of Fénelon. One of the greatest spirits that have ever rendered France illustrious was Bossuet, the "Eagle of Meaux." Whatever is truly great in human thought is found in his immortal discourses; his mighty wing bore him to heights seldom reached by other men. Yet in religion he knew no real tolerance to Protestant or dissenting Catholic. Fénelon himself finally felt his relentless pursuit. Corneille, Racine, the masters of the French drama, taught all the sublimest virtues and scourged all the vices, in their immortal verses; yet, again and again, they sang base palinodes to the tyrant, and justified and glorified his persecutions of the Huguenots. La Fontaine and Fontanelle, the inimitable lyrists of France, with others, sang of all that was sweet, tender, and beautiful in nature and in the human affections. Yet these, too, burned incense on the altars of cruel persecution; and Fontanelle carried off the Academy's prize in his eulogy of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the subject proposed. Madame de Sévigné, the delightful court-gossip and

the matchless letter-writer, in her letters to her daughter and her friends, reveals all the most delicate tenderness of maternal feelings, of friendship and humanity; and yet of the bloody Revocation of the Edict of Nantes she could say, "Nothing is so beautiful as all it contains, and never has a king done any thing more honorable;" and the dragonnades were to her "the grandest and most beautiful thing that could be imagined." When the demon of religious bigotry, of religious delusion and fanaticism, was not on them, Bossuet, Fénelon, and others, could be *men*—humane. When this demon's spell was on them, they ceased to be so; there were two hearts, two consciences in them. Men saw this then; and Colbert, the Minister, himself not guiltless, once said to Bossuet and Fénelon, when he saw them using their eloquence to urge the Government against the Huguenots: "Gentlemen, *this* belongs to your conscience of the Sarbonne. There is another one in you; let that speak, and it will hold a different language."

Some writers* have laid much stress, as a proof of Fénelon's tolerant spirit, on the words of Louis XIV to Madame Maintenon, whose favorite Fénelon was, after the latter had had an audience with the monarch: "*Votre homme parle bien, Madame; mais je vous avoue, il ne sera jamais le mien,*" ("Your man talks well, Madame; but I assure you he will never be mine.") Had this interview and these words of the king referred to the subject of tolerance and religious freedom, it might be of some use to quote this saying in Fénelon's behalf. But this was not then, and never was, the point of difference between this monarch and Fénelon. They may have differed in some respects as to the manner of managing the "heretics" and "rebels," as Fénelon called them, but never as to the question whether toleration and the free exercise of their religion should be granted them. The differences between the two were, in the judgment of both, much more important than any thing simply concerning the treatment of the Huguenots. Besides the fact that Fénelon objected to many things about the court, in its habits and the men and women that filled it,* there was a difference which was irreconcilable, and which Louis forgave to no one; *and the one*

* See an article on Fénelon in the *Protestantische Kirchenzeitung*, 1857.

* See his "Letters sur les Questions Politiques et l'Histoire Contemporaine," addressed to Louis XIV.

precisely that made Fénelon, on his side of it, inevitably intolerant. Fénelon was an Ultramontanist in the fullest sense; while the king, all his life long, with Bossuet and others, warred against the Pope for the Gallican privileges of the King and Church of France, which gave the French monarch certain rights over the Church, and to the French clergy rights against the Roman See. This was a tender point with Louis, as it was essentially and inseparably connected with his supreme sovereignty and independence as king, and the independence of France; and he regarded Ultramontanism, which gave the Pope unlimited authority over the Church, as his greatest enemy—much more so than Protestantism. We have shown, in the beginning of this article, how completely Fénelon held and taught the extremest Ultramontane views; and it is this that occasioned the opposition of the king to him. The author of the sketch of Fénelon's Life, which we have already repeatedly quoted, has noticed this, and his words give the true explanation of the king's remark to Madame de Maintenon. He says:*

"It is easy to conclude, from many passages in his controversial writings, that the liberties of the Gallican Church are, in his eyes, rather an enslavement to the royal power than freedom of the Pontifical authority, and this tendency is, above all, striking in his '*De Summi Pontificis Auctoritate*,' composed some time after the death of Bossuet, and which contains the formal refutation of the Propositions of 1682. It was therefore natural that, in all that concerned the relations of the State with religion, he should give the State less power than the Gallicans desired; and that he preferred, for example, rather to put the new converts under the direction of the bishops than that of the provincial intendants. This feature in his sentiments escaped neither Seignelay nor Père la Chaise. Louis XIV knew it through them; and it is perhaps this which explains that, in spite of the relative success of Fénelon's missions, he was not willing to consent that he should be made coadjutor of the Bishop of Poitiers or the Bishop of Rochelle, both of whom demanded him ineffectually, and especially the second, with the strongest urgency."

This was precisely the occasion of Fénelon's audience with the king, and of the latter's remark concerning him to Madame de Maintenon. The king's *men* were those who maintained his supreme power in France against the pretensions of the Pope, over Church as well as State; in this Fénelon opposed him. So far from it having had any thing to do with religious tolerance, Gallicans and Ultramontanists were one in intolerance; and the question of difference was only whether the bishops or the provincial intendants, the Pope's or

* "*Œuvres Choiesies*," Tome I; "Notice," pp. 11, 12.

the king's officers, should have the privilege of exercising control over the persecuted Huguenots. How merciful the bishops were, we know; they claimed to have a right to use the secular arm for the glory of the Church and the punishment of the heretics and rebellious. So Fénelon every-where taught. This, the true explanation of the king's words, seems entirely to have escaped the knowledge of the author of the article on Fénelon in the *Protestantische Kirchenzeitung*.

Much sympathy has always been excited in behalf of the Archbishop of Cambray, because of the persecution he suffered from his enemies—Bossuet and others—the condemnation of his writings by the Pope, and the disgrace and punishment the court inflicted upon him; as if he suffered, a martyr for freedom of thought and religious toleration. Nothing is farther from the truth than this. In the first place, the question of religious freedom and tolerance for the Protestants had absolutely nothing whatever to do with Fénelon's disgrace and condemnation, either with Rome or the French Court. It was his mystical views of the love of God, represented in what was called *mysticism* and *quietism*, that was made the ground of the opposition against him, and of the condemnation of his writings. This opposition proceeded chiefly from Bossuet and others, and was supported by the king, who already disliked him for the reasons above stated. The Court of Rome was very friendly to him—the Pope especially so—and made every effort to spare him; but was finally driven to condemn his writings by the strong, inexorable demands of Louis XIV and the French bishops. Secondly: Fénelon *never for a moment* pleaded liberty of opinion or tolerance in his own behalf; on the very contrary, he always maintained and consented that if his views, in any way, differed from the doctrine of the Church, they ought to be condemned, and he ought unhesitatingly to retract. Lastly: his recantation and submission to the decision and demands of Rome and the bishops was the most absolute—went, in form and spirit, even beyond the demands, and was almost abject. He published his submission as soon as the Papal decree was received condemning his book, "The Maxims of the Saints," and the Twenty-three Propositions drawn from it. In his act of submission, he says:

"We give our adhesion to this decree, my dear brethren, both as regards the text of the book and the Twenty-three Propositions drawn from it, simply,

absolutely, and without a shadow of restriction. So, also, we condemn the book and the Twenty-three Propositions, precisely in the same form and with the same qualifications—simply, absolutely, and without any restriction. Further, we forbid, under the same penalty, all the faithful of this diocese to read and keep this book."

As a monument of this perfect submission, he went even farther: he made a present to the Cathedral of Cambray of a *Monstrance*, on which was represented the archangel Michael crushing under his feet the works condemned by the Church; on one of which could be distinctly seen the title, "Maxims of the Saints." Fénelon's extreme and somewhat pompous act of submission caused Bossuet to make the biting remark: "I think Rome can be satisfied; . . . he has made a pompous display of his obedience." In all this, however, Fénelon was but consistent with himself; for he held that it was the duty of every child of the Church to yield the most absolute obedience to her decisions.

We add only here, that this law, with him, applied to Protestants as well as Catholics; for he, in common with the Church of Rome generally, regarded the Protestants merely as "rebellious children;" and who were to be brought back to their duty to the Church, if necessary, with "chastisements." He did not regard them as those who have never been Christians or Catholics; their conversion was merely "making their *reunion*:" this was the expression constantly employed. Upon this point we need only quote a passage from one of his "Pastoral Instructions" as Archbishop of Cambray.

"But after this forbearance [with the obstinate], the Church must cast down every thing that lifts itself up against the knowledge of God. She must bring into captivity all understanding to the obedience of Jesus Christ by the most absolute persuasion. She must be ready to punish, in an exemplary manner every disobedience of indocile spirits. She must, finally, prefer God to man, and the truth basely attacked to a false peace, which would only tend to bring about a more dangerous trouble. Nothing would be more cruel than a cowardly compassion, which would tend to tolerate contagion in the flock, in which it grows every day without measure. It is in such a pressing extreme that it becomes necessary, as Saint Augustine says, to use a medicinal rigor, a terrible gentleness [terrible *douceur*], and a severe charity (*medicinali vindicta, terribili lenitate, et caritatis severitate*). We have already heard this father, so gentle and so compassionate toward men convicted of error, declare that rigor is finally necessary. The vigilance and activity of the shepherds, says he, should crush the wolves wherever they appear, etc. (*Ubiunque isti lupi apparuerint, conterendi sint.*)"

This is certainly explicit enough.

It had been stated that Fénelon had recommended tolerance to James II, the dethroned King of England. As already quoted in this article, his grand-nephew, the Abbé de Fénelon, at once challenged the statement as false, and stigmatized it as a "calumny." The story—reported to come from the Scotchman Ramsay, whom Fénelon converted to Romanism—that the prelate had said to him, that if the Protestants of the Diocese of Cambray desired to emigrate, he would give them all passports, is not well authenticated. Besides, it is improbable, in the face of Fénelon's conduct in Saint-onge, where he was the first, and very prompt to inform and warn the Government of the emigration of the Huguenots, and was urgent that effectual measures should be taken to prevent it. If he did say it, it was one of those fine words intended to affect Ramsay, and had no meaning or serious intention in it.

The writer in the *Protestantische Kirchenzeitung* has also given prominence to the fact that Fénelon, in his mission letters, advised that New Testaments be given to the Huguenots. This is again a misconception and a misrepresentation of a fact, by a half statement of it. Fénelon refers twice in his letters to this matter, and in both instances the same way, and is very explicit: "I forgot to tell you, Monsieur, that we must have a large number of books, especially New Testaments, and translations of the mass with explications; for we accomplish nothing if we do not take away from them their heretical books; and we put them to despair if we take these from them, and do not give them as much as we take away." And, again, after saying that "there is need of an authority that never relaxes to force (*assujettir*) all the families to send their children to Catholic schools," he repeats the demand for New Testaments, and adds, "If we take from them their books without giving them others, they will say that their ministers were right in telling them that we did not want them to read the Bible for fear that they might there see the condemnation of our superstitions and idolatries;" and then proceeds to demand an increase of military guards to prevent the escape of the Huguenots. The case is plain. The Protestants were well provided with their own books and their Bible. It is well known how highly they prized these, and with what diligence they read them. Fénelon himself, in these quotations, declares that these "heretical books"—Bible and all—must be taken from them, or else

"we can accomplish nothing." What more outrageous violence to the freedom and intelligence of a people than this? And the giving, in this equally authoritative way of "you must take," is no amend for the outrage, but is simply another. The Catholic New Testament—always with "explications," mass-books, etc.—are given, are forced on them, after they have been forcibly robbed of their own cherished books; and all this as a measure of policy. In plain words throughout, Fénelon treats these people as he pleases—as helpless, as *assujettir*, under his authority. Is this regard for freedom of conscience? is this free toleration? His own flattering biographer, in the "Notice," already so often quoted, properly says that this very kind of "giving" itself, in this way, is a violence to conscience. This act of Fénelon does not add to his renown as a man that sacredly respected freedom of conscience.

The characteristic difference between Fénelon and the other "missionaries" and Catholics of France, was simply this: they *put the "instructions"* to the Protestants, often with rudeness, with harshness and menace; he, more politic, offered the "instructions," *douce-ment*, in words of "mildness and charity,"—this is his own statement of the difference. But both agreed in demanding "the arm of authority, ever uplifted," to make the victims receive the "instructions," and "to strike them if they resist." Fénelon, as the others, regarded and treated "the rebellious children" as *his*, as in duty bound to obey him, and be led back to the fold of the Church. This is the sum of his toleration and his "truly apostolical charity."

Fénelon's bitter hostility to the Jansenists is well known, and how he sought in every way to persecute them. Tabaraud, in his "Supplement" to Bausset's History of Bossuet and Fénelon, says of the latter:

"The tolerant archbishop, passing to the means which the Pope should suggest to the king for proceeding to the extirpation of Jansenism, says that these are: 1. To exclude from all favors, to deprive of their employments and dignities, all those who may be only suspected of secretly protecting its partisans; 2. To exact rigorously the signature of the formulary; 3. To deprive of their places, all enjoying benefices, all the superiors of communities who refuse to do this; 4. To excommunicate all the contumacious, after the three Catholic admonitions; 5. To treat as relapsed heretics those who, after having signed purely and simply (without any reserve), shall attempt to evade their signature by any reserve whatsoever."

This is the "sweet and gentle Fénelon" in his form as Ultramontanist. And of Madame de Guyon—his former friend, and we might say teacher, in his mystical views of Divine love—after this woman, guilty of no crime but her *mysticism* and *quietism*, was cast into the Bastile, Fénelon could say, "I am content that she shall remain there, and that we shall never see her again, or hear any one speak of her." And, again, "If it is true that this woman has desired to establish this damnable system [of Molinism], she ought to be burned, instead of giving her the communion as Mons. de Meaux* [Bossuet] has done."

In conclusion, we shall add a proof as strong as any yet given that religious toleration was not an article in Fénelon's creed. He has, in various forms, and with his accustomed fullness and exact minuteness of detail, written out his political and religious creed, involving in the most immediate and direct manner the very question before us. In his "Letters on Political Questions and Contemporary History,"† Fénelon calls attention to every error and sin of the king, of the court, the government, members of the clergy, and of France generally. Nothing is omitted, *except the intolerance toward the Protestants*. There is not one word of allusion to this great and terrible iniquity; and that, too, after the whole of the bloody history of the Revocation had been before the world: for these letters were written at the beginning of last century. They were written to the king, the dauphin, and others eminent in the State; they were, moreover, written in the high maturity of life, when a man is able to survey life with sincerity, with calmness, without passion and ambition. In his letter to the king, he says, in the opening words: "The person, Sire, who takes the liberty of writing you this letter has no interest in this world. It is written neither by disappointment, nor by ambition, nor by the desire to mingle in great affairs." Yet, even in attempting to awaken the conscience of Louis XIV, the greatest crime of this monarch's life is never mentioned.

In his "Examination of Conscience on the Duties of Royalty,"‡ addressed to the Duke of Bourgoyne, heir to the throne, with great minuteness every duty and every virtue of the ruler of a nation is

* "Supplement aux Histoires de Bossuet et de Fénelon, composées par M. le Cardinal de Bausset," Paris, 1822; page 494.

† "Œuvres Choiesies," Tome IV, page 282.

‡ Same, page 340.

discussed—*except religious toleration*. In his "Plan of Government,"* written in concert with the Duke de Chevreuse, his most intimate friend and disciple, and also for the dauphin, every question concerning the State and the Church, and their relations to each other, is solved and laid down with the method of detail and precision of a constitution or a creed; *but not a solitary word about freedom of conscience or worship*. On the contrary, in the fifth section, "Of the Church," as quoted in the beginning of this article, the very opposite is taught,—that the prince must himself submit to the decisions of the Church, and enforce them on others, as the servant of the Church. In these productions we have Fénelon's political creed—which is, of course, politico-religious, Church and State—and in this creed religious toleration is absolutely unknown. This is decisive.

We repeat it: we look in vain, in all Fénelon's numerous writings, in which he abundantly discusses all the questions of Church and State, for even one word countenancing or establishing, as a right and a duty, religious toleration, freedom of faith and worship, in any sense in which the free world understands this. And so of his actions,—Fénelon never believed it, taught it, or practiced it.

But so extreme and unremitting was the persecuting intolerance of his day, that his less cruel *method*, by comparison, passed for moderation, and even toleration. And this fame, supported by his own constant pretensions to charity and mildness, the perpetual skillful efforts, in the same direction, of his Catholic biographers, and the imperfect study of his life and writings by others, surrounded him, during the last century and the beginning of the present, with the renown of a man of toleration. But the higher standard of judgment of a freer and more enlightened age, and a fuller knowledge and a more impartial study of the man, have dissipated this nimbus of false fame, and remanded him, too, back into the ranks of the intolerant persecutors of his time.

As may be readily conceived, after the long reign of intolerance—after such an unchaining of the furies of persecution, such a general consent and participation on the part of State, clergy, men of science and letters, and the extreme, abject desolation to which the Protestants were reduced by emigration, forced abjurations, slaughter, imprisonment, galleys, confiscation, and all the means infernal bigotry

* "Œuvres Choiesies," Tome IV, page 399.

could adopt to crush them out—it would require an extraordinary courage, and a prodigious and long struggle, to attack and break down this spirit and power of intolerance, so arrogant, so triumphant, and so firmly established in the feelings, the habits and laws of the nation. With the death of Louis XIV, a better sentiment began to stir in the nation, and continued to increase to the close of the ancient *régime*; yet intolerance lived in the customs and laws, till the Revolution, with its annihilating force, swept it from the laws and the mind of the French people. It was not till then that the victory was complete.

But the master-effort that most contributed to decide the final issue, was made by Voltaire in the cases of Calas and Sirven. These two Protestants had both been falsely charged, by the furious fanaticism of the Catholics, with the horrible crime of killing their own children. The former was, by order of the Provincial Parliament of Toulouse, put to the torture, and finally broken on the wheel; the latter escaped from France. Calas was the last man who died in France, a victim of Catholic bigotry. But a few days before him, the young minister Rochette and the three brothers De Grenier—young Huguenot noblemen—had been executed for their faith, also at Toulouse. Voltaire, then at Ferney, near Geneva, was excited to the highest degree at the iniquity of the condemnation of the aged Calas. He wept as he pressed the youngest son of the martyr, but a boy, to his breast, and vowed to avenge his father; and he nobly fulfilled this vow. All the power of his transcendent genius, of his humanity, of his enlightened judgment, and, above all, of his boundless hate of bigotry, was marshaled against this enemy of human kind. There is not a grander struggle recorded in the eighteenth century than that of Voltaire against Catholic intolerance. He declares, and it is true, that for the time he subjected every other interest to it; and the activity he manifested in it was wonderful. He wrote to Protestant princes, and to every man and woman of influence in France, especially at Paris, that could be approached—ministers, courtiers, men of letters, jurists, judges—to arouse them to concerted action against the great iniquity; and from Ferney he managed himself the whole grand crusade. He wrote, and sent forth in the interest of the great cause, his tract on "Toleration."*

* "Traité sur la Tolérance à l'Occasion de la Mort de Jean Calas."

and often defeated, he never yielded. For two years he kept up this mighty battle against tremendous forces; but finally he conquered. It was an amazing triumph, when he brought the very throne of France to his feet! The king, in council, annulled the act of Calas's condemnation by the Parliament of Toulouse, declared the rehabilitation of the family of Calas, and paid them 36,000 livres of indemnity. Then Voltaire renewed the conflict in behalf of Sirven, and for *nine years* fought over again the same noble fight; and again triumphed. If his own letters are to be taken in testimony, these victories were to him the greatest and most precious of his life. When he heard of his success in behalf of Calas, he wept like a child. Amid the deep darkness of the life of this Titanic mind, there is a radiant spot that is a consolation and an honor to human nature. When, in 1778, he made his entry into Paris, and an admiring multitude pressed around him at the Pont Royal, the people asked, "Who is this man whom this multitude is following?" A woman in the crowd cried out, "Do you not know that this is the man that saved the Calas!" And this title is the noblest that posterity will accord to him, as it was, to his last hour, what he esteemed the most.

This mighty campaign against intolerance, waged by Voltaire and the encyclopædists, broke forever its power in France; it never arose from its defeat. The Protestants could not have accomplished it—they were crushed; the Catholics were on the other side: and so God, as he makes even the wrath of man to praise him, chose the power of these unbelievers to do his great work.

VI.—"THE SABBATH."

IT has been said that there are two sides to every question. This is true. And some questions have more than two sides. They have as many sides as there are points of view from which they are examined. This is the case with the Sabbath question.

Some hold to the universal obligation of a Sabbatic law, and affirm that it was given to the first family of mankind for universal observance. Others quote the law given by Moses as of universal obligation, and contend for the *seventh* as the Sabbath-day. Others, again, who believe in a universal law of Sabbath, and quote the Mosaic as that law, contend that, after the resurrection of Jesus, the day was changed from the seventh to the first day of the week.

We propose an examination of this subject in this paper, and will begin by a quotation from the history of Creation: "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the hosts of them. And on the sixth day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made." (Gen. ii, 1, 2, 3.)

This is all that is said relative to this transaction, in a history of two thousand five hundred and thirteen years, according to the common chronology; and that by one to whom the Lord gave a revelation of this whole affair, at least twenty-five centuries after the transactions here noticed. Whether Adam or any of his posterity had been advised of these facts up to this time, is not stated. But it is *inferred* that the first family of our race was fully informed in all these particular statements; namely, that God created all things in the heavens and in the earth in six days, and rested on the seventh, and that he blessed the seventh and sanctified it; *and that he also commanded them, in all their generations, to keep the seventh day as a Sabbath*, in commemoration of the fact that on that day he rested from all his works. All this is *inferred* from the above quotation. The Sabbath an who objects to the observance of the first day of the

week because there is no *command* for its observance, would do well to notice the fact that there is no such record relative to the seventh day in these early times. It is a mere matter of inference. It is not said that any one rested on that day but the Great Architect of the heavens and the earth himself. There is no mention that Adam, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob ever kept that day, or that any one ever was guilty of breaking the law of the Sabbath during their times. Indeed, the word *Sabbath* does not occur in the history of mankind for twenty-five hundred years after God rested from his work. They say that a positive institution can not rest on inference, but must be based on a plain command. This being so, there was no Sabbath till the time of Moses, and then only for one nation; for no other nation was placed under "the law" that "came by Moses." The advantage of the Jew over all other people consisted in the fact, chiefly, "that to them were committed the Oracles of God."

As there is no command given to the ancients to observe the seventh day as a Sabbath, and no example of its having been so observed by any individual among all the godly, from Adam to Moses, where, upon the theory of Sabbatarians, is there any authority for the seventh day (Sabbath), except in the laws given to the Israelites?—under which no Gentile was ever placed. It is recorded that the disciples of Jesus met on the first day of the week for religious services; and that, too, under apostolic sanction, whether they were Jews or Gentiles.

But it is urged that God blessed the seventh day, and that he also sanctified or consecrated it. But it is not said that he *enjoined* it. The matter of *enjoining* is a matter of *inference*, and of inference only. And we do not here affirm that the inference is not legitimate; but we do say that if it is, then is the inference that Divine authority consecrated the first day of the week, and discontinued the observance of the seventh: because the primitive Christians observed the first day, and discontinued the observance of the seventh, while the persons converted by the converts of the apostles were yet living. All these remarks are made with special reference to the amount of evidence contained in Genesis. We will now consider the passage in which the word *Sabbath* occurs for the first time in all the Oracles of God. When Moses gave directions to the

Israelites relative to the preparation of the manna, he said to them: 'This is that which the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord. Bake that which ye will bake to-day, and boil that which ye will boil; and that which remaineth over, lay up for you to be kept until the morning. And they laid it up till the morning, as Moses bade: and it did not smell offensive, neither was there any worms therein. And Moses said, Eat that to-day, for to-day is a Sabbath unto the Lord; to-day ye shall not find it in the field. Six days ye shall gather it; but on the seventh day, which is the Sabbath, in it there shall be none. And it came to pass that there went out some of the people on the seventh day to gather, and they found none. And the Lord said to Moses, How long refuse ye to keep my commandments and my laws? See, because the Lord hath given you the Sabbath, therefore he giveth you on the sixth day the bread of two days. Abide ye every man in his place. Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day. So the people rested on the seventh day." (Ex. xvi, 23-30.)

The expression, "This is that which the Lord hath said," is understood by some as referring to what God commanded Adam. But this is mere assumption, as the words furnish no evidence of the fact, and the context no ground for the inference. It is as reasonable to infer from the words (verse 15), "This is the bread which the Lord hath given you to eat," that it was the same bread that he gave Adam to eat, as that "This is that which the Lord hath said," meant what the Lord had said to Adam, and repeated to them. According to such a rule of interpretation, we must infer from the same form of expression (verse 16)—"This is the thing which the Lord hath commanded: Gather of it every man according to his eating; an omer for every man according to the number of your persons, take ye every man for them which are in his tents"—that God commanded Adam and his posterity to gather and eat manna by the omer; and that he here renewed the command to Israel! Moreover, in verse 23, the same form of expression occurs relative to the cooking of manna, with special reference to the Sabbath: "This is that which the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord. Bake that which ye will bake to-day, and boil that which ye will boil; and that which remaineth over, lay up for you to be kept until the morning." Who would infer from these words that

this direction was given to Adam? In verse 32, it is said, "This is the thing which the Lord commandeth: Fill an omer of it to be kept for your generations." But he did not say this to Adam. There is, indeed, no ground of inference in any of the cases where the expression, "This is the thing which the Lord hath said," or, "hath commanded," in all this context, much less in the words themselves, that the Lord had said so to Adam twenty-five hundred years before. The words quoted are not to be found in any record of any thing which the Lord said to the father of mankind. This is the first record of a Sabbath as "made for man;" the first case in which any mention is made of a command to man, or to any man, to keep a Sabbath. In the beginning, "the Lord blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it he had rested from all his works," and not because he had, as yet, commanded men to observe the day.

In Exodus xx, 8, the Lord said, "Remember the Sabbath-day, to keep it holy." Having lately commanded them to observe a Sabbath, and the seventh day as such, he now commands them to "remember" it; and says to them: "Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. In it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them, and rested the seventh day: therefore the Lord blessed the seventh day and hallowed it." (Ex. xx, 9-11.)

The reason assigned here for requiring men to work six days, and to abstain from labor themselves, and cause their children, and their servants, and even their cattle and the stranger within their gates, to do so, was not because he had before so commanded Adam, or any other person, but *because he, himself, had so done at the end of the week of labor which resulted in the solar system, with all it contained.* Assigning the reason, here, and not before, for requiring abstinence from labor, and a holy regard for the seventh day, affords ground for the belief that the institution was not appointed till it was given to this people. If it had been an old institution, and had been observed for two thousand and five hundred years by the faithful, there would have been no reason for giving any explanation of the cause of requiring its observance now.

The above passage is quoted as the law of the Sabbath. But, in fact, it is rather the law of the week; for it says, "Six days shalt thou labor;" and the reason is as clearly given for this part of the law as for the other—namely, *the Lord worked* six days in making heaven and earth, and all things in them—and this is as good a reason for *working six days* as is the rest of the Lord on the seventh day for *abstaining from labor on that day*. It is not only the law of the Sabbath, but also the law of the week. And he who refuses to work six days is as guilty of a breach of the law as he who works on the seventh day. The penalty for a breach of the Sabbatic portion of the law follows in Ex. xxxiii, 12-17.

This law was "a statute in Israel," and its penalty was death. "Every one who defileth it shall surely be put to death; for whoever doeth any work therein, that soul shall be cut off from among his people." Again: "These are the words which the Lord hath commanded, that ye should do them. Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh there shall be a holy day, a Sabbath of rest to the Lord. Whoever doeth work therein shall be put to death. Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on the Sabbath-day." (Ex. xxxv, 1-3.)

If this law be accepted as of universal obligation, it must be accepted as a whole—penalty and all. Why is it that this part of the law is overlooked entirely? How can a Church insist on the obligation to keep the Sabbath, and, at the same time, neglect the penalty in the discipline of its members? Is not the obligation to put the offender to death as binding on the people, as the obligation to rest on the Sabbath is on the individuals? What shall be done with the Sabbath-breakers who kindle fires in their dwellings—who do not keep within their places, but go abroad on the Sabbath day for recreation?

This law was given to one nation, and one nation only. It was given "as a sign" between them and the Lord their God. And though they were not allowed to go abroad on their own business, or merely for pleasure, yet they were required to have "a holy convocation," or a religious meeting on that day. "Six days shall work be done; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of rest, a holy convocation." (Lev. xxiii, 3.)

This law of the Sabbath became a part of the covenant which

was "written and engraved on stone," and was "made glorious" when it was delivered as a part of the "Ten Commandments;" and, as Paul teaches, it was in his time "done away," or "abolished," and was succeeded by something "more glorious." That which was "written and engraved on stone," of which the law of the Sabbath was a part, is called "the ministration of death," by Paul, because of the capital punishment, *death*, which it enjoined, as in the case of the desecration of the Sabbath; and it is declared to be "done away," so that even the Jews are not any longer under it. 2 Cor. iii, 5-16: "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter kills, but the spirit gives life. [The letter which kills is the 'ministration of death'—that which was 'written in stones,' the Ten Commandments.] But if the ministration of death, written and engraved in stones, was glorious, so that the children of Israel [to whom alone this law was given] could not steadily behold the face of Moses [when he was reading these commandments to them] for the glory of his countenance; which glory was to be done away: how shall not the ministration of the spirit [the gospel of Christ] be rather glorious? For if the ministration of condemnation [that which was written and engraved in stones] be glory, much more doth the ministration of righteousness [the gospel, or new testament,] exceed in glory. For even that which was made glorious [the ministration of death—the Ten Commandments] had no glory in this respect, by reason of the glory that excels. For if that which was done away was glorious, much more that which remains is glorious. Seeing then that we have such hope, we use great plainness of speech; and not as Moses, who put a veil over his face that the children of Israel could not steadily look to the end of that which is abolished [that which was engraved in stones—the Ten Commandments]: but their minds were blinded; for until this day remains the same veil untaken away in the reading of the old testament; which veil is done away in Christ. But even unto this day, when Moses [the law of Moses—the Ten Commandments and his laws] is read, the veil is on their heart. Nevertheless, when it shall turn to the Lord [Jesus], the veil shall be taken away. Now the Lord [Jesus] is that Spirit: and where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."

The law, with all its ordinances, was only a temporary provision. "The law," says Paul to the converted Jews, "was our school-master until Christ, that we might be justified by faith. But faith having come, we are no longer under a school-master." (Gal. iii, 23, 24.) "The law was given through Moses; the grace and the truth came through Jesus Christ." "The law and the prophets prophesied until John: since that, the kingdom of heaven is preached." It is well known that Moses did not give law to the whole world. He gave it only to the nation whom God adopted as his, after all the nations had forsaken him. Hence Paul says of that nation, "Who are Israelites, *whose is the adoption*, and the glory, and the covenants, *and the giving of the law*, and the service, and the promises." (Rom. ix, 4.) The law having been given to that people alone, he says further: "What then is the advantage of the Jew? or what is the benefit of circumcision? Much every way; first, indeed, that they were intrusted with the oracles of God." (Rom. iii, 1, 2.) Again: "Now we know that whatever the law says, it says to those under the law." (Verse 19.) We have before shown that "the law which came through Moses" contains the *first and only* command to observe the seventh day as a Sabbath. This accounts for the fact that no other nation of antiquity ever so observed it. If such a command had been given to the whole race, it is not supposable that not the least reference should ever be found in the history of the ancient nations to such an institution. It is not so with the ordinance of sacrifice. What nation was without its God, its altar, and its sacrifice? If one such could be found, the existence of these things in other nations would clearly point to their origin. But not even one nation "from Adam to Moses" affords a single instance of such Sabbatic observance. The fact is, that there is not only no account of any such tradition, but there is no account of any such law till it "came through Moses."

The letter to the saints in Rome was written to settle matters of difference between the converts from the Jews and those of other nations. The Jews insisted on their days and diet, as if their law was still in force. This led to the following decision: "One man esteems one day above another; another esteems every day alike. Let each one be fully persuaded in his own mind. He who regards the day, regards it to the Lord; and he who eats, eats to the Lord, for he gives thanks to God; and he who eats not to the Lord, he

eats not, and gives thanks to God." (Rom. xiv, 4-6.) The law determined what days should be kept, and what food might and might not be eaten. Some of the converted Jews were disposed to keep those days for religious purposes, and to observe the Jewish laws relative to diet, even after they became Christians. Others were not so disposed. The apostle, not being afraid that any persons would be too religious, allowed those who desired to continue their old religious practices in such matters, to do so. But he objected to their right to require others to conform to their views on those subjects. He therefore says, in another place: "Let not any one judge you in food or drink, or in respect of a feast-day, or of a new moon, or of a Sabbath, which are a shadow of the things to come, but the body is of Christ." (Col. ii, 16, 17.) Again: "Do ye carefully observe days and months and seasons and years? I am afraid of you, lest by any means I have bestowed labor on you in vain." (Gal. iv, 10, 11.) All these observances are of the law, and the apostle feared that, to them, Christ had not become "the end of the law for righteousness." Some of the Galatians had become zealous for the law; and although Paul would allow persons to observe days, and eat what they chose, he would not allow them to take the law as their rule of life, nor would he permit them to urge these as matters of law. He therefore says to them: "I could wish to be present with you now, and to change my voice, for I am perplexed on account of you. Tell me, ye who desire to be under law, do ye not hear the law? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the bondwoman, and one by the freewoman. But the one by the bondwoman was born after the flesh, and the one by the freewoman through the promise. Which things are an allegory. For these women are two covenants, one from Mount Sinai, bearing children into bondage, which is Hagar (for the word Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabic), and answers to the Jerusalem that now is, for she is in bondage with her children. But the Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all." "But ye, brethren, after the manner of Isaac, are children of promise. But as then, the one born after the flesh persecuted the one born after the spirit, so also it is now. But what says the Scripture? 'Cast out the bondwoman and her son; for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the freewoman.' So then, brethren, we are not

children of the bondwoman, but of the freewoman." (Gal. iv, 20-26; 28-31.) "Ye are separated from Christ, whoever of you are justified in the law; ye are fallen away from grace." (Gal. v, 4.) From this, it is clear that whoever practices any thing because it is commanded in the law, and seeks justification by it because it is therein enjoined, has apostacised from grace, or has fallen away from the doctrine of justification by grace.

Now, what can be said in behalf of a "Christian Sabbath?" It is not so much as named in the New Testament. The word "Christian" is never used either of any day, any ordinance, or any religion in all the New Testament. In that book there is neither Christian Sabbath, Christian baptism, nor Christian religion. "Christian" is never used in the sense of an adjective, by which to distinguish a Sabbath, a baptism, or a religion, by any authority from God or Christ or the apostles. They are expressions wholly unauthorized, as are also Christian faith, Christian hope, Christian charity, Christian denomination, and Christian Church. The word is only applied to the disciples, as Platonists, Herodians, Calvinists, and so forth. It indicated, in New Testament times, a *sect* or a *party* of men who followed a great teacher by the name of *Christos*—Christ. Moreover, it is at least exceedingly doubtful whether there is any Divine authority for this name. The first occurrence of it in Acts xi, 26, gives no such intimation. It reads thus: "And Barnabas departed to Tarsus to seek Saul; and having found him, he brought him to Antioch. And it came to pass, that a whole year they came together in the Church, and taught a great multitude; and the disciples were first called Christians in Antioch." Only twice, after this, are they ever so called in all the New Testament—once in Acts xxvi, 28, and once in 1 Peter iv, 16. Now, if this name was given by Divine authority, that authority was singularly disregarded by all the apostles, who never addressed the disciples in any of their discourses, nor in any of their Epistles, by that name. In all the New Testament it is never even repeated by any disciple or by any apostle but once, and then as a name which it was supposed might cause shame, as a term of reproach. "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or an evil-doer, or as a busy-body in other men's matters; but if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name." This is the only time the word is used

by any disciple or any apostle, from the day it was first applied to the disciples. In the other instance, in which it was used by Agrippa, Paul purposely avoids the use of it, as if it were not proper. When Agrippa said to Paul, "With little pains thou persuadest me to become a Christian," Paul did not reply, "I would to God that not only thou, but all those who hear me this day were Christians," as would have been natural if the name were proper; but, "I could pray God, that with little [pains] or much, not only thou but also all who hear me this day, *may become such as I am*, except these bonds." Paul did not accept the designation; but he avoided the use of the name, not because he was ashamed of it, but because it was not given by Divine authority, as he well knew: for it was first applied to those whom he disciplined in Antioch; and he and Barnabas never sanctioned it, neither then, nor at any subsequent time.

We need not, therefore, look for any Christian Sabbath or any Christian any thing else. But we have a day mentioned as the day on which the disciples came together for the purpose of remembering their Great Teacher, by the use of an institution established by himself for that purpose. "And on the first day of the week, we having come together to break bread, Paul discoursed to them (being about to depart on the morrow), and continued the discourse until midnight. Now there were many lights in the upper room where we were assembled. And there sat on the window a certain young man named Eutychus, being fallen into a deep sleep; and as Paul was long discoursing, he sank down with sleep, and fell down from the third loft, and was taken up dead. And Paul went down and fell on him, and embracing him, said, Do not lament, for his life is in him. And having come up again, and broken the bread, and eaten, he talked a long while, even till break of day, and so departed." (Acts xx, 7-11.)

This meeting was held on the first day of the week. It was an evening meeting, as was that when the Lord's-supper was instituted. The protracted discourse of Paul deferred the breaking of the bread till after midnight. Some have said that this carried the supper over into *the second day of the week*. They forget that the Mosaic Sabbath commenced at about six o'clock on the seventh day of the week, and lasted twenty-four hours, when the first day of the next week began, and lasted a like time. They did not commence their days at midnight, as did the Romans, and as we do; but as did the Gauls

and Germans. So says Caesar of the former, and Tacitus of the latter. (De Bell. Gal. lib. 6, and De Mor. Germ. sec. 3.) In the first reckoning of time by days, the evening, and not midnight, commenced the day. "The evening and the morning were the first day." "From even unto even shall ye celebrate your Sabbath." (Lev. xxiii, 32.) The commemorative institution, which was to continue till the second coming of Jesus, was observed by the disciples in Troas on *the first day of the week*, and not on the seventh; and Sopater, son of Pyrrhus, a Berean; and Aristarchus and Secundus, of Thessalonica; and Gaius of Derbe, and Timothy; and Tychicus and Trophimus, of Asia; and Luke the beloved physician, and also Paul the apostle, joined with them in the celebration on that day. This furnishes us with the examples of disciples, in the observance of that day for that purpose—from Berea, a city of Macedonia; from Thessalonica, an important city of the same province; from Derbe, and from Asia—and also the sanction of an apostle. Add to this the fact that the table used on such occasions is called the Lord's-table, and that the supper is called the Lord's-supper, and that this day was called, by apostolic converts of the first century, the Lord's-day, and that the apostle John also speaks of the Lord's-day in Revelation,—and we have sufficient authority for the observance of this day for the same purpose; and, as Paul preached a long while on the occasion, we may connect preaching with the observance of the day.

This is much stronger proof than can be produced showing that a Sabbath-day, for men, was instituted or observed on a single occasion, from Adam to Moses. For such a Sabbath, we have shown that no proof exists. It is marvelous that men will contend for a seventh-day Sabbath for Adam, on a theory unsupported by any command or a single example, and yet refuse to observe the first day of the week with all this evidence before them.

We have avoided the incumbrance of the subject with any other reference to the mention of the first day of the week, until this case is fully considered. The passage in 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2, is worthy of notice in this connection. I give the best, the American Bible Union translation of the passage: "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as I gave order to the Churches of Galatia, so also do ye. On each first day of the week, let every one of you lay by him in store, according as he is prospered, that there may be no collections when I come."

It is contended, by those who would avoid the force of this evidence in favor of the first day of the week, that the expression, "lay by him in store," is evidence that no collection of the Church was had on that day; that, on the contrary, it is proof that each one kept his own money! This would be a strange "collection." The apostle wrote "concerning the collection for the saints," which he wished to have attended to before he came there, that there might "be no collections" when he came. Now, as long as each one kept his money at home, there could be no "collection." *Collect* means to gather, in the sense of, to bring together; and a collection is either the act of collecting, or that which is collected, or a contribution. There are those who hold to collections *by laying money by themselves*, rather than by "contributing to the necessity of the saints." But, by "collections," the apostle meant *the bringing together* what each had laid by him in store; and this was done on each first day of the week. On that day, each person laid by him in store for the collection on each first day of the week, according to his prosperity. What had each first day of the week to do with laying by one's self something for a collection, if no meeting of the contributors was to take place on that day? Why not each one lay his money by himself on any other day of the week, as well as on the first day—say, for instance, on the seventh? Suppose the passage had read: On each seventh day of the week, let every one of you lay by him in store, according as he is prospered, that there be no gathering when I come? How readily it would have been seized as proof of the observance of the seventh day! And it would have been good proof of that fact—far better than any contained in the Old Testament, of a Sabbath for man, till the time of Moses; and yet it is insisted that such an institution did exist!

It may be asked, What obligation are those out of the Church under to observe the first day of the week? To this we reply, that every person to whom the Gospel is preached is under obligation to hear, believe, and obey it. Peter preached to those outside of the Church, on the first Pentecost after the ascension of Jesus; and when they were pierced to the heart, and inquired what they should do, the reply was: "Repent, and be each of you baptized on the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit; for the promise is to you, and to your children, and to all those who are far off, as many as the Lord our God shall

have called. And with many other words did he bear witness and exhort, saying, Save yourselves from this perverse generation. They, therefore, having received his word, were baptized; and on that day there were added about three thousand souls. And they were constantly attending on the teaching of the apostles, and the distribution, and the breaking of bread, and the prayers."

We have seen that the first day of the week was the day on which the disciples met to break bread, and not on the seventh day. It is the duty of all outsiders, who have heard the Gospel, to do just as the primitive disciples did, by apostolic approval. They should not spend the day in recreation, nor in servile work. It should be held sacred to the memory of the suffering Jesus.

The idea that a man is not under obligation to observe some of God's institutions, because he has not obeyed some other command, is unreasonable. Disobedience to one command does not justify disobedience to all, or to any other commands. Every man is bound by the authority of God to believe, to repent, to be immersed on the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, to continue constantly in the apostles' teaching, in the distribution, in the meeting on the first day of the week to break bread, and in the prayers. He has no right to devote that day to servile work, or to merely earthly pleasure. The sufferings of Jesus for our salvation were too severe—his agony on the cross too great—not to be remembered by us, and not to be shown forth at the Lord's-table, in eating, with deepest sympathy and holiest love, the Lord's-supper on the Lord's-day.

"Blessed are those who keep his commandments, that they may have a right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city." (Rev. xxii, 14.)

LITERARY NOTICES.

HOME LITERATURE.

BOOKS.

- 1.—*Physics and Politics*; or, Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of "Natural Selection" and "Inheritance" to Political Society. By WALTER BAGEHOT, Esq. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1873.

IF its title-page does not sufficiently explain the purpose of this book, we may say it seeks, on Darwinian principles, to account for the origin and growth of political communities or nations. It is the second volume of the "International Scientific Series," and it deals with topics much more difficult, and therefore much more controverted, than its predecessor. But little more can be attempted here than to give an outline of the argument.

The researches of recent historical and juridical writers have shown conclusively, that what we are in the habit of calling the patriarchal state of society was once universal. Readers of the Bible get their clearest and vividest ideas of this state, and most of them their only ones, from the chapters of Genesis; though Sir Henry Maine thinks that for the especial purposes of the jurist, the following extract from the "Odyssey" of Homer is the best account of it that he has met with in literature: "They have neither assemblies for consultation nor *themistes*, but every one exercises jurisdiction over his wives and his children, and they pay no regard to one another." Mr. Bagehot well says, "History catches man as he emerges from the patriarchal state." But one can not help asking, Was the patriarchal the earliest social condition of man? If it was not, what was before it? Was there an "original" civilization, or did the early political communities come up from savagery? Mr. Bagehot scouts the idea that there was an original culture, and affirms broadly that all civilized communities have been evolved from the rudest barbarism. In his own words, his argument runs as follows:

"Nothing is more intelligible than the moral deterioration of mankind; nothing than an æsthetic degradation; nothing than a political degradation. But you can not imagine mankind giving up the plain utensils of personal comfort, if they once knew them; still less can you imagine them giving up good weapons—say bows and arrows—if they once knew them. Yet, if there were a primitive civilization, these things *must* have been forgotten; for tribes can be found in every degree of ignorance, and every grade of knowledge

as to pottery, as to the metals, as to the means of comfort, as to the instruments of war. And, what is more, these savages have not failed from stupidity; they are, in various degrees of originality, inventive about these matters. You can not trace the roots of an old perfect system variously maimed and variously dying; you can not find it, as you find the trace of the Latin language in the mediæval dialects."

We need not canvass the merits of this argument, or the merits of the proposition it is intended to prove. Both are totally at variance with the old or theological view of history. Passing by, then, the question whether there was an original culture and a subsequent declension, or whether man started from the rudest conceivable condition, one thing is certain, the civilized people of modern times—the English, the French, the Germans, etc.—as well as the great nations of classical antiquity, have certainly come up from a very low and rude condition; and this one fact is a sufficient postulate for Mr. Bagehot's whole theory of progress. Our author lays out his work thus:

"But what is the problem? Common English, I might perhaps say common civilized thought, ignores it. Our habitual instruction, our ordinary conversation, our inevitable and ineradicable prejudices, tend to make us think that 'Progress' is the normal fact in human society, the fact which we shall expect to see, the fact which we should be surprised if we did not see. But history refutes this. The ancients had no conception of progress; they did not so much as reject the idea; they did not even entertain the idea, Oriental nations are just the same now. Since history began, they have always been what they are. Savages, again, do not improve; they hardly seem to have the basis on which to build, much less the material to put up any thing worth having. Only a few nations, and those of European origin, advance; and yet these think—seem irresistibly compelled to think—such advance to be inevitable, natural, and eternal. Why, then, is this great contrast?"

To many, this will be an unexpected and an unwelcome way of putting the case. To say that stationariness, and not progress, is the normal fact, does not give a very cheerful view to human history. The question is not, therefore, Why do the many remain stationary? but, Why do the few advance? Our author insists that the first step forward is to form a rule of civil life. In his own words:

"The object of such organizations is to create what may be called the *cake* of custom. All the actions of life are to be submitted to a single rule, for a single object; that gradually created the 'hereditary drill' which science teaches to be essential, and which the early instinct of men saw to be essential too. That this *régime* forbids forethought is not an evil, or rather, though an evil, it is the necessary basis for the greatest good; it is necessary for making the mold of civilization, and hardening the soft fiber of early man."

The next step, and one far more difficult to take, is to lay aside this primitive law, or to change it so soon as the needs of the community require. "What is most evident, is not the difficulty of getting a fixed law, but getting out of a fixed law; not of cementing a cake of custom, but of breaking the cake of custom; not of making the first preservative habit, but of breaking through it, and reaching something better." This is the point where so many civilizations have been arrested. "India, Japan,

China, almost every sort of Oriental civilization," says Mr. Bagehot, "though differing in nearly all other things, are in this alike. They look as if they had paused when there was no need for pausing; when a mere observer from without would say they were likely not to pause." Our author presents these two steps in the following well-chosen language:

"The beginning of civilization is marked by an intense legality. That legality is the very condition of its existence, the bond that ties it together; but that legality, that tendency to impose a settled customary yoke upon all men and all actions—if it goes on, kills out the variability planted by nature, and makes different men and different ages fac-similes of other men and other ages, as we see them so often. Progress is only possible in those happy cases where the force of legality has gone far enough to bind the nation together, but not far enough to kill out the varieties and destroy nature's perpetual tendency to change. The point of the solution is not the invention of an imaginary agency, but an assignment of comparative magnitude to two known agencies."

That the principle of legality and the principle of variation are radical elements in progress, no one, whose opinion is of any value, is likely to question. But what is it that leads men to submit themselves to a law, and then to abolish or change it at the right moment? Mr. Bagehot answers, in effect, "Imitation, the principle that leads one man to copy after another." That is, some happy genius discovers a new and improved way of doing things; the superiority of this way is recognized and imitated by the mass; and this results in a new social departure. The inborn tendency to mimic is traced through many departments of life; as, fashion, literature, art, and politics. If the new idea or new method is too remote from the prevailing type of character, it will not command sympathy, and will not be adopted; or if the prevailing type of character is indurated, the idea or method will be equally ineffectual, and society will continue stationary; but if there is room for the play of individual genius, the natural leaders will pioneer the way, and the multitude will follow. The spirit of the age is the spirit of the few persons who lead it; but, to lead it, they must be partially conservative and partially progressive. At all events, they must not be so far in advance of the mass as to be out of sympathy with them.

We reach at last the questions: How explain the geniuses? How do they come to throw out new ideas and suggest new methods? Once more: Why does the multitude, after admiring and imitating one type of character for generations or centuries, suddenly abandon it, and fall to admiring and worshipping another type? These are questions that Mr. Bagehot does not answer; and we submit that, until they are answered, he has not explained progress.

We have read his book throughout with unabated interest. It is somewhat disconnected and fragmentary in form; the argument is conducted on thoroughly naturalistic principles; it assumes that man has got up himself; and it fails to answer the deeply pertinent questions just

propounded: but, at the same time, it abounds in striking and valuable thoughts, in brilliant illustration, and it does throw a great amount of light on the subject discussed. We commend it to all whose studies fit them to grasp its argument, as well worth study.

2.—*Mmeoir of Samuel Joseph May.* Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1873.

THE subject of this Memoir was born in 1797, and died, in a ripe old age, in 1871. In his nineteenth year, while a junior in Harvard College, he resolved to devote himself to the ministry. This resolution he carried into effect, and he continued to be a laborious minister to the close of his life. He was thoroughly Unitarian in theology, but belonged rather to what would now be called the conservative or evangelical wing of the Unitarian body. He thought the Bible "the best of books," but held that it contained "many words that could never have come by inspiration of the pure, benevolent, and holy God." He, therefore, "often wished that we had an expurgated Bible." Dissent as the reader may from this view of inspiration, or from Mr. May's theological opinions as a whole, he can not fail to fall in love with Mr. May as a man. One can not help feeling toward him as Mr. May felt toward Mr. Garrison the first time he heard the latter gentleman lecture on slavery: "Mr. Garrison, I am not sure that I can indorse all that you have said this evening. Much of it requires careful consideration. But I am prepared to embrace you." Few men have had a nobler nature, a purer heart, more sweetness of disposition, or a more fearless and devoted spirit than Samuel Joseph May.

Mr. May's life was exceedingly laborious. He was a parish minister for more than forty years. And, in addition, he labored incessantly in the great reforms of his generation. His efforts in the cause of education, temperance, and antislavery, were tireless, and of the greatest value. Besides, he devoted himself to some movements of more questionable utility. He was a thorough-going non-resistant. Being thoroughly "persuaded that never will our governments be happily and wisely administered until we have mothers as well as fathers of the State," he naturally espoused the Woman's Rights movement. More than all, he was untiring in deeds of private sympathy and benevolence. He was the friend of man, without regard to race or color or condition. One who well knew his manner of life said to him: "I have found a new name for you. You are the Lord's chore-boy." When advancing age compelled him to resign his pastorate at Syracuse, some of his people demurred, saying, "We would rather have Mr. May sit in the pulpit, and only smile upon us, than to hear the most eloquent sermons from any other preacher."

The Memoir is composed of an autobiographical sketch left by Mr.

May, of extracts from his diaries and letters, and of supplementary materials furnished by an unknown hand. It is well worth reading for the light it throws on the history of the period, and especially for its moral stimulus.

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- 3.—*The Lost Found, and the Wanderer Welcomed.* By WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, D. D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1873. 12mo. pp. 170.

THIS is an average book of its kind. It contains nothing original or very profound; but it is well studied, and wrought out with considerable ability. It seems to us that there is rather too much detail for strong and impressive pictures; still the book is well calculated to awaken the sinner to a sense of his danger, and lead him to consider Him who is the way, the truth, and the life. We can not fail to notice one prominent defect, and we do this because it is so common with writers of Dr. Taylor's style of rhetoric. In considering the case of the lost piece of silver, the doctor is very careful to inform us that "it was a coin," and then that "the coin was lost," and then "the coin, though lost, has still a value;" and, furthermore, that "this coin was lost in the house." Now, what all this can have to do with the analogy in the Savior's mind, is wholly beyond our comprehension. Jesus was illustrating the interest which the great Father feels in those that are lost, and he might have used any other substance to which we attach a value, just as well as a piece of money. In point of fact, he does vary the illustration. The case of the lost sheep is really more forcible than that of the coin. Now, to carry out the doctor's method of treatment, we should remind the reader that *it was a sheep*, and that *the sheep was lost*; and that *the sheep, though lost, has yet a value*; and, furthermore, that *this sheep was lost in the barn-yard*. We hope this will be sufficient to show the utter absurdity of such unnatural conceits as are indulged in by the class of writers and speakers referred to. Christ did not play upon words; his mission was too earnest for that; and those who use his words should not strain them into unnatural meanings.

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- 4.—*Woman Man's Equal.* By Rev. THOMAS WEBSTER, D. D. With an Introduction by BISHOP SIMPSON. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. 1873. 16mo. pp. 297.

THE woman question is evidently one of the live questions of the day. Say what we will, this question, like Banquo's ghost, will not "down." Just now it is receiving a new interest from a calmer and more philosophical discussion of the whole subject. Several books have recently been issued from the press bearing upon the question, while very few of our periodicals and journals fail to contribute something of value to the general

stock of literature which is rapidly accumulating on the woman question. Several articles have already appeared in the *QUARTERLY*. One of unusual value will be found in the present number.

The volume before us is a brave and manly discussion, but is altogether too radical for most thinkers at the present writing. Most of the premises of this book might be readily admitted, and yet it is difficult to see why the general conclusion must necessarily follow. No one will likely question many of the points of equality pointed out; but it happens that these points are not the real ones in controversy. That men and women are equal in all respects, is a proposition so absurd that the most enthusiastic advocate of Woman's Rights would not affirm it. Now, it is just here where careful discrimination is needed. Because men and women have equal capabilities for the study of geography, it does not follow that they are equal as practical machinists, or that they have equal ability in executive administration. Husband and wife are said to be one; but we know that, in an important sense, they are not one. Each has a separate personality and a well-defined individuality. Let us, then, carefully determine what are the points at issue, and much of the logomachy which burdens the discussion will be easily disposed of. Bating this evident want of discrimination, Dr. Webster's book is a valuable contribution on the question of which it treats, and will be read with more than ordinary interest by those who are seeking to give woman her true place in social, political, and religious affairs.

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- 5.—*California: For Health, Pleasure, and Residence. A Book for Travelers and Settlers.* By CHARLES NORDHOFF. New York: Harper Bros. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1873. 8vo. pp. 255.

THIS is a sketchy book, and is interesting to the general reader, as well as to those who are seeking information concerning the land of which it treats. The author evidently has faith in California. He thinks that "there, and there only, on this planet, the traveler and resident may enjoy the delights of the tropics, without their penalties; a mild climate, not enervating, but healthful and health-restoring; a wondrously and variously productive soil, without tropical malaria; the grandest scenery, with perfect security and comfort in traveling arrangements; strange customs, but neither lawlessness nor semi-barbarism." One or two more items, and this earthly paradise would be complete; but we forbear lest we might spoil the picture. We confess that we have no very great faith in these splendid dream-lands. We have traveled some, and have yet to realize the expectation which such books as Mr. Nordhoff's inspires. In such delightful El Dorados, there will always be found a good deal of mud, rain, horrid mosquitoes, centipedes, and ugly human nature. Many of the attractions of

California owe their existence entirely to the sharp points of contrast between that climate, with its natural accompaniments, and ours. But, we opine, a ten-years' residence in that land would enable most people to rectify their first judgments. Notwithstanding all we have said, we do not doubt that California is a great country, nor do we doubt the substantial correctness of our author's delineations. The book contains much valuable information, and, as it is beautifully illustrated and handsomely printed, the man would be dull indeed who would not be interested in a perusal of its pages.

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- 6.—*The Marble Prophecy, and Other Poems.* By J. G. HOLLAND. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 1872. 16mo. pp. 112.

THE leading poem of this volume is suggested by the celebrated marble statue, Laocoön, to be seen in the Vatican Museum, at Rome. The conclusion reached is, that even now

"Humanity is writhing in the toils
Of the old monsters, as it writhed of old;
And there is neither help nor hope in her."

Pagan and Christian Rome are sharply contrasted, with no very great advantage in favor of the latter. The poem is in Dr. Holland's best vein, and will be alternately cursed and blessed as it chances to fall into the hands of this or that reader. The critics are, certainly, sufficiently divided concerning the doctor's merits as a poet; but if the popularity of his works is to be taken as an index, it is clear the people think that he will do. Some of the minor poems in this volume are worthy of an immortality. "Gradation" is not only good poetry, but good sense. "Returning Clouds" is an exquisite little gem. "A Christmas Carol" is, we think, the best thing of the kind in our language. "Where shall the baby's dimple be?" is a beautiful conceit, but leaves the mind somewhat disappointed: the passing from the ideal to the real is entirely too abrupt; still, it will be numbered among the best of the shorter poems.

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- 7.—*Spiritualism and Necromancy.* By Rev. A. B. MORRISON, of the Southern Illinois Conference. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. 1873. 16mo. pp. 203.

SPIRITUALISM has its foundation in our love for the mysterious, and our insatiable curiosity to know that which is not knowable. A patent-medicine man almost invariably calls his nostrum by some unpronounceable name. This at once invests it with a mysterious charm, and this gives it a passport with the masses. Every one knows that fortune-tellers are arrant humbugs; and yet there are thousands of respectable people who seek from

these miserable pretenders to peer into the future of their lives. Spiritualism, taking advantage of these known conditions of human nature, sometimes makes followers of those who ought to have more sense than to be led astray by such shallow nonsense. Notwithstanding this, we do not believe that Spiritualism is likely to produce much effect upon the world. We do not believe that it has one-tenth of the followers claimed for it. Recently, a National Spiritual Convention was held in this city, and the number of delegates in attendance at one time was never more than fifty, and these were generally half-crazy fanatics who had neither character nor influence. Mr. Morrison's book is a popular treatment of the subject. It is evidently intended for general use. Many of the arguments are clearly and forcibly put, and the work, as a whole, will do good among the class of readers for whom it is mainly intended.

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- 8.—*Lectures on Light*. Delivered in the United States in 1872-3. By JOHN TYNDALL, LL. D., F. R. S., Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Royal Institution. With an Appendix. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1873. 16mo. pp. 194.

WE need do but very little more than announce the publication of this volume. Professor Tyndall has become so well known to American readers that his works need no introduction to commend them to popular favor. These lectures, however, have special claims upon our people. They were delivered during Professor Tyndall's recent visit to this country, and were prepared for the press mainly for American consumption. The subject of these lectures is certainly not very well suited for stunning effect before a popular audience; hence, any thing like the sensational is excluded. And yet there is such unaffected simplicity in the style, such apt and ample illustration, such originality of treatment, and such perfect knowledge of all the facts relating to the subject, that these lectures are not only highly instructive, but, when delivered to audiences in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, were received with every evidence of popular interest. In their present form, they will be welcomed by a host of readers.

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- 9.—*Interlinear Translation of the New Testament*, with Grammatical and Critical Notes. By Dr. LEONARD TAFEL. Vol. I. Philadelphia: L. H. Tafel. London: David Nutt.

WE have already noticed a volume of this work in the Hebrew text, comprising a portion of the book of Genesis. With this volume we are not so well pleased. It seems to us to be neither desirable nor possible to make the Greek Testament intelligible to English readers. A little

familiarity with the Greek alphabet will enable almost any one to read the Greek of the New Testament with the aid of this Interlinear Translation. The work is certainly cleverly done, and the printing is almost faultless. To those who wish the study of Greek to come easy, this book will be a welcome friend. Still, we doubt the propriety of selling such a glorious language at such cheap rates. The volume embraces twenty-four chapters of Matthew's Gospel.

- 10.—*The Parting Words of Adolphe Monod to His Friends and the Church*, October, 1855, to March, 1856. Translated from the fifth Paris Edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1873. 12mo. pp. 205.

THE interest of this work consists in its associations rather than in its intrinsic value. Adolphe Monod was one of the most eloquent preachers of France, and these parting words—delivered in his sick-room, to his friends and the Church—will be highly prized for the sake of their author. The lectures themselves are not of very much value. They all breathe an earnest Christian spirit, and inculcate an ardent piety; but they contain very little else of any particular value. In fact, if they were the lectures of some obscure preacher, they would not likely have any considerable run. But as the matter stands, however, this volume will find a hearty reception among a large class of readers.

- 11.—*A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of Matthew*, for the use of Bible-classes and Sabbath-schools. By JOHN J. OWENS, D. D., LL. D. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 1873. 12mo. pp. 415.

MESSRS. SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG & CO. have published three volumes, with a view to the wants of Sunday-school teachers in elucidating the International Lessons on Matthew. These are, Lange on Matthew, Dr. Alexander, and Owen. Lange has been reduced in size, by leaving out much superfluous matter to the ordinary student, while both the other volumes are well suited to the purposes for which they are published.

- 12.—*Wonders of the Yellowstone*. Edited by JAMES RICHARDSON. Illustrated with seventeen Engravings. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1873. 16mo. pp. 256.

JUST now, this Yellowstone region is the great excitement. It has only been a little while since any thing trustworthy was known concerning this wonder-land, and even now it is comparatively unexplored. The recent expedition of Stanley will doubtless add something to our stock of knowledge, and will serve to intensify the public interest in our prospective

National Park. The volume before us is timely. It gives the reader a sufficient knowledge of the country to enable him to understand why every body is just now wishing to see it. Bills have already passed our National Legislature, setting apart this "crown of the continent" for the purposes of a National Park, to be held free to all people, for all time. In the present volume we have the history of the discovery of this country, together with an account of some of the most thrilling adventures on record. The story of Mr. Everett's "Thirty-seven Days of Peril" is one of the most remarkable and thrilling experiences that we have ever read, and is not only deeply interesting as a narrative, but is also highly suggestive as a psychological study.

FOREIGN LITERATURE.

BOOKS.

- 1.—*Staat und Kirche. Betrachtungen zur Lage Deutschlands in der Gegenwart.* (State and Church. Considerations on the Present Condition of Germany. By Dr. FRIEDERICH FABRI.) Gotha: F. A. Perthos. 1872. 8vo. pp. 158.

GERMANY, or rather Prussia (for its will and authority are supreme, and what has been done, has been done at its motion and for its sake), has carried off two great victories against two ancient and great foes—Austria and France. The world looks at Prussia with wonder and admiration; and, since the last great war, the intoxication of these great successes has triumphed over every thing else in the hearts of its people. "All weakness is gone; every enemy is subdued; we are in every direction invincible; nothing is before us but a future of victory, virtue, prosperity, and glory." Such is the sum and the interpretation of the general voice of the Prusso-German people, from kaiser to beggar. A wild delirium of joy and confidence sings, on every hand, trisagions and pæans to German unity and fraternity, German invincibility, German virtue, German piety, German learning, German glory, and German superiority among the nations. But in this, Prussia does only what any other nation would most likely have done in its place.

But the great victories, the indemnity of milliards, the establishment of the New Empire, are developing consequences and conditions, in the heart of the Empire, that are more and more perplexing its astutest statesmen, and are awakening the most serious alarms in the minds of the thoughtful of the German people. The causes of these perplexities and alarms are various.

First, it seems that an awful tide of demoralization is sweeping over the nation, the consequence of events. One of the most eminent preachers in

Berlin—pastor of the Church of St. Matthew—at a late pastoral conference in that city, said:

“The war with France has brought us much glory and many millions; but it has also plunged us into the grossest materialism; and of all this glory and of all these millions, the Church has only received—thanks to the munificence of his majesty—a canon.”

In the published circular of the Consistory of the Province of Brandenburg (embracing Berlin), it is declared that—

“The symptoms of a general moral decay are multiplying in a frightful manner. On all sides are heard the complaints that the family ties are becoming more and more lax, the relations between masters and servants are becoming more and more troublesome, the spirit of day-laborers and the working population is growing worse, and that the eager passion for wealth and the grosser pleasures is alarmingly increasing. The purity of manners is sinking from year to year among the youth; the number of illegitimate births is increasing; intemperance, instead of disappearing, thinks only of varying its enjoyments.”

Finally, the *Neue Zeitblatt*, of Hanover, adds to this citation the following observations:

“During and after the war the moral and pure character of the Germans has been continually extolled. When the ministers of the Gospel preached the necessity of repentance and conversion, they were charged with being traitors to the Father-land. The war and German unity have been glorified as having given birth to great virtues. Christianity, the Church, and its ministers have been spoken of as so much venerable old rubbish, which it is best to get rid of once for all. Whence, then, comes this rapid and frightful moral decay of our people? Where are the heroes ready to conquer this new and terrible enemy, and to prepare for it its day of Sedan? Our independence, our national unity,—will they not end in plunging us into the gulf where all our vain boastings will disappear, together with ourselves?”

Earnest voices from all parts of the New Germany bring us the same terrible tidings, and sound the same loud trumpet-notes of alarm. Before these wars, things were bad enough, in a moral sense, in Germany; and if there has been since “a rapid and frightful decay,” what must it be now? This is one of the alarming, disastrous consequences of these wars—even wars of “glorious victories.”

But there are others that are becoming more and more threatening to the peace and unity of the land. We leave the purely political questions aside. The questions that are now exciting, to the highest degree, the minds and passions of the people, and harassing and confounding more and more the statesmanship of the New Empire, are those concerning the relations of State and Church. The history of Germany in the centuries past will lead us easily to understand what moment these questions have in Germany; here is the fatal rock on which Germany has more than once split. The excitement on these questions, *on all sides*, is tremendous, and is growing fiercer day by day. If the New Empire can meet and steer successfully through this tempest, the most terrible moment of which has not yet come, it will do miracles of statesmanship. It is this question of Church and State, in its present conditions in Germany, that the able author of this *brochure* discusses. He states the character and condition of

the parties regarding it, and their aims ; the difficulties surrounding it ; and, finally, proposes a solution. He has made "the great question" a subject, evidently, of thorough study ; and this is not the only voice he has sent forth among his people. His pamphlet on "The Present Ecclesiastico-political Questions" has been for some time before the public of Germany, and this present work has already passed through its third edition. In the opening of the Preface, he says :

"For the last half-year [he wrote in 1871], in conferences and assemblies, in lectures and *brochures*, the question has been discussed, how, from the great late events, a permanent blessing may be gained for the German Evangelical Church. Surely, an important and interesting theme. But another one seems to us to be yet more urgent,—the question, how the embarrassments are to be met into which the political changes in Germany have brought our Evangelical Church ; how the dangers of the established ecclesiastico-political condition are to be averted, and how the problems involved in it are to be solved.

"With this question the following treatise has to do. It seems to us the inevitable, urgent, primary question. On its solution will it depend whether the great political events of these last days will really be a blessing to us, or whether they will bring about the destruction of our hitherto-existing Evangelical Church Establishment—an alternative that few seem yet seriously to have considered. For it is almost universally assumed that the fullness of the political power of the New German Empire must necessarily also bring about a regeneration of the state of our German Evangelical Church. No one can desire this more earnestly than the author of this treatise. But according to what logic this conclusion is accepted as a necessary one, he can not discover ; for really the testimony of history is generally against it. The great epochs of political and religious movements seldom coincide. Thus it is—to take a very late example—an undeniable fact that the results of the year 1866 have only made the state of our German Evangelical Church more difficult and confused."

Such candid, serious words as these are now forced from the hearts of earnest men—unwillingly perhaps—in Germany, every-where, and more and more.

Our author tells us, what every one well versed in the present state of Germany well knows, that the remedy which the German Imperial Government has adopted to meet the immense and increasing difficulties of the State and Church relations, by the extreme measure of *authority*, of making its dominion over the religious affairs most complete and oppressive, is unwise and disastrous. The daily more and more embarrassing and threatening conditions of the Catholic Church in Germany are thus met, by the Government ruling it more completely and imperiously ; and, by *consequence*, the Protestant Church is subjected to the same. That this is the extreme and most dangerous resort, and that can not, especially at this day, long endure, our author sees, as does all clear-sighted men. The dread of religious freedom, based on the principle of *religious individualism*—that is, regarding religion as the affair of the individual, and leaving it there respected and unmolested—is the *mal de peur*, the fatal fear malady of these governments. They can not trust men ; the government must eternally interfere, and govern, govern, govern, every thing to death ; and so govern all manhood and conscience and religion out of men. These monarchs and their men

fear that, to let religion take care of itself—without *cultus, ministers, cabinet, decrees*, to take care of the Church, educate to their purpose and appoint pastors—would lead to universal irreligion. Our author points to England, and especially to America, to show that this fear is groundless. The *ecclesiastical bureaucracy*, which our author says is a thing peculiar to Germany, is the curse of that country; and the sooner it goes to the bottom, the better. Our author thinks that the tendency of things is, by inevitable necessity, to a separation of Church and State—the idea uttered by the Bavarian Prime Minister in 1871.

It is painful to see how imperfect and confused are yet, in Germany, the ideas concerning the true relations of Church and State. One thing must strike every mind familiar with German habits in that direction; and that is, that, with all parties, politics, and religion are always mixed together. The radical liberals, such as we have them, as the general representatives of Germany here in America, can not talk or write, in books or newspapers, without constantly mixing these things together. It will be a long time yet, ere the German mind is freed from this evil confusion of ages.

This book of our author is but one of a numerous literature, daily increasing, which the politico-religious troubles of the New German Empire are calling forth. No man can tell what the end of all this will be, or what troubles and disasters are yet in store for Germany from this prolific fountain of evil. The remedy Bismarck has adopted—a more crushing, iron grip on the Churches—is the worst that could be imagined; it must prove fatal. It is not only the Catholic, but also the Protestant, Church that is becoming recalcitrant, and refuses obedience. The former is rallying and uniting all its members to the extremest resistance; its union and its resistance are absolute. One of the Catholic deputies declared in the Reichstage: "Continue to make these Draconian laws; I tell you, you can not execute them, and we will never submit to them."

May the day soon come—predicted by many as not far off—of the separation of Church and State in Germany, and in every other country where the unholy alliance still exists. *And may the day, too, soon come*—for it is not yet, as a general fact—that Protestant America may see and understand the state of things in Germany better; and, instead of glorifying this bad imperial policy of eternally *governing* the Church, and fulsomely adulating these rulers—as the Methodist General Conference has lately done through Dr. Schaff—rather send forth a unanimous, thundering voice: "Let religion and religious consciences alone, and 'let the people go.'" This alone would be consistent and worthy of us—more American, and more effectual for truth and right, than laying these congratulatory addresses humbly at the feet of these monarchs, whose ideal and passion is to sit with their ponderous weight on the top of Church and State.

- 2.—*Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament.* Von EBERHARD SCHRADER, *Doctor der Theologie und der Philosophie, etc., nebst Chronologischen Beilagen, einem Glossar und 2 Karten.* (The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament. By EBERHARD SCHRADER, Doctor of Theology and Philosophy, etc. With Chronological Supplements, a Glossary, and two Maps.) Giessen: J. Ricker. 1872. 12mo. pp. 385.

THE wonderful results of the discovery and deciphering, in our own day, of the Assyrian inscriptions, are already well known and recognized by the world. The vast amount of light these throw on the remote history of that vast territory once embraced in the Old Assyrian Empire, and especially on the history of the Old Testament, from the days of Moses to the latest prophet, is incalculable. The believer in the Bible has special reason to rejoice in the remarkable confirmation that these ancient records, for so many ages buried in the earth and silent, but now in this late age raised from the dead, give to the truth of the sacred history. Silent, but imperishable, these books of hard alabaster and brick, these libraries and records of the ancient Assyrian monarchs, lay in the dust of the earth, waiting to be called forth by the voice of God in his wonderful providence, a host of witnesses so strange and so unlooked-for, to rebuke the folly and pride of hostile unbelief in God's Holy Word. This extraordinary fact teaches the Christian, too, to be unshaken in his faith, and undismayed at the many assaults made with such fierceness on the foundations of our faith. A breath of God, and they will come miserably to naught.

A most astonishing feature of the history of this great discovery is the complete mastery which the patient skill of study has gained in deciphering these inscriptions. In the Preface, our author says:

"The deciphering of the Assyrian-Babylonian cuneiform* inscriptions has been examined and mastered in its fundamental principles. The language of the inscriptions is now, in its nature, understood and determined. The point of time, we believe, is now come when we can take the sickle in hand, and reap the ripe harvest. This harvest is one unusually rich and surprising above all in relation to ancient civilization and history. Our views hitherto of the current of the history of the Orient in the pre-Achæmenidian times are, in many respects, modified; to some extent entirely overthrown. A series of entirely unexpected events have been revealed to us. As may be readily understood, the lion's share of these discoveries falls to the Old Testament; and it is time to begin the work of applying the results of the deciphering of these inscriptions in its behalf. This work, however, is not to be done by at once furnishing the public, eager for novelties, elegant details of the Assyrian-Israelitish history. We must first of all gather together the building-stones themselves, from which later a firm edifice is to be erected; and these stones must be carefully cut, and most thoroughly examined as to their solidity. This certainly, but nothing more, is, as far as our strength shall go, the object of the following pages. Guided by the Old Testament, we shall wander through the palaces of Nimrūd-chalah, Kuyyundschik (Nineveh), and of the city of Sargon, climb the ruin-hills of Babylon, and uncover the tombs of Warka and Mugheir. What the alabaster slabs,

*So called from their wedge-shaped form.

bricks, and clay cylinders contain relative to the Old Testament, will be collected, and, in the original text, translated, and, if necessary, explained. In this way we shall be saved from all attempts at history-making. It is not our purpose to remove, at any cost, discrepancies between the Bible and the cuneiform inscriptions, least of all to cover them up. If an unconstrained solution offers itself, we shall not pass it by. But a thousand times rather shall we concede a discrepancy that appears, and for the solution of which the present material is not yet sufficient, than violently conceal it, either by modifying the Bible or breaking the monuments."

As to the last remark, the spirit of truth allows no other course. To hide, to distort, in one word, to lie, for the Bible and for God, "supposing that we are thereby doing God service," is a sin, and opposed to the Bible in its entire spirit and all its precepts. The truth only loses thereby; "no such help, no such defenders, it needs."

From the rich treasures of this volume, we can only give here a few examples.

In one of these inscriptions we find a very clear reference to the tower of Babel, mentioned Genesis xi. The translation of the passage is as follows:

"The temple of the foundation of the earth, the tower of Babel, I erected and I finished, and of tiles and of copper as a cover, I placed upon it its top."

And again:

"We proclaim this: The temple of the seven luminaries of the earth, the tower of Borsippa, which a former king had erected—its measure is forty-two cubits—but whose top he had not completed, had for many days been in ruins. No proper care had been given to the canals to guide away the water from it. Rain and storms had carried away its bricks; the tiles of its covering had been broken. The bricks of the building itself have been washed away into heaps of ruins. The great god, Merodach, excited my mind to restore it. I did not injure its place; I did not change its foundation walls. In a month of salvation, on a favorable day [time], I restored the bricks of its structure, and the tiles of its roof into a firmly united work. I renewed its beams, and fixed my name into the crown of its restored walls. To complete it, and to set it on its roof, I lifted up my hand. As of old it was founded, so I builded up [the tower], as in those days I completed the top."

Such is a record from the days of Nebuchadnezzar. The author adds:

"What is revealed by this memorable inscription? Certainly this: that in Borsippa, close by Babylon, there was a very ancient building which is identical with the present Birs-Nimrūd (eighty-four feet high), but whose top had not been completed to the time of Nebuchadnezzar. This top this king added to the height of eighty-four feet, raising up the whole structure in the tower form to a height which, even in its ruins, yet measures one hundred and fifty-three and one-half English feet. Until the time of Nebuchadnezzar, the edifice must have made the impression of an altogether unfinished work."

Concerning the making of bricks (Gen. xi, 3), our author observes:

"It is a remarkable coincidence that the Assyrians and Babylonians designate, both the bricks dried in the air and the process of making bricks, by identically the same words as the Hebrews. The sun-dried brick (in contrast to the burned tiles, *agurru*) is in Assyrian called (in the construct state) *libnat*, answering precisely to the Hebrew *lebenah*. The act of making bricks the Assyrians express by the verb *laban*, same as Hebrew. (See Gen. xi, 3.)"

Many important historical facts in Old Testament history are fully confirmed, and very often cleared up in many obscure points and difficulties. A long list of Biblical names, both Assyrian and Hebrew, as well as of other nations mentioned in the Old Testament, occur in these inscriptions.

Many peculiar forms of expression in the Hebrew Scriptures, and many special words, and whose etymology in Hebrew is sometimes hidden or obscure, are met with in these wonderful records.

"It is noteworthy," says our author, "that the old Semitic word *tehōm* (Gen. i, 2, translated *deep*; that is, abyss of waters), which in the remaining Semitic languages is no longer used, and even in Hebrew is found only in the higher style, is in the Assyrian the usual word for *sea*; and that, too, in the feminine form *tihāmtu*, which appears also in the Hebrew in the plural *tehomoth*. (Ex. xv, 5.)"

In this connection, we may also note the word *Hiddekel* (name of one of the rivers of Paradise), an unusual *quadrilateral* form, in Hebrew. The prefix *hi* has given rise to much conjecture in the Hebrew, as it is not met with in the Aramaic, Arabic, nor even Persian form of the name of the Tigris. But in the inscriptions, this very prefix is sometimes met with, *idiglat*, with the feminine ending *at*, the *i* being equivalent in Assyrian to *hi*.

On Gen. iv, 2, of the name *Hebel* (Abel), our author says:

"*Hebel* (Abel), name of the second son of Adam, has, on Hebrew ground, no satisfactory derivation. The traditional reference of the name to the Hebrew word for *breath* (*hebel*, breath, vanity), has against it not only the unfitness of this meaning, but also the circumstance that in that case the name in question is out of all analogy with the other names of the first men, which were evidently originally 'family names,' that is, names denoting family relations. Thus, Adam denotes 'man' in general; Eve (*Haova*), 'mother'; Cain, 'shoot,' 'sprout'; Seth, the same; Enoch, finally, 'man.' We would expect also a similar appellation for the second son of Adam, and this we reach when we look to the Assyrian, in which *habal-hablu* is the usual word for *son*. The word appears very frequently in proper names; for example, in the name of the builder of the north-west palace at Nimrūd-chalah, *Asur-nasir-habal*—'Asur protects the son'; in the name of the father of Nebuchadnezzar, *Nabu-habal-usur*—'Nebo, protect the son.' Also, in the name of (at least during a part of his reign) the mightiest of all Assyrian kings, the lover and protector of the arts, *Asur-bani-habal*—'Asur created the son'; which name, in Greek mutation, appears as Sardanapalus."

The author, beginning with the first of Genesis, notes every word and passage to the end of the Old Testament that are in any way illustrated in the cuneiform inscriptions. To any one competent to the task, and loving solid study, this volume must be most welcome. There is a strange charm in reading, by the side of the very ancient Oriental records of the Hebrew Scriptures, these also ancient Oriental monuments of the old Assyrian kings. To superficial students, who seek only for the light and evanescent in literature, for books that are born multitudinous and easy as insects, and which are small and short-lived as these, this book has no charms; we do not recommend it to them.

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